143. Editorial Note
On January 6, 19678, President Pak presided over an emergency conference on internal security at the Korean Army Headquarters at Wonju. In public statements President Pak announced that the conference would focus on combating an expected “tenfold increase in [North Korean] agent infiltration whose purpose is all out guerrilla warfare.” The President reportedly called the meeting to discuss counterinfiltration measures and to promote a new Civil Defense Bill scheduled for legislative consideration. Approximately 160 senior officials from the national and provincial governments, the military and police, and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency attended the well-publicized conference. (Telegram 3308 from Seoul, January 9, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR [Page 309] S) The Embassy later reported that the meeting was intended to generate a high level of publicity “to impress NK with readiness of ROKG to deal with infiltrators and other subversive activities, to alert Korean people to seriousness of NK infiltration threat this spring, and to dramatize to Korean people preparedness of Pres. Park and ROKG to protect security of ROK.” (Telegram 3447 from Seoul, January 17; ibid.)
In addition to furthering those objectives, the Embassy reported that the government intended to use the Wonju meeting to “create public climate in favor of controversial Civil Defense Bill.” (Ibid., and telegram 3308 from Seoul, January 9; ibid.) The Embassy advised that the pending bill was “almost unanimously condemned by press and academic groups for wide powers it gives govt. and consequent fears for individual rights.” The political opposition had voiced its intention to defeat the bill when it came before an upcoming special session of the National Assembly. (Telegram 3308 from Seoul, January 9; ibid.)
The conference produced a revised counterinfiltration plan establishing interagency control under the overall authority of provincial governors and the Prime Minister to meet specific threats. According to the Prime Minister, the program would advance Korean interests in “maintaining civilian control over counter-infiltration operations” and in “limiting use of troops and their contact with local population during operations.” (Telegram 3447 from Seoul, January 17; ibid.) In the days following the conference the Minister of National Defense outlined to the Korean press additional counterinfiltration measures, including creating new rapid-response teams and helicopter and patrol-boat units, installing new radar systems, as well as constructing a fence across and defoliating the DMZ. (Telegrams 3350 and 3476 from Seoul, January 11 and 18, respectively; both ibid.)