Office of the Historian

307. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 17, 1968, 1–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Korea

PARTICIPANTS

  • For the United States:
    • The Secretary
    • G—Ambassador Bohlen
    • EUR—John M. Leddy
  • For the Soviet Union:
    • Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
    • Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
    • Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov

The Secretary said that the United States was very concerned about the Pueblo affair.2 The United States has gone as far as it is possible for it to go. He said that we could not apologize for something that we do not think that we actually did, i.e., enter North Korean territorial [Page 687] waters. He hoped that we could obtain Soviet assistance in bringing this question to a satisfactory conclusion.

Continuing, the Secretary said we were also concerned about the infiltration of the DMZ by North Korea and statements by North Korea suggesting possible resumption of hostilities toward the South. He asked for Soviet influence with Pyongyang to keep things cool: the situation could become explosive. Mr. Bohlen added that the U.S. was ready to turn over the crew of the Pueblo to any country with which we have relations, including the Soviet Union, pending an objective review of what had happened.

Kuznetsov said that he could not answer at the moment and could only express the hope that the problem would be solved. Dobrynin said that the North Koreans had shown the Soviets a movie of the crew in which they had made statements which left the impression that the crew supported the North Korean view of the Pueblo incident. The Secretary said that if the crew actually said to the U.S. Government what they were alleged to have said to the North Koreans, then the U.S. would be ready to apologize; but we could not place credence in any statements which had been made by the crew under duress.

The Secretary stated in measured terms that if North Korea attacks South Korea, the United States will react with “maximum violence”.

Kuznetsov said that the North Koreans had given the Soviets evidence that South Korea had been infiltrating North Korea and that they, the Soviets, were concerned about this. The Secretary replied that he felt it important that the Soviets and the United States ascertain independently and as objectively as they can what the facts really are on both sides and that the two governments should keep in touch with this matter. He thought that both governments should work to cool down the Korean situation on both sides.

Kuznetsov said that the Soviets strongly favor detente in Korea and that we should move against any tension or aggravation of the situation. The Secretary pointed out that a step toward this would be the release of the crew of the Pueblo.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s dining room at the Department of State. The memorandum is Part IV of V.↩
  2. Thompson and Gromyko discussed the matter in Moscow on June 5. Each side repeated the positions set forth by Rusk and Kuznetsov. (Telegram 4114 from Moscow, June 5; ibid.)↩