Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

42. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Seoul, May 6, 1965.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Minister of National Defense, Kim Song-un
• Army Chief of Staff, Lt. General Chang Ch’ang-kuk
• Assistant Vice Minister of National Defense, Major General Chang U-chu
• An Interpreter
• Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown
• Edward W. Doherty, Minister-Counselor

1. Ambassador Brown called on the Minister of National Defense at the latter’s request to clarify Washington attitudes toward various requests for assistance previously made by the Minister. Minister Kim opened the conversation by asking what Ambassador Brown had heard from Washington.

2. Ambassador Brown said that he now had a reply from Washington covering the four main points raised by Minister Kim.² Washington’s position was along the lines Ambassador Brown had expected and had warned Minister Kim to expect.

3. On measures to expand trade with South Vietnam, Ambassador Brown said the U.S. Government would be as helpful as possible consistent with the requirements of established policy. This meant that favorable consideration would be given to procurement of goods and services from Korea under MAP and AID funded programs where Korean suppliers were competitive as to price, quality and delivery terms, etc. Thus the door is open to Korean suppliers. It was our belief that there are many good opportunities and markets and that Korean suppliers are in a good competitive position. The Ambassador pointed out that Saigon is the best place to work out specific transactions, not only for goods, but for repair and service contracts as well. The Ambassador stressed that “buy American” limitations would continue to obtain for many commodities, and that in the case of other commodities which were open to “limited free world” procurement, Korea could not be given a preferential position.

4. With regard to the level of U.S. forces in Korea, as the Ambassador had previously explained, the U.S. cannot undertake to make a precise, open-ended commitment. We are prepared to say in the communique, to be issued in Washington on the occasion of President Pak’s visit to the United States, that we have assured President Pak that the U.S. will continue to maintain powerful forces, which in conjunction with ROK forces, would be sufficient to ensure the security of the Republic of Korea. However, we cannot say that we will keep any specific number of troops for any specific period of time. Nor can we make the NATO-type undertaking that an attack on the Republic of Korea would be regarded as an attack on the United States. We are prepared, however, in the communique to reaffirm the U.S. intention to come to the defense of Korea in the event of an attack in accordance with the treaty of 1953.

5. The Ambassador told Minister Kim that he had not been able to change the Washington position on the MAP transfer.

6. As to the military assistance program, again Washington could not commit specific amounts for specific times. The communique could say that MAP would be continued and that the U.S. would do its best to provide MAP assistance in amounts necessary to ensure effective Korean forces. The communique would also say that a substantial portion of won counterpart funds would be available for the defense budget if that would be helpful.

7. The Ambassador then referred to the request for assistance made by the Minister of National Defense earlier (see Memcon dated April 29, 1965) for a military pay raise.³ He said that we regarded this as a complicated and difficult question, especially since it involved the possibility of pay adjustments for other government employees. We recognized the need for pay adjustments but we wanted to make sure a solution was found which would be complete and at the same time not inflationary. Washington too was sympathetic but had suggested that we sit down here in Seoul with the ROKG, especially with the Economic Planning Ministry, to work out all of the details of the problem and try to find a solution. The Ambassador said to Minister Kim that he may have felt that a firm position on this question was lacking on the U.S. side. However, he had discussed the matter at length with General Howze and Mr. Bernstein and we were prepared to assist in finding a solution if the ROKG (not just the MND) would work out a government program.

8. Minister Kim was openly dejected after the Ambassador’s recital. He remarked ruefully that if he could not get some relief on MAP transfer, he would have to stay in the United States; that he could not come back to Korea. Minister Kim went on to explain that the MAP transfer had become a grave political issue and that, more than anything else, the people were expecting that President Pak would come back from Washington with some adjustment in the transfer program.

9. The Ambassador asked what had led the Korean people to such a state of mind and Minister Kim understood the inference. He said he was aware that he is sometimes known as the world champion preventer of MAP transfer. This was because the MAP transfer led to an increased military budget. When he had to ask for more money for the military budget, journalists and editors became attentive and wanted to know why. It was difficult to get more money for the defense budget and therefore he must fight against anything that increases that budget. The Minister of National Defense must provide for the armed forces. The armed forces expect this of him. (The Minister implied at this point that the MAP transfer would make it more difficult to obtain funds for a military pay raise and he was therefore under pressure from the senior officers to resist the MAP transfer program.)

10. The Minister said that the pay raise problem was very serious but that the Korean Government has other serious problems. ROKG officials outside the Defense Ministry look with disfavor on a military pay raise because, in their view, it doesn’t accomplish anything positive but does raise the level of government expenditure. With all the other complicated problems, there is great competition for any additional funds that become available and the Ministry of National Defense stands little chance of winning in the competition. The Ambassador asked why, if the problem is so serious, additional funds could not be raised from Korean revenues and set aside in the budget for a pay raise as is done in the United States. The Minister replied that this might be reasonable and logical in the United States, but it would not work that way in Korea.

11. The Ambassador commented that any pay raise, especially one that included adjustment of civil service pay, would have to be financed substantially out of ROKG revenues. Therefore, there would have to be concerted approach to the problem both within the ROKG and between the U.S. Government and the ROKG. The U.S. Government was not willing to make available additional funds for this purpose until such a concerted attack had produced a feasible solution, consistent with stabilization objectives. It was our belief that a substantial pay raise could be accommodated from prospective revenues that would accrue to the ROKG and still leave funds for other important objectives. The Minister replied that he had frequently raised this problem with Mr. Chang Ki-yong, Economic Planning Minister, but Chang was not willing to stand up and talk for military expenditures. When Chang thinks he is going to have additional funds, he is reluctant to have the funds set aside for military expenditures that would be losing money which could be expended for other objectives. The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Chang knew of the Ministry’s request for 30 million dollars from the U.S. for a pay increase. Noting that he had not spoken directly to Mr. Chang about it, the Minister replied that the EPB generally agrees with the proposal on the condition that “we get the money from you.” The Minister then said that if the U.S. would give only 20 million dollars, he perhaps could get Chang to make available the remaining 10 million dollars.

12. The Ambassador tried to conclude this phase of the discussion by noting that he would ask the Economic Planning Minister to look at the problem and would say that the U.S. was prepared to work cooperatively on the problem. The military budget was a very important part of the total budget, very basic, and we, General Howze, Mr. Bernstein, and the Ambassador, would not like to see a large increase in revenues go entirely for non-military uses with nothing for an increase in military pay. The Minister said he appreciated such support from the U.S. side but that he needed not only moral support, but direct tangible assistance.

13. The Minister asked whether the Ambassador’s refusal of his request applied only to what was asked for in cash, or to supplies of wheat as well. He said he needed more than U.S. help in raising ROKG revenues and if he could not get help, he would have to take up residence in the United States. The Ambassador again explained that the U.S. could not take action on a proposal that was not completely worked out and approved by the ROKG. He pointed out that this could not be considered simply as a military problem. Finally, he stressed that the problem must be worked out here and not in Washington. He explained that Washington was not prepared to negotiate with the Minister on any concrete problems or issues. Concrete results would emerge from the President’s meeting with President Pak. However, these results would embody substantive decision reflected in the communique and agreed between the two governments here in Seoul before the President leaves for Washington.

14. The Minister then spoke of his concern for the defense of Asia, not just of Korea. He hoped that Ambassador Brown would continue to reflect his views to Washington. The Ambassador was so powerful in Washington that no tree could resist his push. The ROK forces were on the very point of starvation. There was a saying in Korea that no tree could sustain the blows of the ax. The Minister had struck only two blows and he intended to cut the Ambassador eight more times in order to get some relief on the MAP transfer and some assistance on the military pay increase. Ambassador Brown replied that he was used to being hacked at.

15. The Ambassador asked the Minister if he still planned to stay over in Washington for several days after President Pak departed. The Minister said that in view of Washington’s attitude, it might not be worth while for him to stay; President Pak would decide. Once again the Ambassador assured the Minister that he would be welcome but could not expect to conduct any business talks with defense officials while he is in the United States.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 KOR S. Secret. Attached to airgram A–551 from Seoul, May 13. The meeting was held at the Ministry of National Defense.
2. Brown and Kim met on April 29 and discussed military issues in preparation for Pak’s visit to Washington. (Memorandum of conversation attached to airgram A–551; ibid.)
3. Kim sought a 75 percent pay increase, which represented $30 million. (Ibid.)