Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, January 24, 1968, 1031Z.

3598. For the Secretary. Ref: A. State 102967; B. Seoul 3571.²

1. President Park reacted strongly to representations made to Prime Minister to effect that ROK Government avoid reprisals against North Koreans. He asked me to call this afternoon and kept me for hour and half. He opened with request for statement of position as I knew it, with emphasis on Pueblo incident. I recounted facts as they have been transmitted to us as well as attitude we took in MAC meeting this morning. I also told him of naval movements and said he could rely on us to remain in contact with him as this affair developed.³

2. Park commented immediately on fact that we had asked North Korea for apology and immediate return of the ship. To this we should have added, he said, that we wanted assurance that there would be no more raiding of any kind into South Korean territory. I said UNC had asked for MAC meeting because we wanted to get at North Koreans on subject of the raid, and the ship affair had developed later. He could be sure that raid would figure prominently in exchange at Panmunjom though we had no precise indication from ROK Government prior to my conversation with him as to what it desired. Park said that the problem would become acute when North Koreans say first, that there was no raid, that attack on Blue House in Seoul was simply a peoples’ uprising; and second, when they reject our request for apology and refuse to return the ship. If we try to minimize the affair from then on, American prestige will fall greatly as matter has gone too far on both sides.

3. I said the matter has to be considered very carefully and that we must think about rather than react immediately to the enemy’s initiatives. The enemy had taken these actions at times and in places of his own choosing. He was not undoubtedly in an alert posture, and there were many reasons why we should not accommodate him. It was this which led us to make representations to the Prime Minister this morning on subject of reprisals.

4. Park said vehemently that we seemed to be more worried about reprisals by ROK Government than we are about getting satisfaction out of North Koreans. He said he respects the UN Command and the wishes of the American ally and he will not undertake unilateral reprisals at this point. He wanted to make it very clear, however, that retaliation will become inevitable if there are any more attacks by the North on South Korea. He said objective of the raid was to kill the President and his family and they had very nearly succeeded. He knows that there are 2400 additional men in North Korea with similar training and purpose. These men have been taken from North Korean Army and given special training. They are located in six centers and he would like to strike them and eliminate entire unit in one blow. He said he is convinced that this will have to be done sooner or later or they will come down here again and again, striking at many different targets.

5. Park said that if United States gets no satisfaction in matter of the Pueblo we should strike North Korean naval ships along east coast after first neutralizing North Korean air power. The South Korean Government would be glad to cooperate in such a venture.

6. When he paused I said his friend President Johnson would be pleased to have his assurance that there would be no unilateral action against the North by the ROK Government. I said we understand that he has been subjected to great provocation but that he would be measured in United States and everywhere else throughout the non-Communist world by restraint he shows in these difficult circumstances. He repeated again his view that we are going to have to do something because of the attitude we have taken in demanding apology and immediate return of the ship, and he wants added to that in any way we can get it across that there must also be assurance to the South Korean Government that there will be no more forays from the North. He is convinced that if we have to act against North Korea, Chinese internal troubles will keep them from moving provided they are given assurance that there will be no threat to their territorial integrity.

7. Meeting terminated on note of reiteration that ROK Government would engage in no unilateral reprisals in connection with this incident. I assured him that we would consult fully with him as developments occur.

8. Comment: I think we have what we want from him in the way of assurance, but if there is another incident all bets are off. I suggest you consider brief message from President Johnson to Park admiring his restraint and statesmanship and assuring him of close cooperation and consultation.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Exdis. President Johnson received a retyped copy of this telegram attached to a January 24 memorandum from Rostow stating, “This will give you the flavor of President Pak’s reaction to recent events in Korea.” The memorandum indicates that President Johnson saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. V)
2. Telegram 102967 to Seoul, January 23, instructed Porter to inform the ROKG of U.S. intentions to act through the UNC and MAC as well as to enlist the assistance of the Soviet Union in urging the North Koreans to release the Pueblo and its crew. Porter was also told to advise the ROKG “in strongest terms against any attempt at action against North Korea in retaliation for Seoul raid,” particularly in light of the added tensions arising from the Pueblo seizure. In telegram 3571, January 24, Porter reported on his forceful conversation on those matters with the Korean Prime Minister, who, in turn, briefed Pak. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. Documentation on the MAC meetings with the North Koreans and the movement of naval vessels into the region is in the compilation on the Pueblo crisis.