235. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Mr. President:
Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Foster recommend that you send the attached letter to Chairman Kosygin2 proposing that the US and Soviet governments announce during the UNGA debate on the NPT that they have agreed to begin bilateral negotiations within a specific time [Page 584] period on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Such a declaration could be very helpful in countering the anticipated basic complaint that the Soviet Union and the US are not themselves undertaking steps toward nuclear disarmament while calling on the rest of the world to adhere to the NPT. It would also bring to fruition our efforts of more than a year to engage the Soviets in a discussion of this subject.3
Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Foster also recommend that you approve the attached message, which would be delivered at the same time as your letter, outlining in more detail our views on the strategic talks. In addition to setting forth the arguments for an early agreement in this field and the principles on which we would be prepared to negotiate, the message presents a specific new proposal for consideration (paras. 9 and 10). Specifically, we would propose a cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile launchers. Moreover, if this agreement were limited to land-based missiles, we would be prepared to rely exclusively on national means of verification. We would also propose to limit strategic anti-missile defense systems to an agreed number of launchers and associated radars. This would also be monitored by national means of verification in the case of fixed land-based systems. We would also be prepared to discuss the problem of monitoring more extensive agreements.4
It is believed that a reasonable, concrete proposal would help convince the Soviets of our serious intent in these negotiations and help remove doubts that, in proposing talks, we are not merely on an intelligence fishing expedition. Some Soviet contacts have also intimated that a concrete proposal would help those in the Soviet government favoring talks to obtain a positive decision on this matter.
Secretary Clifford has not yet cleared the letter or statement, although I understand that he and Paul Nitze had previously supported the proposal in principle. The JCS yesterday afternoon came out against the proposal and, I understand, want to delete all of the oral message starting with the last sentence of para. 6 on page 3 through para. 10 on page 5.
If this is to have a useful impact in the UNGA consideration of the NPT, a decision should be taken on the letter and message as soon as possible.5
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret.↩
- Not found; however, for the letter later signed by President Johnson, see Document 237.↩
- For documentation on the development of this issue beginning with President Johnson’s initial statement of January 1967 regarding curbing strategic defensive and offensive nuclear missiles, see Documents 174, 175, 178, 179, 185, and 186.↩
- See Tab A, Document 231.↩
- A handwritten notation by Rostow at the end of the source text reads: “Mr. President: I believe this requires a special meeting.”↩