237. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I have endeavored to use this channel only when I consider that the matters to be discussed are important and urgent.2 In that spirit I communicate with you now on the following subjects: (1) The question of arms limitation in the Middle East, and (2) the long overdue question of our discussion in regard to offensive and defensive ballistic missiles.
[Here follows discussion of the Middle East crisis.]
[Page 591]The other subject I wish to take up with you again is my proposal, which goes back to December 1966,3 in regard to holding discussions with the aim of controlling the strategic arms race. I understand from Ambassador Thompson that Foreign Minister Gromyko told him on March 26 of this year that the Soviet Government was still studying the problem and that it attaches importance to this subject. As the United States Government has noted in previous communications, each passing month increases the difficulty of reaching agreement on this matter as, from a technical and military point of view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an additional consideration which leads me to raise this matter with you now.
As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly has begun its deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments.4 I am confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the maximum number of adherents. During the resumed General Assembly session our efforts to achieve a treaty that can be opened for signature in the near future with the prospect of obtaining a maximum number of adherents will face a critical test. Efforts undoubtedly will be made by some states to postpone the opening of the treaty for signature at least until after the conference of non-nuclear-weapon states has been held in the fall of this year.5 It is important that our two governments do everything possible to give the greatest impetus to world sentiment favorable to opening the treaty for signature at an early date.
To this end, I propose that our two governments announce early in the course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to begin bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles within a specific time from the date of the announcement, as well as proceeding to discuss the related matters mentioned above. I would hope that such a declaration, of primary importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
[Page 592]I very much hope you will reexamine the question of holding these discussions, whose importance I hardly need emphasize in this communication. I very much hope to hear from you in the near future.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special U.S.-U.S.S.R. File, Pen-Pal Series, 1968. Top Secret. On May 3, at the request of Secretary Rusk, Dobrynin met with him confidentially to receive a copy of this letter, and was asked to deliver it to Kosygin. Bohlen also attended this meeting. (Ibid.) The text of the letter was also telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow on May 7.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 178.↩
- Not further identified; however, at Secretary Rusk’s December 21, 1966, news conference questions regarding a possible freeze on antiballistic missiles were posed to him. Rusk replied “we would regret very much the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major expenditures [for antiballistic missiles].” See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, p. 509.↩
- On March 11, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a revised draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the ENDC. For text of this joint draft, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 162-166. This draft became the subject of an extensive debate in the General Assembly, which reconvened on April 24.↩
- The U.N. Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States convened in Geneva on August 29 and adjourned on September 28.↩