Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

254. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 2, 1968, 0741Z.

3878. 1. Following is summary of MAC Senior Members meeting held at Panmunjom between 1100–1158 hrs local February 2. Full text follows septel.²

2. Begin Summary. RAdm Smith opened with brief prepared statement. Said he had called meeting to discuss serious situation resulting from fact DPRK has possession Pueblo and crew. Said US position is that ship did not enter NK territorial waters until after it was seized and that crew committed no crime whatever. Recognized that US and NK positions differ. Said this situation completely without precedent. Stressed interests of both sides would be served by immediate return of crew and early return of ship to US custody. Expressed hope that meeting would result in agreement in principle on return of ship and crew as soon as physical arrangements can be completed.

3. In response to repeated demands from Pak that Smith say all he had to say, Smith made following additional points:

(A) Time would be saved if neither side mentioned confessions, admissions, punishments or apologies.

(B) Repeated several times that he had come to request return of ship and crew, names of wounded and dead.

(C) Explained at some length why Pueblo case is unprecedented and difference between it and helicopter incident. In accordance guidance received, pointing out that ship had violated no laws, that it was not under UNC command but was unit of US Pacific Fleet, and that there no violation to admit, as was case with helicopter.

(D) Set forth international law aspects in accordance guidance contained State 108367,³ emphasizing that even if Pueblo had been in NK waters, proper procedure would have been to escort it back to international waters as is practice followed between US and USSR.

4. As it became obvious Pak would not respond until he had exhausted efforts to draw Smith out, latter began insisting that Pak make statement to which he would reserve right to reply. Pak responded that Pueblo crew are aggressors and criminals dispatched to NK territorial waters for aggressive purpose as made clear by their confession. Stated that thanks to humanitarian measures of DPRK, wounded are receiving medical treatment, dead body of one crew member has been preserved, and all remaining members are in good health without any inconvenience. Said it unnecessary to cover up or explain away criminal act. Smith denied commission of criminal act, noting that ship had not fired back, had offered no resistance, had violated no law. Said “criminal act” could only be descriptive of North Korean actions.

5. After further exchange Smith asked Pak to suppose that KPA vehicle in JSA or other neutral area were suddenly seized by UNC, taken South, and its crew were made to confess that truck was South of DMZ. Said he supposed in such case North Koreans would wish to have truck back. Such situation was analogous way we feel about Pueblo.

6. Pak, after obvious pause for editing, then read prepared statement in which he said Smith had merely attempted cover up plain fact of aggression and that US had deliberately dispatched armed spy ship to NK territorial waters, which constitutes most flagrant violation of Armistice Agreement. Claimed North Koreans have in their hands all the material and human evidence to prove US committed act of aggression. Said matter can in no way be solved by US proposal to meet solely for purpose of rejustifying criminal act. Said if US really wants to solve matter it must change stand and attitude in addressing subject.

7. Pak continued that “I have not yet been instructed” to inform US side of names of dead and wounded. He then concluded prepared statement by proposing recess this meeting and saying Smith “will be informed” of date for next meeting.⁴

8. Smith rejoined that he could provide much more proof than he already given that ship was in international waters if such would be useful at this time. Pak rejected this offer and repeated Smith would be informed later of next meeting.

9. Comment follows.⁵

Porter

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus II, Cactus Seoul Cables, January 29, 1968 to February 9, 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Rostow sent this telegram to President Johnson under a covering note of February 2, stating that the North Korean representative “was obviously instructed to stonewall until the U.S. position was revealed. This looks like a slow track at the moment.” Porter made a similar point in his comments on the meeting in telegram 3892 from Seoul, February 2, also attached to Rostow’s February 2 note. Rostow’s note indicates that the President saw the telegram. (Ibid.)
2. A complete, verbatim text of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 3890 from Seoul, February 2; corrections are in telegram 3913 from Seoul, February 3. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. See footnote 2, Document 250.
4. Porter commented on Pak’s approach in telegram 3892, February 2, “By tantalizing us in this manner, by offering prospect of further meeting and information which he knows we badly want, North Koreans probably seeking to string this affair out for variety of purposes which will be apparent to Dept., but which here in Korea include enhancing opportunities for friction between ourselves and ROKG.”
5. Reference is to telegram 3892, see footnote 4 above.