Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

279. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, July 26, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Status of Negotiations with Ambassador Bunker over West New Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary Governor Harriman, FE
  • Mr. Tyler, EUR
  • Mr. Bell, FE
  • Mr. Stone, WE
• Dutch
  • Ambassador van Roijen
  • Minister Schiff
  • Jonkheer Huydecoper

The Secretary told the Ambassador that he understood that he had had a conversation the previous evening with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio. Ambassador van Roijen said that this had been his second talk with Subandrio. On the surface the talks were not going badly since the Dutch had made concessions as they wanted to convince the Indonesians of Dutch good faith in the negotiations. The Dutch had come to the negotiations on the assumption they were going to talk about the Bunker proposals. It now appeared that the Indonesians had tried to change the proposals on almost every point. The question had arisen as to what this all meant. Yesterday evening Subandrio had said that the Indonesians had wanted to end any Dutch or UN administration of West New Guinea by the end of 1962. However, they were not going to fight a war over two months but they could not agree to a UN administration over the territory which would last a year.

On the matter of self-determination Subandrio had repeated much more stringently than before that all the points which Stavropoulos of the UN had put forward regarding the referendum were intervening too far and had constituted a manner of control which was humiliating to the Indonesian people. On two essential elements of the Bunker proposals this marked a step backward. Subandrio was much more sticky regarding self-determination and he was obdurate on the matter of timing. He ended the conversation by stating that he was leaving Saturday¹ to return to Djakarta. When asked if that would not constitute a breaking up of the talks, he had shrugged his shoulders.

Ambassador van Roijen said that the talks were not unfriendly but that it was made clear that the Indonesians would not give on one point, namely that of timing. He had stressed to Subandrio the difficulties involved in any transfer of administration and pointed out that a full year would be needed if such transfer were to be carried out in orderly fashion. A hasty transfer would run the grave risk of developing into a situation similar to that which had existed in the Congo. Ambassador van Roijen said that this talk looked very much as though it were an ultimatum. The Indonesians were saying either take a five month period for UN administration and less guarantees regarding self-determination or else they were going to move militarily. The Indonesians had pointed out that they were building up their military force and that they were not going to stop this build up, even though they realized that it was expensive and might even mean the economic collapse of Indonesia. It was partly for this reason that they could not stretch out the length of UN administration for a year.

The Secretary asked if the Bunker proposals had been made public in Indonesia. Mr. Tyler replied that they had been made public in New York by U Thant. The Secretary asked if the text of the proposals had been publicized within Indonesia. No one present knew. Ambassador van Roijen said that the Indonesians had made a great point of indicating that they had expressed reservations regarding the matter of timing when they agreed to negotiate on the basis of the Bunker plan. He said that the Dutch had never been informed of any such reservations by the United States and since their only contact with Indonesia was through United States representatives the Ambassador felt that if this was the case and the Dutch had not been informed of any such Indonesian reservations then they had agreed to meet under false circumstances. The Secretary inquired what the Ambassador’s schedule was for the rest of the day. The Ambassador said he was meeting with Ambassador Bunker and Subandrio at 2 p.m. at the Indonesian Ambassador’s residence. Ambassador Bunker had informed him that he was trying to arrange an appointment for the President to see Subandrio and if this could be arranged it might alter their appointment.

Governor Harriman said that he understood that Ambassador Bunker had made a suggestion to the Dutch Ambassador which would involve agreement that the transfer of administration to the UN would take place as soon as possible after an Indonesian-Dutch agreement was signed and that it might additionally be possible to give the Acting Secretary General the authority to begin the transfer of administration from the UN to Indonesia under a year if the transfer of administration appeared to be running smoothly. Ambassador van Roijen replied that Ambassador Bunker had shown him some pencilled suggestions which he had put down in draft along these lines but he had informed Ambassador Bunker that these proposals would not be acceptable to his Government. He understood that the Ambassador had not made these proposals to Ambassador Malik. Ambassador van Roijen said that the Dutch had met the Indonesians more than half way, in fact they had gone ninety percent of the way. He had in fact demonstrated flexibility regarding the transfer of administration to Indonesia during the second year and he had stuck his neck out with his own Government in doing so. The Dutch had not asked for even one change in the Bunker proposals. Another point that had been brought up in his talks with Subandrio had been the question of Indonesian guerrillas who had been dropped by parachute. On that one point Subandrio had seemed to be reasonable. He had said that the Indonesian paratroops could be confined to barracks and could be placed under the command of UN officers. They could then constitute a part of the UN security force.

Mr. Bell joined the meeting at this point and indicated that the Indonesians had made no specific reservations regarding the transfer of administration to Indonesia during the first phase at the time they agreed to resume negotiations on the basis of the Bunker proposals. Sukarno had, however, made many public statements calling for the transfer of the territory to Indonesia before the end of 1962. Ambassador van Roijen said that when the Dutch had accepted the Bunker proposals they knew nothing about any reservations. The Secretary commented that possibly the Indonesians themselves had transformed their stated negotiating objective into a reservation. Ambassador van Roijen said that Subandrio had told him that the Indonesians had made reservations all along and that he could ask Secretary Rusk if this were not the case. Subandrio then laid great emphasis on the fact that many things had now changed in the picture since the Indonesians had agreed to negotiate on the basis of the Bunker plan. Of course, all these changes had been brought about by the Indonesians themselves, such as the fact that they had dropped paratroopers into the territory.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador what his information was regarding the military situation in West New Guinea. Ambassador van Roijen replied that the Indonesian military buildup was serious. The Indonesians had stated that they were going to continue the military buildup and continue to spend money on it because they had no confidence in the good faith of the Dutch and they had to be prepared for Dutch “booby traps”. Ambassador van Roijen said that he could assure Subandrio that the Dutch would start immediately to withdraw their troops if an agreement was reached and that the Dutch could complete their military withdrawal from the territory within six months.

Militarily the Ambassador could not see what more the Indonesians could do than to occupy a beachhead in the area of Sorong on the Vogelkop. The question was what they expected to do then. He supposed that they could say that then they had accomplished their objectives militarily. In response to the Secretary’s question whether he had been alone during his talk with Subandrio the Ambassador replied in the affirmative. He said that Ambassador Zain had been present during his first conversation but that last night he had been alone.

The Ambassador said that he had had a telephone conversation with the Prime Minister that morning. There was to be a meeting of the Dutch cabinet tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock. The Prime Minister had said that the Dutch must know where the United States stood. They wanted to know if the U.S. would stand by the Bunker proposals or leave the Dutch in the lurch. The Secretary restated the present situation by saying it was the Ambassador’s definite impression that Subandrio had been called back and was to leave on Saturday. Moreover the two basic points at issue were the matter of timing of the transfer of administration and guarantees for self-determination for the Papuan people. Ambassador van Roijen confirmed that this was the case and said that undoubtedly the Russians were pressing the Indonesians to use the matériel that they had given them.

The Secretary said that the President did want to see Subandrio and that he would get in touch with the Ambassador by the end of the day² He asked if the Dutch had any way of sensing whether the Indonesian position was merely tactical or serious. Ambassador van Roijen said that the Dutch had no way of knowing this.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/7–2762. Secret. Drafted by Stone and approved in S on August 2. The meeting ended at noon. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)
1. July 28.
2. See Document 281.