144. Editorial Note
In the late evening hours of January 21, 1968, approximately 30 well-trained and well-armed North Korean infiltrators perpetrated an attack on the Blue House, killing several South Koreans civilians and members of the Korean National Police. At least five North Koreans were killed by defensive gunfire, and at least two were captured and taken into custody. (Telegram 3532 from Seoul, January 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR S) According to an excerpt of the interrogation of one of the infiltrators, the mission was to enter the Blue House, to kill the security forces encountered, “to chop off President Pak Chung Hee’s [Page 310] head and to shoot to death his key subordinates in that building.” (Telegram 3649 from Seoul, January 26; ibid.) The United Nations Command responded by immediately calling for a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission to protest the action. That meeting was scheduled for January 23. (Telegram 3532 from Seoul, January 22; ibid.) Hostile encounters between North Koreans and combined United Nations and Republic of Korea forces continued for several days after the incident at points along the Demilitarized Zone. Documentation concerning those encounters is ibid.
Less than 48 hours after the raid on the Blue House, North Korean forces seized the U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel USS Pueblo on January 23 and arrested its crew. The United States protested the incidents at the UN Security Council and met with North Korean representatives at the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom in an attempt to gain release of the ship and crew. Documentation focusing on the interaction between the United States and the Republic of Korea concerning involvement of the Security Council and the United Nations in the Korean situation and the role of North Korea in that forum is ibid., POL 27–14 KOR/UN; POL 23–7 KOR S/UN; and POL 33–6 KOR N–US. For documentation pertaining to the seizure of the Pueblo and the detainment of its crew, see Documents 212 ff.
In addition to bringing both incidents before the UN Security Council, the South Koreans requested that the United States and the 15 other military participants in the Korean War reaffirm their commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea as set forth in the 1953 Armistice Declaration. Although the United States willingly declared its commitment to the Republic of Korea, it opposed pressing the other nations to do so. The United States believed, since the international situation had changed during the intervening years, that a unanimous declaration of support reaffirming the Declaration was unlikely, undesirable, and could only demonstrate to the North Koreans and other Communist countries a deficiency in international support for positions advanced by the United States and Republic of Korea within the United Nations. (Telegram 113543 to Seoul, February 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 27–14 KOR/UN) Subsequent discussions between the United States and the 15 countries demonstrated the general reluctance of those nations to reaffirm the Declaration. (Telegram 120026 to Seoul, February 23; ibid.) Although apprised of that situation, South Korean representatives continued to discuss their request with the countries in question. Although many were sympathetic to Korea’s plight, few were prepared to satisfy South Korea’s wish. Documentation detailing Korean efforts and U.S. responses to that request are ibid., POL 33–6 KOR N–US; POL 27–14 KOR/UN; POL 17 KOR S-US; and POL 27–3 KOR S.