142. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- More Korean Troops for Vietnam
The Korean response to our New Years Day package is extremely good so far.2 There are, of course, some things still to be worked out, but as Ambassador Porter puts it “these do not present major problems in connection with the dispatch of troops.”3
They do, however, want some help with their domestic Parliamentary problems. The Prime Minister and the Defense Minister want to come to Washington to see you “for a few minutes,” preferably around the middle of January. The visit would be publicly described as further discussion of the Vietnam situation. They want no conversations with any other officials and no official greetings or ceremonies.
The purpose of this trip is to move the Prime Minister and Defense Minister in the front of this problem so that Park can take the position that they have convinced him of the need for more troops in Vietnam. Put another way, it takes the emphasis off your conversations with Park in Australia and reduces the ability of the Parliamentary opposition to argue that Park jumps when you say “frog.”
State is against the visit (draft cable at Tab A).4 State thinks it:
- —would stimulate worldwide speculation as to what had caused the urgent and mysterious trip;
- —would involve the President too directly in Korean domestic political squabbles;
- —would make the dispatch of additional troops too directly a response to the U.S. President’s wishes rather than the result of Korean determination to do its full share. I do not agree with State’s position. 11,000 men are important to us, and if a brief interview helps Park with his domestic hurdles, we should try to accommodate him.
I believe that such a visit would be put in a better light, however, if the Koreans went to Saigon first, “became convinced there of the need” and thereupon were asked by Park to consult with you.
Although State seems not to be confident that the visit is Park’s idea, Porter (Tab B, last paragraph) comments: “There is no doubt that President Park sees this as a device to move the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense to the forefront in coming Assembly consideration, and to permit Park himself to adopt a position of having been convinced of the need for more troops by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense as a result of their Washington consultation.”
I think we should have Ambassador Porter make certain that the visit is desired by President Park. If that is the case, I recommend that you squeeze his emissaries into your schedule even though I know that mid-January is a very bad time for you.
The options are set forth below for your decision.
If President Park wishes, I will see them.5
I agree with State’s position. Discourage the visit.
See me.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1967–1969, 5D(2), Allies, Troop Commitments and Other Aid. Top Secret.↩
- In telegram 3214 from Seoul, January 3, Porter provided a detailed discussion of his meeting with the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense on January 3 and of their response to the U.S. proposals. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–KOR S)↩
- Among the outstanding issues was the Korean proposal to replace 5,000 troops with civilian personnel. Documentation covering subsequent discussions of that issue is ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S.↩
- None of the tabs is printed.↩
- This option is checked; however neither minister made the trip.↩