154. Telegram From the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency1
8805 (In 52438). Ref Leop 8780, para 2 (In 50695).2
1. [COS] finally contacted [Identity 1] by phone 30 Oct, and he invited [COS] meet him his home at Para Camp 1 Nov 1000. Had twenty minutes alone with [Identity 1] before [Mobutu] and [Identity 2] arrived. [Identity 3] finally arrived at 1215 for last half hour of meet.
2. With [Identity 1] alone, [COS] made point ODYOKE supports him, and does not support anyones efforts to overthrow him by force. [Identity 1] said he understood our attitude on trade unions, although his colleagues do not, said he knows ODYOKE does not support trade unions in Congo, but that such support is private. [COS] then said, in accord [Gullion] instructions, our delay last weekend due to need answer [Page 216] wash queries whether locus of power had shifted.3 Re arrest trade union leaders, assured [Identity 1] our concern was not with right of GOC to arrest people who advocate violent overthrow of government, but whether this move was tactically wise, and in any case pointed out need for consultation before hand view international ramifications.
3. Main substantive point this meet was inadequacy our proposed contribution to [cryptonym not declassified] party effort. [Identity 1] left these complaints to his colleagues who carried on manfully.4
[Omitted here is further discussion of the meeting.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 7, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations. Secret; Rybat; [cryptonym not declassified]; Priority. Received at 1604Z.↩
- Not found.↩
- On October 21, Kasavubu signed a decree putting into effect a “state of exception” imposing martial law in Leopoldville and establishing a ministerial committee of three (Anany, Maboti, and Bomboko) to administer it. Telegram 8709 from Leopoldville to CIA, October 25, reported that Ambassador Gullion was deeply concerned at the consequences of the committee’s arrest of four Congo labor leaders who had called for a general strike, apparently without consulting Adoula. The Ambassador was trying to bring home the folly of this decision, and specifically requested a delay in funding for the [text not declassified] political party. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 7, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations) However, in telegram 78634 to Leopoldville, October 28, the CIA stated that in view of the tense situation in Leopoldville, the Department of State had now asked that the funds withheld be passed at the earliest opportunity. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 8828 from Leopoldville to CIA, November 4, reported that the Ambassador had meet with the [text not declassified] group on November 2 and thought the meeting had at least partially allayed the [text not declassified] fears that they were being ditched. Gullion believed CIA should increase its contribution to the party. (Ibid.) For Gullion’s report to Washington on his and Godley’s meetings with the [text not declassified] leaders, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 433.↩