Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

236. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford¹

JCSM-272-68

Washington, April 27, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Arms Control on the Seabed (U)

1. (TS) Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-35409/68, dated 16 April 1968, subject as above, which requested the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft position paper prepared by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).²

b. JCSM-235-68, dated 15 April 1968, subject: “Arms Control Proposals for the Ocean Bottoms (U),” which recommended that the Secretary of Defense forward to the President the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that US support for arms control measures on the seabeds would not be in the national interest at this time and, in fact, would bear a potential for grave harm.³

2. (S) ACDA proposes a treaty in which “each state party to the treaty undertakes not to station or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state.” ACDA also proposes that any verification required for compliance with the seabed arms control agreement would be by “unilateral verification capabilities.”

3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not oppose the consideration of arms control measures provided such measures will not have the effect of weakening the relative strategic posture of the United States and if an effective control system is established. Reference 1b sets forth the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the broad subject of arms control measures on the seabeds. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm those views at this time. In that memorandum, while noting arguments that acceptance of a denuclearization proposal might serve the immediate political purpose of helping to develop a climate of opinion favorable to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the long-range consequences of banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds would be detrimental to the security of the United States. If, in the future, the US nuclear capability were to depend in part on the emplacement of weapons and devices on the ocean bottoms, the option for their use would be politically foreclosed by the terms of this proposed agreement. While it is premature to decide whether the United States should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capacity in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such a requirement is a distinct possibility. It is not a question of current programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal.

4. (TS) Possible future risks to the US nuclear forces include enhanced effects of nuclear weapons, such as X-rays and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), on US strategic missile systems. Another risk can be identified in terms of the advancing technology in long-range underwater surveillance systems. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that scientific or technological breakthroughs could make present US strategic offensive and defensive missile systems vulnerable to enemy attack. To counter this possibility, the United States might well be required to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds.

5. (TS) If “pindown” and submarine vulnerability were to become a reality, the geographical differences between the United States and the USSR would become of great importance. The fact that the Soviet Union has a land area over twice that of the United States gives it an obvious land-development advantage over the United States. However, the United States has a conveniently located territorial base for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whereas Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. Soviet coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range of site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States. Clearly, it would be in the best interests of the USSR if it could offset any US geographical advantages with an international arms control agreement.

6. (S) A distance limit in connection with a seabed arms control proposal would prejudge and reduce the credibility of our current position on territorial seas. This could adversely affect the US bargaining position in forthcoming discussions on the breadth of the territorial sea.

7. (S) The United States does not have a verification capability now, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation has now or will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. In their opinion, an effective control system for a seabed denuclearization agreement could not be developed satisfactorily, and an international agreement by itself accomplishes little unless it can be effectively enforced. An unverifiable agreement could encourage a false sense of security in the United States. Lacking a dependable US detection/verification system, the USSR could probably emplace significant numbers of weapons on the seabeds. It is important to note that even a few nuclear weapons, if properly located, can seriously threaten US security as was amply illustrated by Soviet clandestine emplacement of a few missiles during the Cuban crisis.

8. (S) In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that discussion and/or negotiations concerning the undersea environment should be limited at this time to such matters as scientific research, exploration and exploitation of resources, and establishment of marine parks and preserves. Although future marine research and exploration may well indicate that there could be arms control measures which would be in the national interest, adoption of the present ACDA proposal would not be in the national interest and, in fact, has a potential for grave harm.

9. (U) In view of the wide variety of argumentation presented in the ACDA proposal, additional specific comments are provided in the Appendix.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment⁴

JCSM-272-68

Undated.

APPENDIX

Specific Comments on ACDA Proposal

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the rationale contained in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) proposal are as follows:

A. (C) Background

ACDA implies that the Pardo proposal⁵ was adopted by the UN General Assembly; whereas, in fact, it was not adopted. The UN General Assembly did adopt a US sponsored resolution to establish an ad hoc committee to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor.

B. (TS) Political

1. The statement that the United States should develop a position with regard to the seabed now, before technological possibilities become operational programs, is not supportable. The fact that we do not know the ultimate use of the seabed is reason enough for the United States to retain the option for its future use.

2. ACDA states that the proposed measure could be used to counter less acceptable measures which have been suggested in the UN General Assembly Committee One and the ad hoc committee. It is not appropriate to “counter less acceptable measures” with other unacceptable measures.

3. ACDA’s assumption that its proposal would “preserve the nuclear-free status of the seabed” is insupportable. The value of any agreement which does not include all nuclear-capable nations is questionable.

4. ACDA stresses that its recommended US position would: appear to be forthcoming with respect to the Soviet demilitarization proposal; soothe purported feelings of resentment concerning the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and demonstrate continued cooperation with the USSR in dampening strategic nuclear competition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a potentially vital US strategic advantage should not be offered as a negotiation tactic, believing it to be harmful to the national interest and dangerous to the security of the United States. The NPT should be debated on its own merits. Whatever derivative political benefits might result from the ACDA seabed proposal in terms of approval of the NPT are not at all clear and in no case match the potential substantive US strategic advantage that might thus be lost.

5. ACDA assumes that the 12-mile proposal would:

a. Be more acceptable than other possible formulations.

b. Avoid the issue of the extent of national jurisdiction.

c. Not affect recognition of the breadth of the territorial sea.

These assumptions are not supportable. There is currently substantial support in the world community for a 12-mile territorial sea. The endorsement of a 12-mile limit in connection with an arms control proposal would further reduce the credibility of our current 3-mile position. This could adversely affect the US bargaining position in forthcoming discussions with the USSR on the subject of the breadth of the territorial sea, and weaken US ability to obtain navigational rights for vessels and aircraft which are necessary before a 12-mile limit can be accepted.

C. (TS) Military

1. A prohibition on the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed could be contrary to the security interest of the United States. The USSR and Communist China have a combined land area almost 3-1/2 times that of the United States and its possessions; thus the land-deployment base of our most powerful potential enemies is greatly superior to our own. Conversely, the United States enjoys greater access to ocean areas than do the USSR and Communist China. The ACDA statement, that the emplacement of weapons on the seabed does not appear to offer us any significant strategic advantage because the United States currently has no such program, is not supportable. Although strategic, technological, and economic factors thus far have caused exploitation of the seabeds to be a matter of lesser urgency than other development programs, there is not justification for assuming that this condition will continue to exist indefinitely. Strategic factors such as EMP X-rays and submarine vulnerability may require the United States to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds. It is not a question of current nuclear programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal.

2. The statement that the Soviets would forego the same options to use the seabed as a potential area for deployment as the United States is misleading. If it should become necessary to use the seabed because of possible US strategic vulnerability, giving up options to utilize the seabed could be of greater disadvantage to the United States than to the USSR. Soviet coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range of site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States.

3. The ACDA statement that, within 12 miles of our coasts, the proposal would still leave us with over 140,000 square miles of underwater area for weapon deployment is misleading. Weapon dispersal considerations and the US geographical land deficiency compared to the USSR could dictate seabed weapon deployments in the deep oceans.

D. (TS) Verification

1. ACDA proposes reliance on unilateral verification. It can be stated categorically that the United States does not now have the necessary technology for unilateral verification. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. Any arms control agreements which lack effective verification could work more to the detriment of the security of the United States than no arms control agreement at all. An unverifiable agreement could encourage a false sense of security in the United States while creating an opportunity for nations disposed to exploit or circumvent international agreements to gain significant military advantages.

2. The ACDA assumption that undetected weapons could be limited to “a few” is not supportable. Lacking a dependable US detection/verification system, the USSR could probably covertly emplace significant numbers of weapons on the seabeds. It is important to note that even a few nuclear weapons, if properly located, can seriously threaten US security as was amply illustrated by Soviet clandestine emplacement of a few missiles during the Cuban crisis. In short, in the absence of a detection/verification capability, there can be no real substance to an arms control agreement—only trust—and history testifies to the ineffectiveness of trust in restraining potential enemies.

3. Throughout the paper, ACDA states that the existence of a seabed treaty should deter weapon emplacement and should help the United States to obtain widespread “international support” for whatever response to weapon emplacement on the seabeds by other nations the United States would choose to promote. The degree and effectiveness of this “support” is doubtful. Neither the existence of the Limited Test Ban Treaty nor world opinion against atmospheric testing has restrained Communist China and France from continuing such nuclear tests.

4. ACDA states that its proposal was drafted to provide assurance that the collective security interest of the United States and its allies would be protected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposal has a potential for grave harm and that some of our allies may take the same view.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 388.3, January 1968. Top Secret.
2. The ISA memorandum of April 16 has not been further identified, but the “draft position paper” is presumably a reference to ACDA’s April 12 proposal to the members of the Committee of Principals on arms control on the seabed; see footnote 4, Document 233.
3. See Document 234.
4. Top Secret.
5. For the statements by the Maltese Representative, Pardo, to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, November 1, 1967, in which five proposals for inclusion in a treaty on the peaceful uses of the ocean floor and seabed were advocated for adoption by the United Nations, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 547-554.