Office of the Historian

255. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington, February 2, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • UNC-North Korean Meeting on Pueblo Incident

[Here follows a summary of the February 2 meeting, see Document 254.]

Comment:

4. Our initial judgment of the first meeting is as follows:

a.
The North Koreans were expecting that we would say what we did, but we were less certain what they would say.
b.
The North Koreans did not make any explicit demands or threats (e.g., exchange for prisoners held in the south, threats to try the Captain and/or the crew, reduce pressure on them, etc.), other than alluding to the necessity that we admit that we engaged in “espionage,” violated territorial waters and the Armistice Agreement.
c.
The atmosphere of the meeting was businesslike and apparently without the usual heavy-handed North Korean insults.
d.
So far the North Koreans have refrained from announcing this initial meeting. (The greatest danger of press leaks seems to be in Seoul.)

5. In sum, we believe the meeting went about as well as could be expected. The North Koreans did not, at least at this stage, raise the ante to include other demands, but they might well do this in the future. They took care to keep this channel open while retaining the initiative in calling another meeting. This does not foreclose our asking for another meeting.

6. We have asked Seoul for their views of how to approach the next meeting and what to say at the meeting, and are working on our own scenario. Our guess is that the North Koreans will give us 24 to 48 hours to study what they said before suggesting the next. That meeting might perhaps narrow the issue, so we would expect a third or fourth meeting before we see clearly where we are. It is conceivable they may want to drag this out, although the Task Force still feels that they want to release the men soon in order to get the heat out of the situation.

7. I have sent a cable asking Admiral Smith to request through the Joint Duty Officers at Panmunjom the names of the injured and dead.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis; Cactus. A copy was sent to Katzenbach, Rostow, Read, Helms, and McNamara.↩