168. Editorial Note
After news of the Eisenhower-Strauss proposals appeared in the press, on June 25, 1967, President Johnson spoke to the former President to assure him that the administration was considering a variety of water programs (see footnote 2, Document 164). In a personal letter of July 28, Eisenhower reminded Johnson that his interest in nuclear desalting was a long-standing one and to assure him “that my support of this kind of work is both disinterested and non-partisan.” (Johnson Library, White House Central Files, EX UT 4) In his July 31 response to Eisenhower, Johnson wrote: “I know we have both long felt in our bones that the time when desalting would become economic for irrigation could be made a great constructive turning point in human history and, in particular, a basis for movement towards reconciliation in the Middle East.” (Ibid.)
A briefing on water issues was scheduled for the former President, according to a list of pending measures from the NSC Special Committee meeting of August 10. A handwritten comment by Saunders reads: “and tell him Strauss already has the Senate up in arms—” (NSC Special Committee, August 10; ibid., National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, NSC Special Committee—Suspense, HHS) On August 14 Republican Senator Howard Baker, Jr. and 52 co-sponsors submitted a sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling for the “prompt design, construction, and operation of nuclear desalting plants” as a means to alleviate the Middle East’s “chronic shortage of fresh water, useful work” and lack of an “adequate food supply.” The sponsors argued that these economic benefits could provide the basis for a “stable and durable peace” in the region. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 90th Congress, 1st Session … 1967, Volume XXIII, page 962)
On August 15 British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean forwarded a Foreign Office paper critical of the Rothschild proposals to Eugene Rostow at the State Department. While the desalination plans were “technically possible,” the Foreign Office wrote, only some agricultural crops “in very special conditions” could be produced economically given the high cost of the water. Israel would be able to use both the additional power and water, but “Studies which have been made also [Page 300] show that three hundred million gallons per day of water [one hundred million gallons per day more than a nuclear plant] could be provided in Jordan, by developing existing ground water sources, at a capital cost of … less than one-seventh of the capital cost of nuclear desalination plants of similar capacity.” The Gaza Strip would also have trouble absorbing the proposed capacity. (Letter from Dean to Rostow, August 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Europe and the USSR, United Kingdom, Vol. XII, Memos, 7/67–12/67)
Because of the crisis in the Middle East, political pressures for quick action on the proposals were intense. On August 22 Interior Secretary Udall wrote Johnson: “At this point the Republicans have—through the Strauss-Eisenhower effort ‘stolen our clothes’ as far as the water issue in the Middle East is concerned… . We will spend more this year on desalting than was spent during the entire eight years of the Eisenhower Administration… . We have the answers. Let’s unveil them now.” (Report by Udall to the President, August 22; ibid., White House Central Files, EX UT 4) Two days later Udall proposed immediate action and release of a press statement to “quickly summarize those action alternatives that deserve serious consideration by all nations interested in a peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis.” (Memorandum from Udall to Johnson, August 24; ibid.)
The next day, however, Hornig wrote to Seaborg informing him of problems with the Atomic Energy Commission’s proposed demonstration desalting plant in California: “It has been obvious from the beginning that the site proposed for the large nuclear power and water desalting plant in California (the MWD project) could present a very serious safety and licensing problem, because of its close proximity to a large population center, its possible seismic implications, and novel features of the man-made island. We have all hoped, of course, that these problems could be resolved before any substantial amounts of money were irrevocably committed to the project.” (Ibid., Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Chron File July–Sept 1967)
In mid-December the Baker resolution was passed by the Senate. In a December 26 memorandum to Rostow, Saunders urged him to “flip through” the resolution “especially to be aware of the curiously ambivalent Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report.” The White House should continue to “show we’re doing something”: “Even the proponents of the ‘energy center concept’ admit it’s not sensible to talk about jumping to the Strauss vision all in one step.” (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II) By December 22 Hornig wrote to Califano that he was concerned that AEC material prepared for the State of the Union message reporting that “food factories” were “being studied” was too optimistic: “If this interesting and potentially very important development for the future is to be included [Page 301] in the State of the Union Message, I will be glad to draft suggested language that will place the ‘dream for the future’ in perspective and indicate that, in the meantime, efforts to meet the world food and population crisis must be pressed forward on the international front, there being no panacea yet that will eliminate hard work.” (Ibid., Papers of Donald F. Hornig, Chron File Oct-Dec 1967)