Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

308. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 19, 1968, 10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposal suggested by Nick Katzenbach, concurred in by Sec. Rusk, for retrieving the crew of the Pueblo.

It involves our signing a receipt for the return of our men in a way which would permit us to disavow accepting a North Korean version of an apology but would permit them to argue that we had.

An Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts would explore, before the event, whether this procedure would be acceptable to the North Koreans; and that they would deliver the men at the time the receipt was signed by our new representative Gen. Woodward.

Walt

Attachment

Washington, May 18, 1968.

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson

SUBJECT

• Next Steps on Pueblo

In February you approved an instruction to our representative in Panmunjom authorizing him to accept an unsatisfactory North Korean receipt for the Pueblo crew by overwriting in his own handwriting a simple statement that he had received 82 men and the body of the 83rd crew member.²

We have not as yet had a chance to use this procedure, since the North Koreans have never proffered a receipt.

We now would like to revive this proposal through a back channel procedure, i.e., an Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts.

He would be fully briefed on our plan and would tell the North Koreans that we would accept their draft receipt with an overwrite, emphasizing that it must be simultaneous with release of the entire crew.

If the North Koreans were to accept this procedure they would, of course, claim that we had signed their receipt; we would claim that we had signed only what General Woodward had written. Both sides would understand this ambiguity.

We would also publish—immediately after release of the crew—the whole story of the seizure and the negotiations, including the transcripts of the meetings at Panmunjom. This record fully supports our refusal to sign their form of receipt as they presented it.

Dean Rusk concurs in this approach. I recommend that you authorize us to go ahead with it.³

Nicholas deB Katzenbach

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret. Johnson handwrote “Let’s discuss Tuesday on Agenda” at the end of the memorandum.
2. The intrusion was detailed in telegram 110781 to Seoul, February 6, in advance of the MAC Secretaries Meeting convened on February 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. Ambassadors Porter and Johnson were informed of the proposed strategy on May 16 and indicated their support for the approach. (Telegram 00288 to Seoul and Tokyo, May 16; telegram 6549 from Seoul and telegram 0074 from Tokyo, both May 17, all sent through CIA channels; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968) Warnke also supported the proposal for reasons he outlined in a May 21 memorandum to Clifford. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91–0017, Korea 385.3 [Sensitive]) The Department of State decided to implement the plan and delay the next senior members meeting until May 23 or 24 to allow Porter and Johnson time to make appropriate preparations. (Telegram to Seoul and Tokyo, May 17, sent via CIA channels; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968)