153. Editorial Note

In telegram 76839 to Leopoldville, October 18, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency stated that it would appreciate as soon as possible the suggestions of the Chief of Station and Ambassador Gullion regarding the nature of future U.S. support should Cyrille Adoula be disavowed by the [text not declassified] group in the immediate future, or should he, in a realignment of the group, receive a position inferior to [Page 215] the one he held now. The Chief of Station and the Ambassador were to include in their consideration such factors as the ascendancy of Belgian political influence, and also extremist nationalist activity. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 6, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations)

In telegram 8639 to CIA, October 19, the Chief of Station and the Ambassador responded that they thought Adoula would pull through again this time, but agreed that they should not be caught without a contingency policy in case he were demoted or removed completely. In case of the latter, their best estimate was that Adoula would be replaced initially at least by a basically moderate leader whose cabinet would reflect roughly the same political spectrum as was now running the country. Whether Adoula survived or not, they recommended that the United States continue to keep a strong hand in the Congolese political picture—partly as a brake on the more baneful aspects of Belgian commercial policy, and partly because creation of a national moderate political party (which the United States was covertly supporting) would make a valuable contribution to future political stability in the Congo. (Ibid.)