Office of the Historian

256. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1

Washington, February 2, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Next Korean Moves

Berger and Doherty were encouraged by the first meeting, saying that the North Koreans obviously wanted to keep the door open. I am not. It was completely negative. Berger feels that the North Koreans [Page 584] find themselves in a box and want a fairly prompt out. I think nothing of the sort. I think they will want to prolong the series of meetings because:

  • —the status quo is a victory for them;
  • —prolonged meetings without result will greatly exacerbate our relations with ROK (already worrisome);
  • —for further exploitation of ship and crew;
  • —enormous prestige from keeping the United States on the hook longer;
  • —the Soviets have reportedly predicted to the North Koreans that our reaction to the Pueblo seizure would be mild and so far the North Koreans may feel that this has been the case, despite our show of force, hence safe to prolong;
  • —in addition to prestige arising from keeping us on the hook, there is also prestige arising from “equality” in bilateral talks under less than UNC auspices.

We must carefully watch people at State who tend to think of next steps at Panmunjom chiefly in terms of valid arguments. It is important to remember that we tend to talk from Aristotelian, syllogistic logic, whereas the North Koreans think only in terms of Communist dialectic “logic.” That difference was never more apparent than from the verbatim account of last night’s meeting. The entire meeting was completely in character.

I do not believe we will budge these people short of a careful, reasoned raising of the temperature. However, I think it probable that we should wait 48 hours after the last meeting to see whether there will be a prompt second meeting at which we can take their temperature better. We could not expect any reading from this first encounter. We should not wait much longer before applying a little more heat—political (Soviets—Mac Toon working on letter) and military (several studies in progress, should get two tonight).2

Al
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February). Secret; Nodis; Cactus.↩
  2. A draft letter to Kosygin from President Johnson was prepared in the event that the North Koreans adopted a totally negative attitude in negotiations at Panmunjom. (Ibid.) Throughout February the Department of Defense explored various military options, including air strikes and use of nuclear weapons, with the Pacific military command. (Ibid., Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968; ibid., Korea, Vol. V; and ibid., NSC History, Pueblo Crisis 1968, Vol. VII, Day-by-Day Documents, Part 13) A February 2 memorandum from Berger to Katzenbach discussed additional military options. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)↩