Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, February 2, 1968, 0405Z.

3863. 1. We are maintaining close contact with highest ROK levels in effort to calm recurrent fears that Pueblo crew aspect of problem with North Koreans will soon be settled, leaving ROKG only unsatisfied party. Presidential Secretary General informed me this morning that ROKs interpret NK statement that UN machinery not acceptable but NK prepared to use MAC at Panmunjom to mean that NKs are prepared to make concessions on Pueblo and crew. This led to usual discussion of aftermath, if ROK supposition proves to be correct.

2. PSG expressed uneasiness about this morning’s meeting but was reassured by scenario related State 108330,² particularly our desire to have ROKG issue statement confirming that meeting arranged after consultation with them and that they completely informed and in close touch with USG these matters. In addition to stress on fact that MAC machinery being utilized to deal with aggressive NK actions against ROK, I said they could take line with press if necessary that private meetings on this or that aspect of problem might be held from time to time and that USG and ROKG confer in this connection. He said they would issue statement to above effect after hearing from us (or by other means) that Pyongyang had announced fact of meeting.

3. During conversation with PSG this morning he brought out fact that ROKs have done substantial amount of military planning. I avoided discussion on this by saying we still very much in diplomatic stage of our effort and that present not good time for discussion of military aspects. I reminded him that we were pleased to have President Park’s assurance that there would be no unilateral reaction by ROKs. Lee Hu-rak said he understood but time may be approaching for serious discussion of military matters.

4. While they have thus far been amenable to intensive persuasion and have accepted our tactics, it will be apparent to you that desirability of military action against NKs runs persistently through their thoughts and utterances.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus.
2. Telegram 108330 to Seoul, February 1, provided guidance on media responses, should North Korea make an announcement or broadcast about the MAC meeting. (Ibid.)