Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 6, 1968, 2151Z.

110828. Personal and Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. As one who has been intimately involved with Korea since the drafting of Japanese surrender terms, I am deeply disturbed by the present atmosphere of our relations. I know that we are dealing with an especially sensitive people, sometimes called the “Irish of the Far East.” I also am aware of other moments of tension even worse than the one we have today, particularly when I think back to the Syngman Rhee period. I think I understand fully the genuine concerns of the South Koreans even though I get impatient about their super sensitivity.

The one thing which is not tolerable back here is their suspicion about our basic motives and purposes. We have invested over 33,000 battle deaths, 20,000 non-battle deaths, and over 100,000 wounded in the security of an independent Republic of Korea. We have maintained large forces in that country for 17 years. We have invested over six billion dollars (almost half the total Marshall Plan) in economic and military assistance. We have recently massively reinforced our air power in Korea and the immediate adjoining areas. We have carried the banner for Korea in the UN over and over again. You should find ways to make it clear that Korean suspicion against this record is simply incomprehensible to the American people. The danger is that it will be deeply resented back here with potentially disastrous results for both countries.²

We do not expect the Republic of Korea to be a satellite of the United States nor do we expect the United States to be a satellite of Korea. We have elementary and basic common interests and the United States has done its full share in supporting these common interests. We expect no less from the Koreans.

I assume that the South Korean press has had its attention called to everything I have said about Korea in my “Meet the Press” interview.³ If they got mad because I could not swear in blood what happened to the Pueblo during a ten-day period of radio silence, they must not be angry because I cannot pledge in advance to be a liar. I have no doubt that they have been misled by some of the excessive speculation by some American reporters on that particular point. But I thought I hit hard on those subjects of direct interest to the Republic of Korea, including the infiltration and other threats by North Korea, during recent weeks and months.

By separate cables we are sending you another letter from the President to Park and answers to other specific questions you have raised.⁴

I would appreciate any further suggestions you have as to what can be done to clarify these matters with key Korean leaders.⁵ I have just seen tickers of a backgrounder someone out there apparently held which was helpful. Keep giving us your best judgment and we will give you our best from this end. With warm regards.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Priority;Nodis. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by Read, and approved by Rusk.
2. On March 7 Rusk reiterated this message to Ambassador Kim when responding to Korean efforts to amend the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty. (Telegram 4596 from Seoul, February 29, airgram A–431 from Seoul, March 7, and memorandum of conversation, March 7; all ibid., DEF 4 KOR S-US)
3. On February 4 Rusk and McNamara appeared on the television news program “Meet the Press.” A transcript of the broadcast is in Department of State Bulletin, February 26, 1968, pp. 261–272.
4. See Documents 158 and 159.
5. Porter responded by stating that the Embassy continued “to hammer home thoughts you expressed,” but was handicapped because South Korean “leaders do not yet display much political sophistication and allow themselves to be whipsawed even by elements in their own party and of course by the press.” Porter further noted that distorted or erroneous press reports coming from the United States merely compounded the problem. (Telegram 4034 from Seoul, February 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)