Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea ¹

Washington, February 7, 1968, 0603Z.

111263. Joint State-Defense Message. Ref: A. Seoul 3976;² B. Seoul 3971.³

1. Ref. B and similar messages from General Bonesteel leave little room for doubt that prompt and effective measures must be taken to allay public and official ROK suspicions that US engaged in double dealing with North Korea.

2. We must convince ROKG officials that Pueblo seizure and North Korean raids against ROK, while part of one overall problem, must be dealt with by different measures. Possibility that immediate problem of release of Pueblo and crew can be obtained through private negotiations must be exhaustively explored. On the other hand, we cannot reasonably expect North Korean acts of aggression against ROK to be deterred either by private negotiations or by public harangues in MAC. The appropriate measures for this purpose are those which will visibly strengthen ROK military posture and ability to repel and punish infiltrators.

3. To get this distinction across to Park we are transmitting septel text of another personal letter from President Johnson. This letter, in addition to summarizing previous offers of additional military equipment made in connection with the possible deployment of additional ROK forces to Vietnam, informs Park of President Johnson’s decision on the general magnitude of MAP augmentation.

4. FYI. We want this new $100 million package to consist of items which will have the greatest psychological and political impact on ROKG and its public (as well as on North Koreans). General Bonesteel is requested to consider whether a squadron of eighteen F–4’s would be an effective way to accomplish this objective. Such squadron, with ground equipment, spares and pilot training, would cost about $60 million. Other items we have in mind include additional F–5’s, SAM missile equipment, patrol and swift craft naval vessels, combat and other vehicles and self-propelled artillery. The availability of equipment should be kept in mind in the preparation of this list. We do not propose to divert any significant amounts from Viet-Nam. This submission should be coordinated with the Embassy. [End FYI.]

5. In presenting text of letter to Park you should also say that if he wishes you and General Bonesteel will be glad to discuss with key ROK officials, employing general line of argument set forth in para. two above, and stressing significance of additional military assistance offered in President Johnson’s letter.

6. It seems from here that for maximum political benefit this info should be announced in ROK. The announcement could be made by Park himself in a statement, or jointly by USG and ROKG in Seoul. We leave this to you to work out, but we would like to clear text of any joint announcement here and in any event arrange coordinated release times.

7. New subject. Enterprise task group has been ordered and is moving southward through Korea Straits to area only 12 hours sailing time from former position. USSR will presumably report this movement to Pyongyang. Timing of this movement is calculated to give impression to North Korea that US prepared to ease off some pressure even while talks in progress. You should inform Park of this negotiating gambit.

8. Final Caveat: You should convey to Park in whatever words you find appropriate that loose talk in Korea about pulling back some forces from Vietnam has not been well received here. We cannot believe that any serious consideration is being given to such a move by responsible officials, especially in the face of this new grant of aid and our augmented presence in Korea, and we want Park’s reassurance that there will be no such move.⁴

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus. Also sent to CINCPAC and repeated to COMUS/K. Drafted by Doherty, cleared by Warnke and Bromley Smith, and approved by Walsh. Smith submitted drafts of this telegram and Document 159 to the President, who approved both drafts. Smith recorded the President’s reservation to this telegram: “President asked that Porter make clear to Park that arms package et al. is linked to keeping Korean contribution to South Vietnam effort unchanged. Berger informed and will revise second cable—i.e., instructions to Porter. With this change, both cables cleared. BKS” (Memorandum from Smith to Johnson, February 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident, Miscellaneous, Vol. I. Secret)
2. See footnote 1, Document 155.
3. In telegram 3971 from Seoul, February 5, Porter discussed the apprehension in Korea about the U.S. approach to North Korea in an attempt to gain the release of the Pueblo crew and the fear that the United States would withdraw the augmented forces once that issue was resolved. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)

4. This paragraph was added to satisfy the President’s instructions. Porter broached the subject during a meeting with Pak on February 8, but failed to receive reassurances from him that talk of a troop withdrawal would be rebutted by high ROK officials. The Prime Minister later informed Porter of his statement to the National Assembly that such a step was not government policy and assured Porter that the government had no intention of taking such action. (Telegram 4088 from Seoul, February 8; Ibid.)

   Printed from an unsigned copy.