Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 7, 1968, 0619Z.

111264. You are authorized convey following message from President Johnson to President Park: “Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Porter has transmitted to me the text of your thoughtful letter of February 5.²

He has also given me your views, expressed orally to him, on the conduct of the negotiations between the United Nations Command and the North Korean Senior Members of the Military Armistice Commission.

I am keenly aware of your desire that the Pueblo seizure and ROK complaints against North Korea not be treated as unrelated matters. I agree fully that a solution of the one without a solution of the other would be incomplete. I would like, therefore, to give you my further views as to how the two problems should be related. I believe that we can separate the short question of negotiating tactics from the longer run and continuing problem of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea against attack from the north.

First, let me refer to the negotiating problem. Delicate negotiations of this kind cannot hope to succeed if conducted in public; they would degenerate to the level of propaganda exchanges characteristic of Military Armistice Commission meetings in the past.

We do not object in principle to your other suggestion, that the UNC Senior Member be joined by a ROK member in future meetings with the North Korean Senior Member; however, we doubt very much that the North Korean side would agree, and we do not wish to risk a breakdown in these discussions.

At the same time, I realize that the method of private discussions between the UNC and the North Korean Senior Members has created a political and public relations problem for you. The Korean public, the press, government officials, military officers and even members of your cabinet, have concluded that the US is engaging in those private discussions in order to reach an agreement on the problem of the Pueblo seizure separately and to neglect the broader range of problems posed for the Republic of Korea by North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement.

Our reasons for wanting private discussions, moreover, are not easy to explain to the Korean public, and they do not suffice to allay the suspicions that are mounting and that threaten to impair our usually close and friendly cooperation. It is clearly not enough for your government and mine to explain that the success of the current negotiations for the release of the Pueblo and crew will depend on secrecy. It is important that the immediate problem of the Pueblo seizure and the longer-run problem of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea against attack from the north be presented in somewhat different perspectives.

The seizure of the Pueblo presents an immediate challenge to the United States which must be dealt with promptly and decisively. The measures to deal with this problem are not necessarily the same as the measures to deal with North Korean aggressive actions against the Republic of Korea. The United States will not, I assure you, humiliate itself or the ROKG to obtain redress. But we cannot leave unexplored the possibility that secret negotiations, against the backdrop of increased military strength in the area, will achieve our immediate goal.

Unlike the Pueblo problem, for which we must have an immediate solution, the security of the Republic of Korea against attack is a continuing problem. It will still exist after the Pueblo and its crew have been released. It will not be solved by angry words uttered in the Military Armistice Commission, or by negotiations. It will require tangible and continuing measures to strengthen the Republic of Korea militarily. And if the Republic of Korea, as a result of North Korean threats against it, is visibly strengthened in its military stance, by the kind of measures I have already indicated to you, and which I shall outline in detail below, the North Koreans will have suffered a moral and psychological defeat in the current crisis.

If we succeed both in obtaining redress in the Pueblo seizure and in strengthening the security of the Republic of Korea, then we will indeed, in your words, have completely attained our common goal.

I am confident that you will see that the long run interest of your country in strengthening itself against possible attack is more important to you than the immediate problems of negotiating tactics and propaganda. I therefore want to give you more complete information on the measures I am proposing for the permanent strengthening of your military posture.

Ambassador Porter already has discussed with you our willingness to provide certain equipment to ROK forces in Korea in conjunction with the deployment to Viet-Nam of additional ROK forces. The equipment includes.

1. A $32 million counterinfiltration ‘package’ which was jointly devised by your Chiefs of Staff and General Bonesteel. Certain key items in this counterinfiltration package have been authorized for air delivery and many of these items will arrive in Korea within the next 15 days.

2. Two additional destroyers for the ROK Navy, one of which will come from the active US Navy fleet. This destroyer is now undergoing overhaul, and will be delivered to the ROK Navy no later than April 30. The other is being activated from the US Navy reserve fleet and will be delivered after overhaul in 12 months or less.

3. A self-propelled 8 in. Howitzer artillery battalion.

4. A company of 12 UH–1–D helicopters.

In order to provide new programs of help, I have decided to increase military assistance to your forces in the current fiscal year by an additional $100 million.³ This further amount will fund other items of equipment which should leave no doubt either in the minds of your people or in those of the North Koreans of our determination to see that you are in an even stronger position to withstand and repel further aggressive acts they might contemplate.

I trust, Mr. President, that the foregoing will amplify and support my previous assurances to you that my government’s vital concern for the security of your country is undiminished. I hope that with this tangible evidence of support you will redouble your efforts to allay the suspicions of some of your countrymen that in the current crisis the United States is selfishly pursuing its own ends and neglecting its long standing commitments to the people and the government of the Republic of Korea.

Ambassador Porter and General Bonesteel stand ready, I am sure, to assist in this effort through their normal channels to the appropriate officials of your government.

With my warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson⁴

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus. Text received from the White House, cleared by Smith and approved by Walsh.
2. Document 155.
3. On February 8 President Johnson requested Congress approve the additional funds as part of his foreign aid program for FY 1969; see Department of State Bulletin, March 4, 1968, pp. 322–329.
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.