Office of the Historian

259. Report Prepared by the Ball Committee1

Washington, undated.

BALL COMMITTEE ON THE USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

Terms of Reference

A. Purpose

1.
Establish the facts and circumstances of the Pueblo incident.
2.
Assess what criticism (if any) can fairly be made of planning, instructions, and conduct of the mission.
3.
Submit findings and recommendations, in the light of this incident, regarding future surface intelligence collection operations.

B. Procedure

1.
Review all facts bearing on the Pueblo incident:
(a)
the justification for the mission and the manner in which the decision was taken;
(b)
operating instructions under which the Pueblo sailed, including their adequacy and clarity;
(c)
communications systems available to the Pueblo and how they were used in relaying information through the chain of command to Washington;
(d)
adequacy of interagency arrangements for monitoring approved aerial and ship reconnaissance operations, particularly with respect to continuing political assessments of sensitive reconnaissance operations;
(e)
command, control and coordinative arrangements for the Pueblo.
2.
In this connection, review established national requirements for peripheral reconnaissance of foreign countries, and particularly North Korea, by U.S. naval ships, and procedures for determining and approving the missions to be undertaken to meet these requirements.
3.
Assess the adequacy of the emergency assistance arrangements provided intelligence collection vessels, to include consideration as to whether such vessels should be escorted and/or kept under continuous surveillance by other U.S. forces.
4.
Take into account relevant international law and the practice of intelligence gathering countries such as the Soviet Union.

C. Timing

The Committee should report as soon as possible, and in any event no later than February 9.

Attachment

Possible Lines of Inquiry

The President asked the following specific questions:

1.
Why was the Pueblo on the mission?
2.
Why wasn’t the Pueblo escorted?
3.
Why did the Pueblo delay in requesting assistance?
4.
Why didn’t the Navy respond faster?
5.
Why didn’t the 5th Air Force respond before the ship was towed to Wonsan Harbor?

The following questions have occurred to the Committee staff:

1.
Why was there no automatic destruction equipment on the Pueblo?
2.
Why was the ship designed with minimum defensive capabilities?
3.
Why was this system of missions held so close to a hostile area?
4.
Why wasn’t there at least an air alert for the mission?

  1. Source:Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Ball Committee Briefing Book, February 1968. Confidential. The principal members of the committee were George Ball, Chairman, Admiral David McDonald, General Mark Clark, and General Laurence Kuter. An identical copy of this document, without the attachment, bears a typewritten notation “Revised 2/3/68,” and a memorandum for the record shows that the initial meeting of the committee to discuss its organization and terms of reference was held on February 3. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, Envelope marked “Hold for Mr. Ball”)↩