433. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State1

969. 1. During consultations this weekend between Godley and Govt. officials (including Adoula and Mobutu) and also meetings of Amb, there came to light acute case of jitters among Congolese officials which led some to believe, or profess to believe, that USG had decided Adoula govt. was lost cause and was proceeding to transfer its support to an opposition group led by jailed labor leaders. As usual in Congo, intensity of conviction increased farther the observer was placed from events. Thus Mobutu, who has been sitting things out in usual hamlet manner, was most worried of govt. team. In support of their hypothesis they had dreamed up everything from missed appointments in Leo to [garble] coup d’etat in Vietnam.

2. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Adoula’s own past relations with labor movement and his apparent inability or unwillingness to give his colleagues straight story on his own connection with Irving Brown (he invited him to Leo); and his attitude on arrest of labor leaders (he was against it) seems further to have agitated his companions.

4. Of group Adoula seemed least concerned. Kasavubu not at all.

5. Godley’s meetings Nov. 2 and 3 appeared to have disabused group of their worst fears. Also seem to have had effect of increasing their understanding of their dependence on Adoula or rather on Adoula’s reputation in outside world.

[Page 884]

6. At any rate when at Adoula’s request I met with him, Mobutu, Bomboko and Nendaka their fears had grown less; in fact it was I who had to bring matter up in interest of clearing the air. Even if I did not dispel every last suspicion, believe I succeeded in curing hallucinations about US intrigue with labor leaders. I assured them Adoula-led GOC continued have Emb. support. I reviewed whole record of US involvement with GOC and UN from days of Kitona and rounds two and three; referred to US stake of 350 million dollars in Congo. Told group that we had recently furnished to Adoula material for his forthcoming speech citing aid he could expect from US.

7. Then took occasion explain to group that while US citizens could understand closing of parliament and reasons for state of exception (in view threat to state), GOC should realize what kind of people we were; that principal support up to now for US policies in support of UN and Adoula came from just those sources which extreme dictatorial action could alienate. Also said it was natural for USG to be interested in how institution of commissioners regime affected responsibilities of GOC and of its head.

8. Group absorbed these remarks with little comment. Bomboko as spokesman reiterated their continuing firm solidarity with Adoula and others volunteered affirmation their determination proceed with constitution drafting to be followed by early elections. Expressed their confidence in latter provided they had help. After meeting Adoula told me it had been useful in clearing up confusion.

9. I believe GOC largely over its uneasiness and that meeting had salutary aspect in letting Binza group know it should not take USG for granted no matter what.

10. Nervousness and insecurity of group, of course, mean that it must be handled with special care and understanding. We do not yet have discernible alternative, and in Adoula, despite his faults, we have credible international figure.

11. At same time we should be aware that

A.
Despite group’s renewed conviction that they need Adoula, they have never shown less concern for him than in last few weeks.
B.
Adoula can still hold group together but characteristically he does it by playing on misinformation and suspicions, e.g. by letting them persist in illusion re labor intrigue which he could have set right immediately.
C.
Despite considerable new decisiveness and efficiency, discernible in such things as propaganda and security, group is far from out of woods and will not be so long as economic difficulties persist and corruption is unchecked.

Gullion
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL The Congo-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN and Brussels.