309. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1

7491. Subj: Seventeenth Senior MAC Members Closed Meeting at Panmunjom, May 28, 1968. Ref: (A) State 168988;2 (B) Seoul 7431.3

1.
Meeting began at 1100 hrs and ended at 1134.4
2.
Woodward opened with statement contained Ref (A). Pak started to take notes while UNCMAC interpreter was reading Korean version of Woodward’s statement but soon abandoned note taking and adopted air of boredom and indifference when he discerned direction of statement. However, he again began taking notes when UNCMAC interpreter reached that portion of Woodward’s statement discussed Ref (B).
3.
After pause of about six minutes, during which he looked carefully at latter portion of Woodward’s statement and underlined several sentences including that discussed Ref (B), Pak chose one of several prepared statements to read in response. This statement was general expression of unhappiness with fact that US side had reviewed its previous position and had not come to today’s meeting with document of apology and assurance along lines that which Pak had presented at sixteenth meeting. He said US failure to do so clearly shows US is not concerned about fate of Pueblo crew and has no intention of settling question at these meetings. He reiterated that NK-proposed document was based on “grim reality” of crimes committed by Pueblo, pointed out responsibilities US must assume as organizer of crime, and stated that to settle question US must write document of apology and assurance as demanded and present it to NK side. He then closed with [Page 691] statement that he would comment on Woodward’s statement of today at next meeting.5
4.
Comment: Although Pak’s interest was clearly aroused by sentence discussed Ref (B), his failure to comment on it or to probe as to its meaning demonstrates again that he is allowed to exercise virtually no initiative.6
Porter
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus.
  2. Telegram 168988 to Seoul, May 22, transmitted instructions for this meeting. Woodward was to repeat the U.S. position presented thus far and add “You cannot expect me to consider your draft as a proper basis for settling the issue before us in the absence of your clear assurance that, simultaneously with my acceptance of an appropriately amended version of such a document, you would release all of the members of the Pueblo crew.” (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 7431, May 24, Porter suggested modifying the instruction to make clear that Pak “should come to next meeting armed with such assurance and that if he does so and also proposes appropriate amendments General Woodward will be prepared to discuss them.” (Ibid.) The Department of State concurred. (Telegram 170389 to Seoul, May 24; ibid.)
  4. Telegram 7499 from Seoul, May 28, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (Ibid.)
  5. The results of this meeting prompted the Department of State to instruct the Embassy in Moscow to again approach Gromyko to review the Korean situation and express the desire of both Washington and Moscow to avoid an escalation of tension on the peninsula. (Telegram 173266 to Moscow, May 29; ibid.)
  6. Porter later commented that he believed this meeting “provided indications NK waging war of nerves showing signs of some apprehension on its own part.” (Telegram 8078 from Seoul, June 22; ibid.)