Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, April 27, 1965.

1082. Following is draft memo of private conversation between Amb Lodge and President Pak, which has not been cleared by Amb Lodge. This followed more general discussion being separately reported.²

1. Amb Lodge said that President Johnson wants President Pak to know, for his personal ears only, that an appraisal of the situation in South Viet Nam indicated that it might be necessary to introduce additional troops. The possibility of asking Korea to contribute a regimental combat team of perhaps 4,000 men was being discussed with PriMin Quat. No conclusions had yet been reached. Hence the Amb was not making any specific request, but he did want President Pak to know that such a request might be forthcoming.

2. The President said that any request for further assistance from Korea would be given very serious consideration. He could assure Amb Lodge that Korea would do what it could to help.

3. The President said that the Korean Amb in Saigon (Sin Xang-ch’ol) was concerned that there were not sufficient combat troops in South Viet Nam adequately to protect the 2,000 non-combat troops which had been sent there.³ This was a matter which had been under consideration by his govt. There had been opposition in some quarters to the dispatch of the 2,000 non-combat troops to South Viet Nam. Some of this came from people who were ignorant, some from people who were dubious about the policies being pursued in Viet Nam, and some was just political opposition. All of these matters would have to be considered, and also questions on timing. The President would consider them and would continue the discussion of this question with Amb Brown.

4. Amb Lodge said we very much appreciated President Pak’s forthright response to his remarks, and that Amb Brown would be in touch with the President when the matter had been further considered in Saigon and Washington. He stressed the importance that no word of this suggestion should get out to the public because of the obvious embarrassment that would be caused to all concerned in Saigon, Seoul, Washington, and in any other countries that might contribute, by premature disclosure. The President said he fully appreciated the necessity for secrecy.

5. The President then said that he wished to mention the matter of the settlement with Japan. He asked Amb Lodge to assure President Johnson that the Korean Govt was determined to complete the settlement with Japan. There would be opposition. There would probably be further demonstrations. There would be difficulty in the Assembly. But the President was convinced that the majority of the Korean people supported that settlement and that the govt would be able to secure its ratification. He said that he had hoped that the agreement would be signed before he left for Washington. Practical considerations of drafting, etc., however, made this very difficult. He thought now that it probably would be signed by the end of May, perhaps when he came back. The agreement might be submitted to the Assembly at the end of June or early July when, he said, with a smile, it was very hot and people would be less inclined to protracted debate and struggle.

6. The President closed by asking Amb Lodge to assure President Johnson that he was in full support of President Johnson’s policies and that he intended to tell President Johnson personally when he saw him in Washington.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Also sent to the White House and repeated to Saigon for Lodge.
2. A summary of Lodge’s general discussion of Vietnam with Pak and other high-level Korean officials was transmitted in telegram 1085 from Seoul, April 28. (Ibid., POL 7 US/LODGE) Additional documentation on the Lodge visit to Seoul is ibid. and POL 27–3 VIET S.
3. The Embassy in Saigon was puzzled by Pak’s claim and noted that Korean forces included an infantry battalion and a company of marines, were stationed in a relatively secure area close to U.S. and Vietnamese air bases, and had reinforced their installations with sandbags and trenches. (Telegram 3607 from Saigon, May 1; ibid.)