Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues

98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, November 15, 1967.

69795. Ref. London 3659.²

1. We perturbed by inference contained reftel that British industry may be on verge lobbying, possibly with some Governmental support, British divergence from full adherence single global communication satellite system concept.

2. Initial USG position on INTELSAT definitive arrangements (forwarded by CA–2813)³ provides for accommodation communication satellites for domestic purposes, including complete procurement from national resources. In case of domestic satellites, essential element vis-é-vis INTELSAT is INTELSAT’s coordination of technical and operational parameters. Position is totally silent on regional satellites. US does not wish to encourage them. President’s August 14 message (CA–1299)⁴ stated that if there should be a regional satellite that carries international traffic, adequate provisions must be made so that traffic diverted will not jeopardize the economic efficiency of the INTELSAT system or limit its extension to developing countries.

3. Admittedly, intended purposes end use Project Symphonie⁵ and its relation INTELSAT still subject to speculation. However, any regional functions to be accomplished by Symphonie or “follow-on” project, could, without doubt, be provided at less cost and better by INTELSAT.

4. Issues then, as concerns industry, boil down to simple factors pride and supposed economic benefits. Adherence by all administrations to principle INTELSAT and support for concept presented by USG for INTELSAT definitive arrangements, will in end afford national industry greater benefits through continuing receipt INTELSAT technology, freedom (if granted by administrations) to be sole source producers of satellites for domestic purposes and, as already demonstrated in fact, an increasing role in the production of components, subassemblies and complete satellites for the INTELSAT system. USG position is that INTELSAT procurement processes should to extent feasible be responsive to interests and capabilities all members, affording them equitable opportunity compete for INTELSAT procurements regardless nature of material or sophistication involved. In that regard it significant that U.S. assistance in areas technology, fabrication, etc., is possible in cases not inconsistent single global system concept and INTELSAT arrangements.

5. Embassy, on basis press release reported para 3 of London 3659, should contact appropriate officials UK Government and urge careful consideration of implications vis-é-vis INTELSAT stemming from industry recommendation concerning Symphonie or follow-on project.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Limited Official Use. Drafted by G. Huffcutt (E) and cleared by Nelson (E), O’Malley (DTM), Nesbitt (SCI), Newman (EUR), and Loy (E). Repeated to Bonn and Paris.
2. Dated November 7. (Ibid.)
3. Dated October 11. (Ibid.)
4. Dated August 15. (Ibid.) For text of the President’s message to Congress on communications policy, August 14, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 763–771.
5. “Project Symphonie” was a joint Franco-German plan to construct a wholly European satellite. Other European countries also were to be invited to join the consortium. (Airgram A–2035 from Paris, June 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6)