231. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Bohlen) to
Secretary of State Rusk1
ACDA-2915
Washington, April 5, 1968.
SUBJECT
- US-Soviet Strategic Missile Negotiations
On March 16, following a briefing which ACDA
gave you, you instructed me to form a committee to examine the ACDA recommendations on controlling the
strategic arms race. This review has now been
[Page 565]
completed by representatives of the Department, ACDA, and DOD/ISA, and I wish to submit
for your consideration and approval the following proposals.
Though the working group was initially in substantial agreement on these
proposals, I understand that Ambassador Foster has certain reservations and will be submitting to
you a separate memorandum on the subject. However, the proposals set forth
in this memorandum have the full approval of Ambassador Thompson and DOD/ISA. They will be presented
simultaneously by DOD/ISA to Secretary Clifford. If you and Secretary Clifford agree on them, they will be checked with the JCS prior to submission to the President for
his approval.
Objectives
The main aim of the US in engaging the Soviets in negotiations on strategic
missiles would be to reach an agreement which would maintain a stable
US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship, primarily by controlling the
number of offensive and defensive missile launchers. Even if unsuccessful in
this quest, the US would benefit indirectly from such talks. They would
promote a better understanding of the concerns each side has in the
developing missile race. Also, a new US-Soviet agreement to hold such talks,
if announced in the near future, would help
secure support for the NPT (see below).
Initial Negotiating Position
The US should be prepared to submit a concrete initial negotiating position
to the Soviets even prior to their agreement to set a date for talks. Some
Soviet contacts have intimated that such a step would help the Soviet
Government (i.e., those favoring talks) to reach a positive decision on this
matter. It would be taken as an earnest of our intent and help remove doubts
that, in proposing talks, we were merely bent on an intelligence fishing
expedition.
The attached initial negotiating position (Tab A), drafted in the form of an
oral statement to be presented by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, is a revised version of the paper
submitted to you, the Secretary of Defense, and the Acting Director of
ACDA in early March.2 It incorporates recommendations made by
ACDA relating to the general principles
which would underlie a strategic arms agreement. However, like its immediate
predecessor, it essentially is based on the draft proposal approved by you
on September 23, but modified to take account of objections subsequently
voiced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.3
[Page 566]
Whatever may be the decision on the timing of the delivery of this oral
statement, it would be desirable to reach agreement now within the US
Government on an initial negotiating position, so as to provide a base for
further examination of the problem and to be prepared for talks should they
eventuate.
Timing of Presentation
As for timing the proposed initiative, both you and Secretary Clifford indicated in early March that the
time was not ripe for such a move. This may still be the case today.
However, new considerations have arisen. The President’s initiative, and the
North Vietnamese response, on limiting bombing have cast a better
international climate in regard to the Vietnam War. Also, on March 14, the
ENDC completed its work on the NPT and submitted a draft treaty to the UN General Assembly for its consideration and
endorsement. Preliminary soundings indicate that General Assembly support
for the NPT may be anything but
overwhelming. A number of non-nuclear weapons states have complained, among
other objections, that the nuclear powers have assumed no meaningful
obligation under the NPT to move forward
with the business of disarmament.
In order to dispel this charge, as well as to hold out an added inducement to
the Soviets to agree to talks, it is recommended that Ambassador Thompson deliver the proposed statement
under Tab A promptly after his return to Moscow (April 17) and that he
preface this statement with a message from the President to Chairman
Kosygin (Tab B), arguing that it
would be advantageous to the cause of the NPT if the US and USSR were to
announce during the General Assembly session their agreement to commence on
a given date bilateral discussions of limitations on strategic arms.4
Negotiating Tactics
Once negotiations begin, we should pursue in parallel discussions of concrete
proposals and of principles, embodying the concept of an agreed limitation
on the strategic arms race. The latter dialogue would be helpful in
convincing the Soviets of the desirability of our proposal, as well as in
obtaining a clearer idea of Soviet thinking on this arms-disarmament
complex, which in turn might influence our final negotiating position. The
general principles contained in the ACDA
briefing paper of March 16 could serve as guidelines for such a
discussion.
[Page 567]
Negotiating Problems and Alternatives
It is recognized that our initial negotiation position contains a number of
significant omissions and almost certainly would be challenged by the
Soviets on certain points. Several of them were examined in the ACDA study. In some problem areas, it would be
relatively easy to construct convincing rebuttals. In other cases, we might
at some point want to reconsider our position. However, I do not recommend
that decisions on these problem issues be made at this point. This would
have to be done after negotiations have been in progress for some time and
we have a clearer idea of Soviet intentions.
I understand that S/P, at your instruction, is
preparing a separate study on the problem of strategic arms control and that
it proposes a rather substantial reduction of missiles. This study will be
given careful consideration and may prove useful for future contingencies.
However, I believe that, at this stage at least, our aim should be to obtain
Soviet agreement to level off the strategic arms race.
Alternative contingency proposals such as this could be considered by the
Committee of Principals.
Recommended Action
- (1)
- That you approve the proposed oral statement set forth in Tab A,
either to be delivered shortly (see below) or to be held as a
contingency position.
- (2)
- That you approve the proposed Presidential letter to Chairman
Kosygin (Tab B), to be
delivered along with the above oral statement by Ambassador Thompson on his return to Moscow.5
[Page 568]
Tab A6
Action: AmEmbassy Moscow. Subject: Strategic Missile Talks.
- 1.
- You should seek earliest opportunity to approach Kosygin or highest available
responsible Soviet official to request again a favorable response to
our proposal7 for early talks on
strategic missile controls. You should outline our views on possible
strategic missile controls and on desirability of early talks, as
set forth below; text of your oral remarks may at your discretion be
left with Soviets.
- 2.
-
Begin Text: The United States Government
initially proposed discussion on strategic anti-ballistic missile
systems because of our belief that deployment of such systems, even
if justified in military terms, could not help but spur on a new and
costly cycle of the strategic nuclear arms race. We agreed, however,
in the very first exchange of views with the Soviet Government’s
suggestion that such discussions should include offensive strategic
nuclear missile delivery systems, as well as anti-missile defensive
systems. This has remained throughout, and continues to be, the
position of the United States Government.
- 3.
- The United States Government has proposed these talks within the
framework of the Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961,8 accepted by our
two Governments as a basis for disarmament negotiations and as
offering the best means to begin to make progress towards general
and complete disarmament. As we have noted earlier, we believe that
it should be possible to reach agreement more quickly on important
limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without waiting
for agreement on all of the difficult problems inevitably involved
in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that
measures to curb the strategic arms race would help pave the way for
substantial reductions, and would have great value in themselves
inasmuch as they would avoid a further costly and possibly dangerous
spiral of strategic missile deployments. The first step in achieving
meaningful strategic arms control should be to restrain the further
growth of strategic forces. It may not
[Page 569]
prove easy to find mutually acceptable
limitations, but we are prepared to work earnestly toward that end,
and we assume what you will as well.
- 4.
- It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on
steps to curtail the strategic arms race, and even to make
reductions in existing forces, without the necessary participation
of others. Moreover, early agreement between our two countries would
be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries
would sign and continue to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
We will be demonstrating that we are moving toward disarmament as we
are committed by the treaty to try to do.
- 5.
- Over a year has passed since we first proposed these discussions.
Not only is delay regrettable, but the problem which we are facing
can become more difficult with time. However, our task is to take
account of the existing situation in devising mutually acceptable
measures to curtail the strategic arms race. As each month goes by,
the existing situation is one of greater and more complex armaments
on both sides. An agreement a year ago, when the United States first
proposed talks, might have prevented many of the increases on both
sides which are now in process. An agreement today to curtail future
deployments would have the same effect as an agreement a year from
now to effect a reduction in deployed weapons; it should also be
easier to negotiate, and would result in important savings of
resources for us both.
- 6.
- We recognize that limiting strategic arms consistent with our
mutual interests and common goals is a complex task, given the
nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile
systems and the many factors affecting and determining military
capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of
strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical
evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems.
However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic
arms limitations can be attained provided we start with a common
understanding of a problem and are striving for similar goals. In
this context, we believe that there are some basic principles
underlying the early achievement of any such mutually beneficial
restraints on the strategic arms race.
- 7.
- Any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced strategic
postures acceptable to both sides and should include both offensive
and defensive weapons systems. Both sides should be confident of a
reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related
fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic
relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. It
would be futile for us to attempt to define such concepts as
“superiority” or “parity”, these notions have little meaning in a
situation, such as the present, in which each of us is certain that
the other has the capability under any circumstances to inflict
unacceptable damage. We recognize that some adjustments
[Page 570]
in the deployment of the
strategic forces of each side might be appropriate. Such adjustments
would be designed to meet our common objective of providing
assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or
enhanced, while at the same time avoiding possible disruptive
effects and the great cost of a continuation of the strategic arms
race.
- 8.
- Our respective national means of verification should be adequate
for achieving meaningful strategic arms control constraints. The
United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing
maximum reliance on such verification of limitations on deployment
of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. For other more
comprehensive measures, some supplementary inspection arrangements
may be required; we would be prepared to include the minimum
inspection necessary for effective verification. Our position on
this subject is flexible and is governed by the principles that
verification of compliance with agreed undertakings is necessary,
that maximum reliance should be placed on unilateral ability to
verify compliance, and that when additional procedures are required
for adequate verification, they must, of course, be provided.
- 9.
- With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States
suggests that consideration be given to cessation of the initiation
of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile
launchers. This weapon category should include strategic missiles of
medium and intermediate range (ranges greater than 1,000 KM), as
well as longer-range intercontinental missiles. If the agreement
were to be limited to fixed land-based missile systems, we would be
prepared to rely exclusively on national means of verification. In
view of the difficulty of verifying through national means the
deployment of sea-based or mobile land-based strategic missile
launchers, the possibility of an agreed limitation applying to these
weapons could be the subject of discussion.
- 10.
- The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-missile
systems is more complex. While some ABM systems may be required in light of the offensive
strategic missile systems of other countries, we must recognize that
as far as our own two countries are concerned they may also be an
important factor in the strategic balance between us. This
importance will, of course, be increased if there are agreed
limitations on offensive missile systems. In general, it would seem
that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile
defensive systems would be an agreed number of anti-missile
launchers and associated radars which each side could deploy. As in
the case of strategic offensive missile systems, we believe that
national means of verification would provide assurance with respect
to the scale of deployment of fixed land-based defensive
anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated radars. Concerning
land-mobile or sea-based anti-ballistic missile systems, the same
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considerations would
prevail as are noted above in regard to mobile offensive
systems.
- 11.
- The United States Government has presented these views in the
expectation that representatives of our two Governments will meet
shortly to discuss these matters.
End Text.9
Tab B10
Action: AmEmbassy Moscow. Subject: Strategic Missile Talks.
1. You should deliver without delay the following personal message from
President Johnson to Kosygin:
Begin Text:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Ambassador Thompson has informed
me of the talk he had with Foreign Minister Gromyko on March 26. Concerning the proposal for our two
governments to hold discussions with the aim of controlling the
strategic arms race, I understand Foreign Minister Gromyko to say that the Soviet
Government is still studying the problem and that it attaches great
importance to it.
I am gratified with the latter statement because it corresponds to my
deep conviction about the need for such negotiations. I am concerned,
however, about the necessity to initiate meaningful discussion as soon
as possible. As the United States Government has noted in previous
communications, each passing month increases the difficulty of reaching
agreement on this matter as, from a technical and military point of
view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an additional
consideration, which leads me to write you this letter.
As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly has begun its
deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft
represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments. I am
confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the maximum
number of adherents. During the resumed GA session our efforts to achieve a treaty that can be
opened for signature in the near future with the prospect of obtaining a
maximum number of adherents will face a most critical test. Efforts
undoubtedly will be made by some states to
[Page 572]
postpone the opening of the treaty for signature
at least until after the conference of non-nuclear-weapon states has
been held in the fall of this year. It is important that our two
governments do everything possible to give the greatest impetus to world
sentiment favorable to opening the treaty for signature at an early
date.
To this end, I propose that our two governments announce early in the
course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to commence
bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and
defensive missiles within a specific time from the date of the
announcement. I am convinced that such a declaration, of primary
importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion
of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Through these private bilateral discussions it should be possible for our
two countries to reach some agreement on initial steps for curtailing
the strategic arms race. We believe that equitable and mutually
beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained provided we can
reach a common understanding of the problem and are striving for similar
goals. In our view, any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced
strategic postures acceptable to both sides and should include both
offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both sides should be confident
of a reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related
fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic
relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. We
continue to believe that meaningful strategic arms control constraints
involving limitations on the deployment of certain strategic offensive
and defensive weapons systems can be adequately verified by relying on
our respective national capabilities. Progress on controlling the
strategic arms race, while important in itself, will also contribute to
our mutual objective of achieving and maintaining the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
I hope and trust that these actions will bring our two governments into
closer working relationships.
Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson
End.11
