131. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan
  • Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba
  • Hidetoshi Ukawa, Chief, Second North American Section, American Affairs Bureau, MOFA (Interpreter)
  • President Richard Nixon
  • Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Council [Affairs]
  • Mr. James J. Wickel, American Embassy, Tokyo (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

  • Prime Minister Tanaka’s Call on President Nixon

The President greeted the Prime Minister at the entrance to the Kuilima Hotel and escorted him up to his suite on the sixth floor.

After the press photographers had taken pictures and departed, the Prime Minister began the conversation by thanking the President for his kind invitation to this meeting in Hawaii. Even before receiving it, he said, he had been planning to call on the President at the earliest opportunity after organizing his new government. He thanked the President again for the invitation.

The Prime Minister then conveyed a personal message of appreciation from HIM The Emperor to the President and Mrs. Nixon for greeting him in Anchorage during the stopover there on his trip to Europe last year. During his audience with HIM The Emperor prior [Page 474] to departing for Honolulu, the Prime Minister said HIM The Emperor asked that he also convey to the President his own heartfelt desire that the cordial and friendly relations between Japan and the United States be further strengthened.

The Prime Minister also conveyed respects on behalf of former Prime Minister Sato, as well as his heartfelt appreciation to the President for effecting the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Sato hopes to find an opportunity before too long, he added, to visit Washington and thank the President personally.

The President said that he would be pleased to welcome former Prime Minister Sato to Washington as an old friend any time that he would find convenient to come.

The Prime Minister thanked him for this response.

The President asked that his own warmest regards and respect be conveyed to HIM The Emperor. Now that the invitation has been extended and accepted he said that he looks forward to welcoming HIM The Emperor to Washington on an official state visit whenever a mutually convenient time can be worked out through the appropriate channels.

In connection with the subject of visits, the President added, after the elections, at some time during the coming year he hoped also to welcome the Prime Minister on a visit to Washington.

If this appeared to be a great many visits, the President explained, it underscored the necessity for continuing to have constant contacts between the leaders of both nations not just as official duties but also because of the deep friendship between both countries.

The Prime Minister agreed enthusiastically.

The President noted that while the Prime Minister’s plane was landing last evening, he recalled his own several trips to Japan, many of which were made during the 1960s, while he was out of office. He also recalled having the opportunity to know personally five Prime Ministers of Japan, including Prime Minister Tanaka. He saw Prime Minister Yoshida in Japan in 1953, followed by Prime Ministers Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato, and now Prime Minister Tanaka. He recalled feeling that his personal friendship for Japanese Prime Ministers is not exceeded in our relations with any other country.

The Prime Minister said that he understood this feeling.

The President emphasized that he feels it most important for both countries that the chiefs of state of each meet, and said that he would welcome the opportunity.

The President explained that former Prime Minister Sato, in addition to his official contacts, had a personal channel of communication with Dr. Kissinger through a representative of his own choosing. He [Page 475] hoped that the Prime Minister would wish also to maintain such contact.

The Prime Minister said that he agreed completely. He expressed appreciation that Dr. Kissinger came to Karuizawa to consult with him recently about this visit.2

Recalling the warm reception accorded by the President at his villa in San Clemente in January,3 the Prime Minister expressed pleasure at being able to meet the President again so soon, not only for official talks but also because of the personal friendship involved. He stressed his belief in the necessity for constant communication. All Japanese, he said, know and appreciate the fact that the President is the first one born on the Pacific coast, and the fact that he feels so close to Japan.

The Prime Minister noted that it is generally said that former Prime Ministers Ikeda and Sato are products of the “Yoshida school,” but he pointed out that he entered the “Yoshida school” one year earlier than either of them.4 Sato, he said, was elected to the Diet nine times, and Ikeda ten times, as he himself has been, despite the difference in their ages. Ikeda was his senior by eight years and Sato by seventeen. Nevertheless, he said, all shared in the same general flow of thought in Japan, having been nurtured in the “Yoshida school.” Yoshida stressed that Japan’s relations with the United States and the United Kingdom were of the utmost importance to his foreign policy for Japan.

The Prime Minister recalled being driven by the President in a golf cart from the Western White House to Casa Pacifica and said that he feels he should learn to drive a golf cart so he can welcome the President in the same style.

The President said that golf carts are easy to drive, and safe, and save walking on the golf course.

The Prime Minister then recalled telling Dr. Kissinger recently that constant contact, both official and unofficial, is very important.

Dr. Kissinger noted that the Prime Minister said this is important in both the political and economic fields.

The Prime Minister recalled, in connection with economics, that he also said Japan must have a strong American economy. The fundamental view of the GOJ is that American prosperity means Japanese prosperity. While the current economic problems could not be resolved [Page 476] in one move, he expressed the belief that constant communication, with meetings between officials and experts every month if necessary, while keeping watch on long-term trends would lead to a smooth solution satisfactory to both sides.

The President noted that one of the reasons he appointed Ambassador Ingersoll is that we need in Japan a businessman with a good economic background. The Prime Minister, he noted, has not only achieved success in business but has the further qualification of having served as Finance Minister and Minister of International Trade and Industry.

The Prime Minister said that he appreciated the appointment of Ambassador Ingersoll, who could foresee problems in all aspects of the relationship, not just economic ones. It was, he said, a happy choice, since he is an expert in economic affairs. The Prime Minister said that he knew Ambassador Ingersoll many years before, having met him through David Kennedy, when he was still head of Continental Illinois. He noted that he had, as Finance Minister some years ago, approved the establishment of Continental Illinois’ branches in Tokyo and Kobe.

The Prime Minister cautioned that trade negotiations through government channels only tended to develop into item-by-item negotiations, and pointed out that it is more effective to have consultations between specialists, with a view toward expansion of long-term balanced trade to the mutual advantage of both countries. Therefore, he appreciated the fact that Ambassador Ingersoll does not confine himself to official contacts with himself and the Foreign Minister, but also speaks broadly to the business community in Japan, which understands him so well.

The President said that he knows negotiations to resolve the great imbalance in our trade are difficult. He is glad to hear there is some progress. He also understood that the counterparts are discussing the technical points in the other meeting. He emphasized that a skilled and experienced politician would understand that the present trade imbalance might appear to be advantageous to Japan, but if allowed to grow could lead to rising protectionism in the Congress. We should understand, he said, that it is in our mutual interest to resolve this trade imbalance as much as possible so as to prevent any move toward restriction issues, but rather to provide for freer trade, which is in the interest of both Japan and the United States, which are great economic powers. He realized that some Japanese businessmen, like our own, would tend to take a negative attitude toward any actions taken which they thought would result in a detriment to their own short-range interests. However, in viewing the long-term, he stressed that we as political leaders must create conditions which encourage the reduction of barriers. This, he said, we can do only if the members of the Diet [Page 477] and of our own Congress are convinced of the long-term interest to both countries of redressing the balance. Japan’s businessmen and manufacturers are competitive and efficient, he said, and our own businessmen and manufacturers have that reputation. Therefore, we should welcome competition, and as political leaders he said both of us should do all we can to see that barriers are not raised. Therefore the GOJ moves to reduce the present trade imbalance would have, he believed, a salutary effect on both public opinion and in the Congress.

The Prime Minister said that an excessive imbalance in trade did not serve either nation, and is undesirable. Therefore, he wished to do his best to reduce the current imbalance. Japan would make specific efforts to reduce the imbalance, in order to continue to benefit from expanding trade. However, he did not believe this matter could be solved in half a year, or a year. Having served as Minister of Finance some three years, as an LDP policy-maker, and also as Minister of International Trade and Industry for a year, he felt he is qualified as an expert. While in office, therefore, he said he wishes to bring about an “ideal situation.” While continuing to consult between governments, he said the Government of Japan would also continue its efforts to persuade business to accept necessary measures. The Prime Minister added that the President’s term of office is four years, but his own term as LDP President is only three.

The President said that he is young, the youngest to serve as a Minister and also to serve as Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that he was also the youngest man to serve as a Diet member, but pointed out that long life does not depend on chronological age. While the President could serve eight years, he could serve as LDP President only six years (two three-year terms).

The President asked if that is all he could serve.

The Prime Minister replied that this is all, unless LDP party regulations are amended, or unless he stepped down after two terms and later ran for another term.

The Prime Minister said that he views Japan-U.S. economic problems as being important. Therefore, he has been meeting with Ambassador Ingersoll, and Ambassador Eberle, and wishes to bring about some conclusion. Japan’s entire post-war economic recovery has been based on the dollar, he said, and therefore the maintenance of the value of the dollar and continued growth of the American economy are also in the interest of Japan, insomuch as these contribute to the maintenance of world peace and the position of the free world. Japan, he said, wishes to cooperate in the interest of expanding the American economy.

The President said this is mutual. A strong, healthy Japanese economy is in our interest. He realized that Japan has a special problem [Page 478] with respect to playing a military role in the Pacific and Asia, but Japanese economic influence could be decisive in many areas. Therefore, it is in our interest that there be a strong, vigorous Japanese economy, so that Japan could play a vital role in Southeast Asia, which would help develop the whole region, and would be decisive. He commented that the Prime Minister would read in the press statements reflecting the feeling by some of our political leaders and businessmen that Japan is a serious competitor to be dealt with, but noted that he does not share their feelings. Healthy competition benefits both nations, he believes, except, of course, when the trade imbalance is too great.

The Prime Minister said that he wished to discuss the healthy balance of trade noted by the President. Within two or three years Japan wishes to restrain its surplus on current account to one percent of GNP, which would be used to finance economic aid of one percent of GNP to the LDCs. Moreover, of that amount the Government of Japan wishes to reach the ideal level of 0.7% of governmental developmental assistance as soon as possible. It is said by some that Japan has attained economic affluence, he said, but this is not true. There is an excessive concentration of population in urban centers, such as Tokyo and Osaka, which gives rise to many problems like pollution and inadequate housing. Japan lags behind the United States in social capital formation, he said, and great investments are needed for social capital and to improve living conditions. Thus, great domestic investments must be made, as well as large contributions to economic assistance to the LDCs. He said that the Government of Japan hopes to move forward toward realizing both goals.

In this connection, the Prime Minister added that Japan should cooperate with the Southeast Asian nations and the ROK in providing both aid and investment. When the tensions in Vietnam have been reduced, he said that Japan should also provide aid and investments to help stabilize the lives of the people. He noted Japan’s promise at UNCTAD to attain the goal of governmental aid of 0.7% of GNP by the end of the decade. This would equal the entire budget to support the Government of Japan Defense Forces. While this is a difficult objective, he said the Government of Japan should tell the people this aid is essential, and gain their understanding. With the cooperation of the United States over the past quarter of a century Japan has achieved great economic progress and Japan now wishes to assume a larger burden in contributing to peace and the development of the LDCs, on the basis of full consultation with the United States.

The President agreed that this, of course, is in the interest of Japan as well as the United States, as a Pacific power. Healthy, growing economies in Indonesia, Thailand and Indochina, as well as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh if that time could come, would be most help [Page 479] ful. Whenever the level of the lowest is raised, he noted, the level of the highest often benefits most.

One other point the President wished to make, which Dr. Kissinger has heard him make to European leaders, is that Japan’s role is not limited only to the Pacific, but that Japan is a world economic power. If we look at the world’s power centers we find the U.S. and the USSR, Japan and Western Europe. Therefore he noted the importance of Japan and the United States cooperating not just with each other, but also together with the Western European nations, England, France and the other EEC nations, so as not to simply limit our actions principally to the Pacific.

The Prime Minister agreed. Japan also wishes to cooperate with the enlarged EEC. However, he noted, while Japan has expanded its economy greatly since the war, Japan does not yet stand on an equal footing with some of these nations. For example, in the UNSC, and he feared that if Japan makes the first move the Europeans will react strongly. If the U.S. would, in a sense, “introduce” Japan and help moderate European reactions, then he felt that Japan could be helpful in many areas.

The President said that Dr. Kissinger could tell how, before the meetings in China, he had discussed this very subject with Heath, Pompidou and Brandt, that is, that Japan could play a role along with the United States.

Dr. Kissinger noted, that the President, in fact, had a most intense discussion of this very point with Heath. He added that the President has given him orders to keep in close touch with the Prime Minister prior to Heath’s visit to Tokyo, September 16.

The Prime Minister agreed with the President’s point that it is in both Japan’s and the United States’ self-interest to keep in touch with respect to the newly enlarged EEC, which would constitute a powerful economic structure.

The President reemphasized the desirability of the United States and Japan working closely together in their contacts with the leaders of the EEC nations. Obviously he did not mean that neither nation would join the EEC, but it would be in our mutual interest to work closely together in expanding trade with Europe. Since both Japan and the United States have vigorious economies, and look outward rather than inward, it is in our common interest to work to ensure that the EEC does not turn inward.

The Prime Minister agreed. He noted some concern over the undesirable possibility that the expanded EEC might develop its own “Monroe Doctrine” and develop its own internal trade after January 1 when the UK enters the EEC. Therefore he agreed on the desirability of [Page 480] maintaining close contact between Japan and the European nations to ensure that the EEC not move in the direction of contracting world trade, and further to consult with them on economic assistance to the LDCs. However strong the United States might be, with the example of Vietnam in mind, he felt that it is better to persuade the free world nations to maintain close ties, especially since both the USSR and PRC are seeking to expand their influence around the world. Thus, he felt that Japan and the United States should maintain communications with the EEC nations in the interest of all the free nations.

The President noted the Prime Minister’s forthcoming visit to Peking and wondered if he could give an evaluation of what he foresees developing in the way of relations between Japan and the PRC.5 In raising this, he explained, he did not suggest that policies of our two countries should be identical for he realized that the Prime Minister served the interests of Japan, just as we serve our own nation’s interests. On the other hand, our view, (which he felt that the Prime Minister reflected in his recent talks with Dr. Kissinger at Karuizawa) is that it is of overriding importance to both the United States and Japan that we not get into a conflict over China policy, while we need not have identical positions, he cautioned that neither should we allow antagonism to develop between us.6

The Prime Minister stated two conclusions with respect to China policy. First, Japan would not consider any restoration of diplomatic relations with the PRC that would be disadvantageous to Japan-United States relations. Second, it would be ultimately in the interest of the United States as well if Japan could normalize its relations with the PRC. He noted that containment, for example of the PRC, is one means to weaken its power, but on the other hand it could also serve the cause of world peace to open a window to the world for the PRC. The effect of this latter kind of policy could be seen vis-à-vis the USSR. In terms of the reality of the great population and low standard of living [Page 481] of the PRC, he did not believe containment to be an effective policy, because whenever a nation with a low standard of living closed itself to the world (or was contained) it caused the people to unite, and in the case of the PRC brings about such developments as providing rear area assistance to North Vietnam.

The Prime Minister, in evaluating the effect of the President’s visit to Peking, felt that one visible effect is that the PRC is not now extending such aid to North Vietnam even though the United States has intensified its “carpet bombing.” In examining the United States-North Vietnam policy, the Prime Minister stated his personal view is that the President had established a “pipeline” for communication during his visits to Peking and Moscow, on the basis of which he personally anticipates an early resolution of the war, which efforts he applauds.

Turning back to Japan’s relations with China, the Prime Minister said they are neighbors, but have had a number of conflicts during the hundred years following the Meiji Restoration (1867). The domestic situation within Japan has now developed to the point, he said where it is almost impossible for Japan not to normalize relations with the PRC, even though there may not be such “merit” in this as Japan’s mass media or public opinion believes.

The President interjected “or our press either.”

The Prime Minister observed that the popular tide favoring normalization could not be dammed up. Even though there may be no particular advantage (“merit”) to normalization, he did not foresee any great disadvantage, of the kind to which the GOJ should be alert. Personally he did not see such a disadvantage. One major problem, he admitted, is Taiwan, but if Japan did open a “diplomatic path” to the PRC, it could avoid incurring the kind of strong enmity of the PRC which it did while following a policy of containment. Further examples of the benefit of opening relations were that Japan could urge the PRC not to send any aid to North Vietnam, or not to liberate Taiwan by force, or not to send aid to SEA on the same basis as the USSR, that is, arms to promote disorders. Further, Japan could conduct normal trade with the PRC, and thus avoid the situation in which the memorandum Trade Office necessary to conduct trade now interferes in Japan’s domestic affairs. Opposed to these advantages, he conceded the political difficulties related to Taiwan, but observed that leaving relations which China in their present form must be considered in terms of increasing Soviet involvement and actions, for example, the large naval force the USSR maintains at Vladivostak across the Sea of Japan, ships of which pass freely through the Straits of Korea to the South China Sea. The problem of Taiwan and its relationship to the Soviets is delicate, he said, but Japan would not be deeply concerned if the United States maintained its presence in Taiwan.

[Page 482]

The Prime Minister observed that Japan and the United States have different views of China, Japan seeing her as a close neighbor while the United States looks at it from across the Pacific. In much the same way as the United States knows all about its close neighbor, Latin America, Japan knows too much about China. He concluded by stating that it is impossible for Japan to continue not having relations with China.

The President wished to tell the Prime Minister that he received a private message this morning from Thailand’s Prime Minister Thanom requesting that he raise his (Thanom’s) concern with the Prime Minister with particular respect to Taiwan’s economic position and investments there, and the need to preserve Taiwan’s position.

The President specifically noted that we and the PRC “agreed to disagree” on Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué. He assured the Prime Minister that we would do all we can in the economic front to help the ROC keep its seat in the International Financial Institutions, and to help keep Taiwan a viable, strong economic power. He noted that the leaders in Taiwan obviously would be watching closely the Prime Minister’s visit to the PRC. He realized that this is a difficult problem for us, as for the Government of Japan, in view of the extensive political, military, economic and personal ties with Taiwan, but added that both of us recognize, for different reasons, that we must begin the difficult process of working out some kind of relationship with the PRC.

The President said that he would not presume to tell the Prime Minister what to do; but offered to note on the basis of our experience in Peking and Moscow some essential principles to keep in mind in dealing with the leaders of these Communist governments. First of all they are pragmatic. In both capitals Japan is respected highly for its great economic power. Therefore Japan need not seek relations as a supplicant. Dr. Kissinger was our first expert and he was the second to discover that improved relations depended on mutual respect and frankness. We talk to them for reasons of our own, and they with us for reasons of their own, he said, which is similar to the position of Japan. Japan needs something for reasons of its own, but they need something from Japan for reasons of their own. If approached in that way he felt that the PRC would respect Japan.

The Prime Minister agreed with the President. The central feature of the present policy of the Government of Japan is to open relations with the PRC. But Japan wished to do this on a basis of mutuality.

The President added that this should not be done at the expense of Japan’s friends, just as the United States guarded against sacrificing its friends.

Dr. Kissinger cautioned that the press should be told only that the President and the Prime Minister discussed this subject in a general way, without describing the specific substance.

[Page 483]

The President felt that it would be useful with the press to say, if asked, that China was discussed, (because they would say we are lying if we said it was not) and secondly that every country seeks to develop its own relations on the basis of its own national self-interest.

Dr. Kissinger suggested that it would be a wiser approach to the press to say “on the basis of its own necessities.”

The Prime Minister said that he wished to emphasize with respect to China that he is not seeking to normalize relations with the PRC on “rails they laid down,” that is, that Japan would not accept all of Peking’s demands. As a basic premise, Japan would do nothing to normalize relations which would adversely affect Japan’s position in the free world, or Japan-U.S. relations, or which could not be defended as being in Japan’s own national interest. Therefore, he promised he would inform the United States of all negotiations with the PRC.

The President commented on one point that we found, which is that the Chinese leaders are wise and hard-bargainers, and that it is our impression that they keep a bargain they agree to. Another point important to note is that they take a long-term view, and do not allow any possible short-term advantage to deter them from looking down the road for long-term advantage.

The Prime Minister said that Japan hopes to understand China to some extent, even though it has had many conflicts with China over this past 100 years. While the PRC may have desired relations with Japan, Japan has not had relations with them for one-quarter of a century, but Japan is now convinced that normalization, rather than containment, would best serve the interest of peace and stability in Asia. In the absence of normalizations Peking could continue to interfere in Japan’s domestic affairs, but if relations are to be normalized Japan could insist on non interference in domestic affairs as a condition.

The President wryly commented “and hope for the best.”

The Prime Minister reemphasized that the premise on which he approached normalization is that he would not lose sight of Japan’s relations with the United States.

(Here the President checked his watch.)

The Prime Minister conceded that Taiwan is a difficult issue, and that Japan would perhaps seek American help in handling it.

The President suggested that this could be discussed tomorrow, along with the other subjects of interest we had not yet discussed, Korea, and our negotiation position with respect to Vietnam, as well as any other subjects the Prime Minister wished to raise.

The Prime Minister wished to speak one word about the ROK, which is Japan’s “lifeline” in security. He said that Japan would continue to do its best to assist the ROK economy, but added that the [Page 484] ROK has asked that he convey their desire to the President that the United States not withdraw its forces from Korea.

The President said that we will not, but pointed out that we could not stay there if the use of our bases in Japan is restricted.

The Prime Minister said there would be no such restrictions on United States bases in Japan under the Security Treaty. Dr. Kissinger said that this included the right to move tanks on public streets.

The Prime Minister said he hoped to resolve this matter in the near future.

The meeting adjourned, with the President saying that he looked forward to further talks at dinner this evening.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [1 of 4]. Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted by Wickel. The meeting took place in the Presidential Suite at the Kuilima Hotel. A memorandum of conversation from a meeting that was held concurrently between Ohira and Rogers is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 JAPAN. In a July 31 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge wrote that Tanaka wanted Ohira, with him during all discussions of international political issues. U. Alexis Johnson informed the Japanese Embassy that Nixon would like to meet privately with Tanaka so that the two leaders could get to know one another better. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, July 31; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit, Honolulu, 4 of 4) The next day, Holdridge wrote to Kissinger, “On Ohira’s attending sessions with the President along with Tanaka, Tanaka and Ohira both feel quite strongly about being together, although they are appreciative of the President’s sensitivity. The Japanese point out that Ohira as the leader of a strong LDP faction is almost Tanaka’s equal in political power, and Tanaka and Ohira hope that a compromise can be reached for Ohira to be present in the sensitive discussions, with perhaps a private meeting between the President and Tanaka taking place prior to the President’s informal dinner on August 31. (Memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, August 1; ibid.)
  2. See footnote 5, Document 130.
  3. Tanaka was part of the official Japanese party that participated in the U.S.-Japanese summit January 6 and 7 at the Western White House in San Clemente. See Documents 111113.
  4. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan during the 1950s, influenced many politicians who later became leaders within the LDP.
  5. On August 11, Tanaka accepted an invitation from Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to visit the PRC. On September 11, the Japanese and Chinese governments announced that the visit would occur from September 25 to 30.
  6. That morning, Kissinger had learned details concerning Japan’s approach to China. According to a memorandum of conversation with Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker and Rodman, Kissinger said, “Of all the treacherous sons of bitches, the Japs take the cake. It’s not just their indecent haste in normalizing relations with China, but they even picked National Day as their preference to go there. We have an intelligence report which says the Chinese didn’t even want them then, or any foreigners. And yesterday they send me a message saying their Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Tsurumi wants to meet with me privately to work out the agenda, and the next thing you know they’ve told Rogers and Johnson, who were then hovering all around me. I don’t know how they do it. I told (the Japanese) I wouldn’t see him.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 864, President’s Files—Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David—Memcons, May–Oct 1972 [3 of 5])