Attachment
TALKING PAPER
for your Meeting with Foreign Minister Subandrio
The Dutch-Indonesian talks on West New Guinea on the basis of Ambassador
Bunker’s formula (Tab A)2 are currently at an impasse over
three main problems:
- (a)
- Indonesian insistence on shortening the minimum one year period of
interim UN administration prior to
transfer of administration to Indonesia;
- (b)
- Indonesian efforts to minimize the role of the United Nations at
the time of self-determination; and
- (c)
- The status of the Indonesian paratroopers in the territory during
the period of interim UN
administration.
The Dutch delegation has sought to adhere strictly to the provisions of
the Bunker formula, while
exhibiting flexibility on relatively minor points. Indonesia, on the
other hand, has sought to modify the Bunker formula, both in respect to the length of interim
UN administration and in interpreting
UN participation in the act of
self-determination to mean observation only.
In regard to Problem (a) Ambassador Bunker on July 23 suggested a compromise formulation
(Tab B) to Ambassador van Roijen
which would give the Secretary General discretionary authority to begin
the
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transfer of administration
to Indonesia prior to the end of the one year minimum period if, in his
opinion, the phasing out of the Dutch has progressed smoothly and
earlier transfer of administrative control was in the interest of the
inhabitants of the territory. Ambassador van Roijen maintained his Government’s position that it
could not accept a shortening of the one year period contained in the
Bunker formula. Nevertheless,
if Indonesia were to be forthcoming on guarantees and safeguards for
self-determination, in the interest of a peaceful settlement the
Netherlands Government might agree to Ambassador Bunker’s compromise.
As for Problem (b) Indonesia has consistently sought to minimize the
United Nations role in the act of self-determination. At Ambassador
Bunker’s suggestion, and with
the agreement of both sides, the UN Legal
Counsel presented suggested principles and procedures on
self-determination which would have provided for regular UN plebiscite machinery. (Tab C) The
Netherlands delegation accepted the Legal Counselor’s proposals. The
Indonesian delegation rejected them on the grounds that they derogated
from the Bunker formula’s
provision that Indonesia make arrangements, with the assistance and
participation of the United Nations, for the act of self-determination.
At the suggestion of the Indonesian delegation, and with the Netherlands
delegation’s concurrence, Ambassador Bunker, on July 25, presented a compromise on
self-determination (Tab D) to both sides which, while providing for
UN participation, circumscribes the
UN role. Ambassador van Roijen has indicated that this
compromise might be acceptable to the Netherlands. No official reaction
has been received from the Indonesian delegation as yet.
On Problem (c), in a conversation with Ambassador van Roijen on July 25, Foreign
Minister Subandrio indicated that
Indonesia might be prepared to have the Indonesian paratroopers in the
territory assembled in barracks under the authority of UN officers. We believe that some such
arrangement will be satisfactory to the Netherlands and to the Secretary
General.
You may wish to make the following points to Foreign Minister Subandrio:
- 1.
- The United States continues to believe that the Bunker plan offers a framework
for a peaceful solution honorable to both sides.
- 2.
- The Netherlands Government has made the principal concession
in agreeing to transfer all administrative control of the
territory to Indonesia prior to the act of
self-determination.
- 3.
- If agreement is reached within the framework of the Bunker proposals, Indonesia will
have achieved through diplomacy its primary objective of control
of the territory.
- 4.
- President Sukarno will
then be able to say to the Indonesian people that the transfer
of the territory to Indonesia has begun. Through skill,
patience, statesmanship, and magnanimity, President Sukarno and
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Minister Subandrio will have brought to a brilliant
conclusion the Indonesian revolution.
- 5.
- The United States Government is firmly convinced that the
Dutch Government, having accepted the Bunker proposals in principle, will faithfully
implement an agreement reached with the Indonesian Government
within the framework of the Bunker plan.
- 6.
- Indonesia should not insist on an alteration of the Bunker proposals which might
jeopardize the attainment of an agreement.
- 7.
- Ratification of the agreement and its subsequent execution
will be facilitated to the extent that the agreement adheres to
the Bunker
proposals.
- 8.
- A peaceful and honorable settlement of this dispute will
benefit Indonesia in the following ways:
- (a)
- By enhancing the stature and reputation of Indonesia,
President Sukarno,
and Minister Subandrio in world opinion;
- (b)
- Economic progress will be stimulated whereas
hostilities would impose a tragic drain on Indonesia’s
resources;
- (c)
- The restoration of economic and diplomatic relations
with the Dutch which, in the long run, will benefit
Indonesia as well as the Netherlands.
- 9.
- We are convinced that a peaceful and honorable settlement is
in sight. There is no justification for further sacrifice of
human life. The alternative to a negotiated solution would be
tragic.
- 10.
- Sincere friendship for the Indonesian people and respect for
President Sukarno
- 11.
- The United States has made a great effort to assist in
bringing about a peaceful settlement of this dispute. We have
committed our prestige to this effort. A sudden attack on West
New Guinea when a peaceful solution seems possible would raise
grave problems for the United States at a time when we have
assumed major responsibilities in Southeast Asia.
- 12.
- It is easy to start a war but very difficult to control its
course, limit its scope or stop it. I wish solemnly to state
that if a major attack is mounted against West New Guinea the
United States would be faced with very grave decisions with
respect to our own attitude and course of action. We can not be
indifferent to the safety of lives in West New Guinea
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if fighting occurs at
a moment when a peaceful solution is clearly in sight.3
- 13.
- If Subandrio indicates
his intention to return to Djakarta this weekend, he should be
urged to remain here to continue the negotiations. If Subandrio must depart then, at
least, Malik should stay
to continue the talks with Ambassador Bunker. On his departure Subandrio should be asked to make
a public announcement that he was going home for consultations
and that he would be returning to the negotiations.
