Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

281. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, July 26, 1962, 7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Possible Breakdown in Dutch-Indonesian Negotiations Over West New Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador van Roijen, Netherlands Embassy
• Mr. Emil Schiff, Minister, Netherlands Embassy
• The Secretary
• Governor Harriman
• Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR
• Mr. Woodruff Wallner, IO
• Mr. Galen L. Stone, WE

The Secretary asked the Ambassador what he saw as the question that would be coming before the Dutch Cabinet meeting tomorrow (Friday, July 27 at 10:00 a.m.). Ambassador van Roijen said that the question before the Cabinet would be what could the Dutch expect from the U.S. in the present situation and on the answer would depend what action the Dutch Cabinet would take. The Secretary said that we wanted to know what the U.S. could expect from the Netherlands. Ambassador van Roijen said that in the event of an Indonesian attack the answer was obvious. The Dutch would meet force with force. It was clear that the Australians were not going to assist them. Therefore, the Dutch needed to know what the Americans were going to do.

The Secretary said he had just returned from a meeting alone with the President and Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio.¹Subandrio had confirmed that he was returning to Djakarta on Saturday. When he was asked if that meant that the Indonesians were breaking off the talks, he said it did not mean that. The President had pointed out that if that did mean breaking off the talks he should clarify it publicly. The President told him that he should stay to continue the negotiations or if he could not remain that at least Ambassador Malik should stay on. The President had also pointed out that it would be insane for the Indonesians to start shooting about something that was already in hand. Such actions would not be understood by anyone. While the use of force might look appealing and glamorous on the first day or two, such a course of action was utterly unpredictable. The majority of the U.N. would not understand it if the Indonesians started shooting when the possibility of a settlement was at hand. The United States would be asked to take part and there would be a general feeling of revulsion in this country. Subandrio had said that he had urged Sukarno not to make any decisions with regard to major military moves until he returned. The Secretary commented that Subandrio did not say, however, that he had had any reply from Sukarno on this point.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador if the Dutch had been considering under what circumstances they would throw the dispute into the U.N. Ambassador van Roijen said that this had not previously been considered but he thought the Cabinet might consider this at its meeting tomorrow. The Secretary said that if U Thant got no satisfaction out of Subandrio when he met with him tomorrow and Subandrio and Malik went home early thus breaking off the negotiations, it would be inconceivable to him that two-thirds of the General Assembly would not support a “don’t shoot but talk” policy. Ambassador van Roijen said that it would be necessary first to go to the Security Council where there would be a Soviet veto and then go on to the Assembly. But before going to the General Assembly it would be necessary to have seven votes in the Security Council for action under the Uniting for Peace procedure. Mr. Wallner was confident that we could get seven votes from the four Permanent Representatives, Ireland, and the two Latin American nations. The Secretary asked if he was correct that there were no resolutions presently outstanding regarding West New Guinea. Mr. Wallner confirmed that this was the case. He said that if this matter were brought to the Security Council the preference would be to have it raised by U Thant, Australia, a friendly member of the Council, ourselves or the Dutch, in that order. The Secretary commented that the one who thought that he was under threat had the clearest interest in bringing the matter to the Security Council. Mr. Wallner pointed out that there was a dear advantage to U Thant’s raising the matter under Article 99. However, he might decide not to do this. Then we should weigh carefully to whom the initiative should fall. If we were able to get the Indians to abstain in the General Assembly then it would be easy for us to get a two-thirds vote. Ambassador van Roijen said he was not sure that we would be able to get a two-thirds vote and there were a lot of ifs involved. He was afraid that by that time military operations would have long since been underway. The General Assembly action would amount to a post mortem. Mr. Wallner said he thought that we could get an emergency session together fast

Ambassador van Roijen asked if there was no other way to prevent the Indonesians from starting something. The Dutch had done everything on their part to come to an agreement. The Ambassador said that what he understood was that the United States was unwilling to bring sufficient pressure on the Indonesians to deter them from military action and make an agreement possible The Secretary said that he had not said that. Ambassador van Roijen asked if the Secretary could deny it. The Secretary said the first thing to decide was what the Dutch Government would do. Ambassador van Roijen said that the Dutch were going to fight and asked if the U.S. was going to fight with them. The Secretary asked if the Dutch were going to fight at the present stage of the negotiations. Ambassador van Roijen said that he thought that the Dutch were negotiating on the basis of the Bunker proposals. The Secretary said that he was asking if the Dutch had said their last word. Ambassador van Roijen said that Subandrio had said in reply to his question that if he was implying that the Indonesians were trying to alter the Bunker proposals he was correct. He asked what the U.S. expected the Dutch to do. The Secretary said he was not expecting anything. Ambassador van Roijen said it was obvious that if the talks were broken off it would be on Indonesian responsibility. He wondered in this circumstance if the Dutch could count on the full support of the United States in the U.N. The Secretary said there was no question of that. Ambassador van Roijen said that you can break off and be right and you can break off and be wrong. He thought the least the U.S. could do would be to make it clear to the world where responsibility for the breakup of the talks would lie. The Secretary said he would like first to prevent the breaking off of the talks. Ambassador van Roijen agreed.

Note: The Secretary then asked to see the Ambassador alone.² Before the others present departed, however, Ambassador van Roijen said that he wanted to make it clear to everyone that anything he said was in no way directed against Ambassador Bunker, whom he felt had carried out his task in exemplary fashion.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/7–2662. Secret. Drafted by Stone and approved in S on August 2.
1. The President and Rusk met with Subandrio from 6 to 6:32 p.m. but no memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) Writing to Bundy on July 27, Komer reported that “Bunker’s sense is that JFK scared the living daylights out of Subandrio.” (Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, July 27; ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 7/62) Rusk gave Jones an account of the meeting with Subandrio in Document 284.
2. Rusk met with van Roijen alone from 7:50 to 8:20. Then he met with Harriman, Tyler, Bunker, Wallner, and Stone until 9:25 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)