Office of the Historian

257. Paper Prepared by the Department of State1

Washington, February 2, 1968.

DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE NEXT MEETING IN PANMUNJOM

The North Korean representative at the February 2 meeting implied the possibility of release for the Pueblo and crew if the United States were to accept the North Korean version of the facts and acknowledge that an act of aggression had occurred involving a US violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The North Koreans might also press for an apology and an assurance that there would be no repetition. Release might be obtained if the United States were prepared to sign a statement or receipt incorporating the above elements.

Our scenario for the next meeting has been prepared for the purpose of setting forth fully the US position. We do not suppose that it will induce any release by North Korea. It contains one forthcoming element, in the form of a proposal to hold a US investigation and to express regret publicly if that investigation bears out the North Korean version of the facts. There are a number of other moves that can be made by the two sides in subsequent meetings.

The North Koreans, for example, may peel off various of the elements from their package. Or they might propose that any release be in exchange for North Koreans held prisoner in the ROK. They might conceivably agree to release of the officers and crew while retaining the vessel. Or they might agree to release of the officers and crew minus the captain, whom they might wish to hold for a further period as they did in 1967 with the captain of a Japanese fishing vessel.

Other North Korean positions are also conceivable, and should surface in the next meetings.

The following are some of the positions that the United States could consider with a view to release of the Pueblo crew:

1.
We could consider release accompanied by a statement declaring that we would make a full investigation of the charges brought by North Korea, that the results of the investigation would be notified to [Page 586] the North Koreans, and that the North Korean authorities reserve all their rights in this matter.
2.
Another possibility would be a balanced statement of the positions of the two sides as the immediate prelude to release of the crew (and vessel); such of the North Korean positions as they insisted upon could be included, and our basic positions would be stated.
3.
We could certainly consider a release accompanied by a statement omitting any mention of either side’s positions and saying instead that the release was based on humanitarian grounds.
4.
We could propose an impartial fact-finding or determination on disputed issues, to take place after the release of the crew (and vessel); our proposal would embody the following elements:
(a)
If the determination were in favor of North Korea, the United States would be prepared to express regret;
(b)
If the determination were in favor of the United States, North Korea would make appropriate reparation.
5.
Still another variant would be release accompanied by a statement that the decision to effect release was made by North Korea without prejudice to its right to demand satisfaction.
6.
Still another possibility would be a statement recounting that the Pueblo had been taken into custody by North Korea on January 23 and that release was being effected on the understanding that the United States would ensure that its vessels do not enter into the territorial sea of North Korea. [This statement would be phrased in a way that could not properly be interpreted as an admission of guilt.]2
7.
We might want to consider, as a move to be made by the United States at some point, the withdrawal of naval units currently operating south of the 38th parallel, if such an action would be decisive in obtaining release.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February). Secret. Attached to a February 3 memorandum from Read to Rusk transmitting this and five additional papers covering other potential courses of action, including possible adjudication and arbitration, sending a Presidential letter to President Pak, making another advance to the USSR, and assessing third country approaches to the Soviets.↩
  2. Brackets in the source text.↩