Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

258. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Pueblo Seizure—Possible Military Options

Attached are planning papers on four courses of action involving military pressure in North Korea.² None of these should be contemplated for employment in the current phase of negotiations. They should be reserved for possible use after the current negotiations at Panmunjom have clearly failed.

1. Air Reconnaissance over North Korea.

2. Sailing Banner into area where Pueblo was seized.

3. Seizing a North Korean vessel.

4. Limited blockade of North Korean naval vessels.

5. Polish ship.

6. Reprisal.³

Number 3 has been cleared in the Korean Working Group; the others are still in various stages of clearance.

Discussion:

It is clear to me that each of these contemplated actions involves risks. The numerical order in which they are listed above indicates a descending order of preference in terms of combining minimum risk and maximum pressure.

1. Air Reconnaissance over North Korea is probably first in order of preference, confined to the use of Black Shield. It would appear to the North Koreans either as a form of pressure or as a threat of more forceful action to come. They would not know which and this would increase their anxiety. The risk of loss is low. The North Koreans would resent but probably not publicize our intrusion into their air space unless they shot down a reconnaissance aircraft.

2. Sailing Banner along the North Korean coast with an escorting force demonstrates our right and our willingness to do what we were doing when Pueblo was seized. We believe the risk of North Korea seizing the Banner is zero; the risk of their attacking it with aircraft or missiles is low. The presence of the escorting force and the knowledge (or suspicion) that U.S. forces are prepared to react quickly to an attack on Banner would tend to deter such an attack and make the North Koreans apprehensive. Despite the escort, however, there is a risk of attack by aircraft or missiles with a possibility that Banner would be sunk. Like the other courses of action listed, it does not offer much prospect of producing the return of Pueblo and crew, but it does increase the pressure and tension in the area.

3. The seizure of a North Korean naval vessel is more risky since it would probably be opposed by North Korean air and naval forces. It would be a dramatic demonstration of our concern and determination, but it would probably not greatly increase our bargaining power in obtaining release of Pueblo and crew; in fact it would probably reduce prospects of this. And unless we had exhausted the machinery of the United Nations, our action could be properly denounced as illegal.

If we wish to seize (or sink) a North Korean naval vessel, our best chance might come during a fracas resulting from enemy attempts to harass or sink Banner.

4. A limited blockade of North Korean naval vessels would quickly become a “set-piece” operation on our part. North Korea could watch it, determine the pattern, and pick the time and place for offensive action. If they decided to do it, they could, almost certainly, sink an important US naval vessel, such as a destroyer. We stand to lose much more than we gain by undertaking actions which leave the initiative for counter-action to the enemy. There, in his own backyard, we cannot afford to maintain enough force to prevent a determined counter effort from succeeding. Even though we doubt that he would risk it, we shouldn’t repeat the Pueblo incident, on a larger scale, by giving him the option of striking us again at a vulnerable point.

Recommendation:

1. Air Reconnaissance. Low key reconnaissance would be designed to achieve needed information and concurrently keep the opposition guessing as to our next move. This effort, limited to that reconnaissance which we really need, and which the enemy will think is compatible with a genuine military need, should be seriously considered. It should be of a nature designed to minimize the probability of loss.

2. Sailing Banner. If we conclude that we must do something visible at this time, sailing of Banner is probably as good as any other visible action.

If we do it, we should do it low profile, with little or no visible force. A combat air patrol should be a safe distance away, in order of 50 miles, where it could intervene if required but where it would be less likely to create an incident. The surface escorts should be well over the horizon, clearly out of sight of any vessels approaching Banner but able to intervene.

We shouldn’t undertake the operation at all unless we were prepared for some significant consequences:

a. If North Korea sinks or seriously damages Banner, we should be prepared to count this as an “Act of War.”

b. We should have plans in being, and have made a decision, in advance, to make a suitable military response to the sinking or serious damaging of Banner.

c. These plans should include such actions as neutralization of the North Korean Air Force.

3. Seizing a North Korean Naval Vessel. As the attached detailed planning indicates, this course is dangerous. We might fail; we might suffer heavier losses than the enemy in the process. We probably should not undertake this action unless we are looking for a small fight and wish to use this action to cause one.

4. Limited Blockade of North Korean Naval Vessels. This action is not recommended. It would be costly in resources, would be unlikely to help retrieve the ship and crew, and leaves the US vulnerable—NK could pick the time and place and hope to sink a significant US vessel such as a destroyer. It is unlikely that North Korea would do this; however, if it happened, our legal position for retaliation would not be particularly good and we would have suffered another blow to our prestige.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib. Part A (beginning February). Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was received on February 3. Although the memorandum is on Department letterhead and is unsigned, presumably it is from Rusk.
2. Not printed.
3. The memorandum bears Rostow’s handwritten notations. Next to course of action 1, Rostow wrote: “good sense—marginal.” Next to number 2, “risks less likely.” Rostow wrote in numbers 5 and 6. The former referred to seizure of a North Korean vessel under Polish flag of convenience.