Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969–1972

128. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, August 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

• My Conversation with Tanaka in Japan on August 19

As you prepare for your meeting with Tanaka in Honolulu, you may be interested in reading over the full transcript of my conversation with him on August 19.² The highlights were as follows:

U.S.-Japan Relations

—Tanaka considered the U.S.-Japan relationship a “family relationship,”³ not an arms-length diplomatic one. Our ultimate interests are identical, he said.

—Tanaka observed that the U.S. had often been more Europe-oriented in the postwar period, even though Japan had been firmer in support of the U.S. leadership role. I pointed out that you, in contrast, were very Asia-oriented⁴ and believed the U.S.-Japan partnership in Asia was a key to world peace.

—Tanaka was definitely interested in establishing a special channel directly⁵ to the White House through Ambassador Ingersoll, and we agreed to set one up.

Economic Issues

—Tanaka set himself the goal of a serious effort to reduce the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance to $3 billion by March 31, the end of the current Japanese fiscal year. (His figures showed the current imbalance as $3.2 billion; ours showed $3.6–3.8 billion.)

—He cautioned that not all the short-term measures the Japanese would take would necessarily show up in the figures for this fiscal year.

—He had instructed his officials to work out long-term measures to “stabilize” our economic relationship over a period of two to three years. He mentioned increased purchases of agricultural and advanced industrial products; central bank lending; bilateral consultative mechanisms; and joint efforts with us to stabilize our trade position in the multilateral framework.

Political Issues

—In areas where the U.S. has made a “great sacrifice for peace” (Southeast Asia, Korea), Japan was interested in providing economic support in parallel with our security support.

—He asked about Vietnam, and I gave him a brief account of the military and the negotiating situations.

—He expressed concern that we might withdraw troops from Korea, and I assured him we had no plans to.

—There was now a consensus in Japan on the need to normalize relations with the PRC (partly as a result of your Peking Summit). But Tanaka would not do it on an unconditional basis. China had a long-standing historical and cultural attraction to Japan—but the U.S. tie was stronger.

—Japan was becoming cautious now about joint U.S.-Japanese oil investments in Siberia, because of apparent PRC concern. Tanaka and I agreed that our experts should exchange ideas on the whole project soon.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii) 31 Aug–September [1972] [3 of 4]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2. Economic aspects of Kissinger and Tanaka’s conversation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972, Document 96. The entire conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit, (Hawaii) 31 Aug–1 September [1972] [3 of 4].
3. Nixon underlined “family relationship.”
4. Nixon underlined “very Asia-oriented.”
5. Nixon underlined “establishing a special channel directly.”