Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

43. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Seoul, May 12, 1965.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Prime Minister
• The Minister of National Defense
• The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. John Lim, Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister
• General Hamilton H. Howze
• Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown

The Prime Minister said he had asked us to come because the government had received a request from the government of South Viet Nam for combat troops. He wanted to make it quite clear that the ROKG wanted to send combat troops and to make its contribution to the defense of Southeast Asia. They were about to begin consultation with leading members of the Assembly on this subject.

There were, however, certain problems with the Assembly which had been illustrated at the time when approval of the dispatch of 2,000 non-combat troops had been requested. The opposition at that time had asked what assurances the government had received from the United States to guard against the difficulties which would be created for Korea by sending these troops, for example additional risk of aggression from the north.

Specifically they had raised the following points:

1) Had the government been able to get a commitment from the United States to revise the 1953 defense treaty so that an attack on Korea would be regarded as an attack on the United States?

To this the government had replied that this was not necessary because the presence of substantial US forces in Korea was in itself a guarantee of US action, since those forces would themselves be the subject of any conceivable attack.

2) Had the government received an assurance from the United States that it would not withdraw any of its forces now stationed in Korea?

3) Had the government been able to secure a repeal or extension of the MAP transfer program?

To this the government had replied they had not, but the US Government had agreed to make certain adjustments in the program which would be helpful.

4) Had the government taken steps to get an increase in the level of MAP to compensate for the sharp decrease which had taken place in recent years as result of which the Korean forces were inadequately equipped even to defend their own country, much less to go off to help in SVN.

To this the government replied they were constantly in touch with US authorities about military assistance. In any event they did not feel that the dispatch of troops to SVN was a matter for bargaining with the US, but was a moral obligation on Korea’s part.

The Prime Minister said there were many questions raised by the opposition on the earlier occasion of troop dispatch and that they would all come up again with renewed force when the government presented the request to the Assembly for authorization to send combat troops. It would be very helpful if certain assurances could be given to the President while he was in Washington and reflected in the communique so that he would be in a strong position to answer any such questions.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the government was already pressing the Assembly for ratification of the settlement with Japan and encountering serious difficulties.

The Prime Minister repeated that the government was determined to send combat troops and was not in any way bargaining with us about this. He was simply asking for help to enable the President to be able to do it.

The matters on which the President would like reassurance in Washington, in addition to those raised by the opposition, were the question of a pay raise for the armed forces, which was desperately needed, and increased trade with SVN. If the President could come back also with assurances on these two points, it would be very helpful.

It was true that President Johnson had singled out President Pak for special personal courtesies such as sending his private airplane to Seoul and scheduling a fine parade for the President in New York City. These were greatly appreciated. But if the President simply went to the United States and was cordially and honorably received and came back without anything specific to show for his visit, this would not help.

The Prime Minister said that he did not think the allotment of $150 million of DLF funds over the next few years would make much impression on the Korean public, particularly since it would be realized only in small amounts in view of our insistence on projects. He recalled that when he had been Ambassador in Washington $70 million had been allotted for one year, but because of lack of projects only about $40 million had been realized. He was afraid that this would happen again and that the government would be criticized by the opposition because of it.

I said that the Prime Minister had expressed himself with his customary lucidity and frankness, and I hoped he would allow me to be equally frank. I would try to be equally clear.

But first of all I would like to know exactly what the SVNG had asked for and whether I could see a copy of the letter from the SVNG. This was produced and was simply a brief two paragraphs saying in effect “additional combat troops would be very helpful here and we would appreciate your sending combat troops at your earliest convenience.” There were no specifics as to the nature or quantity of the units being requested nor any indication of the job they would be expected to do.

I said that as the Prime Minister undoubtedly knew, when Ambassador Lodge was here he had told President Pak that we had been discussing with the SVNG the possible need for additional troops and he had told President Pak that a request for a regimental combat team might be forthcoming. He had not then made any such request.

I said that this letter had been sent by the SVNG without our knowledge, and that when it had been sent I had been asked by Washington to speak to the President immediately about it. I had done so on the evening of May 7 before the government had received the letter. I had told President Pak that while we believed that dispatch of a Korean regimental combat team to SVN would be desirable, we appreciated that this might cause him serious political difficulties, particularly with respect to the ratification of the agreement with Japan, and that I had been instructed to tell him that we would not ask him to take any action which in his view should cause him serious difficulties in that connection, and that a delay in action on this request until after the ratification would not in our view cause serious difficulty.

I very much appreciated, and I knew our government would very much appreciate the desire of the Korean government to contribute combat troops. Our position on timing was as I had stated to President Pak.

I said that I was well aware of the matter raised by the opposition and likely to be raised by them again. I felt that the answers given by the government on the previous occasion had been exactly right. I particularly welcomed the Prime Minster’s statement both to the Assembly and to me today that the ROKG did not wish to bargain on this matter. We agreed that this was not a matter for bargaining and we did not propose to bargain.

As I had explained to the Minister of National Defense on May 6,² and as I had explained to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mun Tok-chu, it was not possible under our constitutional system for the President to change the treaty commitment which we had with Korea, even if he wished to do so. Moreover he could not make any commitment to keep any specific number of troops in any specific locality for any specific period of time. Nor could he give assurance of the maintenance of any specific level of military assistance.

He could, however, and would gladly do so, give very positive assurance to Korea of the continued military support of the United States. The form in which we proposed he should do so was contained in the draft communique which we had given to Mr. Mun as our suggested revision of the Korean draft.³ We were also prepared to recommend to Washington some wording changes suggested by Mr. Chang Sang Mun to Mr. Doherty yesterday at his meeting with Mr. Mun which were designed to increase the sense of urgency of our commitment. We felt that the language of our draft was a very strong and powerful assurance which should clearly comfort the Korean people.

I had not been able to persuade Washington to go any further on MAP transfer than the memorandum which I had given the Prime Minister some weeks ago. If the President continues to feel very strongly on this matter I could only suggest that he bring it up personally in Washington. So far as Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bell were concerned we could go no further.

I repeated to the Prime Minister what I had said to the Minister of National Defense. (See Memorandum of Conversation enclosed with Embassy’s A–550)⁴ about the pay raise question.)

I said that we already working on expanding opportunities for Korean trade in SVN; that we are hopeful of significant results and that we are prepared to consider recommending to Washington that some reference to this matter be included in the communique.

I said that all of us in Seoul would do our best to try to get the highest possible level of military assistance of the Korean forces and that I was encouraged that aid to Viet Nam had now been separated from the regular MAP legislation, thus I hoped lightening the burden on the regular MAP program.

I said that we thought $150 million of new development money under the most favorable terms available anywhere in the world was a real contribution; that the speed with which it was used depended entirely on the Korean government and that we were prepared to provide more as soon as it was used up. If some language change could be made to make it clearer that this money was all immediately available, we would be glad to consider it. I feel that if the matter were presented to the Korean public in this light it would be appreciated by them.

I said that I welcomed the discussion which we had just had because I felt that it brought into focus things which had been said on both sides many times. I felt that we now had had sufficient discussion of the issues; that everyone on the American side had a very clear idea of what the Korean government wanted and why. I thought the time had now come to get down to actual language. On this the ball was entirely in the Korean government’s court. We had considered the Korean first draft and had presented our ideas on what we thought the language should be. If the Koreans had any specific suggestions to make I hoped Mr. Mun would make them in his meeting this afternoon with Mr. Doherty. I felt that no useful purpose would be served in further general discussions.

The Prime Minister said he understood that we could not for constitutional reasons give the NATO commitment, but if MAP transfer were to be pressed further he assumed there would be no difficulty in the Minister of National Defense doing so in Washington. (I said it would have to be done by the President.) The Prime Minister said that the government would shortly present to us a program dealing with the pay raise problem; that he appreciated my explanation of the DLF matter and would suggest some language to improve the impression for the Korean point of view, and that he agreed we could get down to work on actual drafting.

Mr. Mun said that my explanation of our constitutional problems had clarified the reasons for some of our positions and he would certainly take these into account and would have specific language to suggest to Mr. Doherty.

Mr. Lee Hu-rak came in just about the time we were discussing the DLF fund, and said that the phrase “over the next few years” was troublesome. He also noted that our communique omitted reference to trade and again raised the question of a commitment to maintain our present level of troops. I said that the last was not possible, but that we were prepared to recommend deletion of the phrase he found troublesome and mention of trade in the communique.

Comment: It was obvious that all present were very disappointed. Gloom started to descend very obviously as soon as I mentioned that we were not pressing for action on combat troops to Viet Nam before the ratification of the agreement with Japan, and thickened as I proceeded, this despite the fact, which I pointed out several times, that I said nothing which had not been said to each of them many times before.⁵

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 KOR S. Secret. Attached to airgram A–550 from Seoul, May 13. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s Office.
2. See Document 42.
3. Documents tracing the negotiations on the contents of the communique released at the conclusion of the Pak visit are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 KOR S.
4. Reference should be to airgram A–551 from Seoul; see Document 42.
5. When summarizing this conversation, Brown also commented that “it has been clear for some time both from intelligence sources and from my conversations with MND that ROKG at Cabinet level was hoping to use request for combat troops to RVN to wring some concessions from us on the points mentioned above in connection with President Pak’s visit to Washington.” Brown believed, however, that the conversation brought Korean “expectations to more realistic levels.” (Telegram 1175 from Seoul, May 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S)