Office of the Historian

278. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy0

Washington, July 26, 1962.

Secretary Rusk is seeing van Roijen on Indonesia at 11:30 this morning,1 and I think it would be wise for you to have two words with the Secretary before he leaves.

Subandrio and van Roijen had a long private talk last night and while there is no agreement, there is no impasse. Subandrio, van Roijen and Bunker are having another session this afternoon. The discussion is turning on ways and means of giving Subandrio some more to wave while not moving from the essentials of the Bunker plan in any way that will humiliate the Dutch.

The reason for you to have a word with the Secretary is simply to be sure that you and he have the same basic feel of the matter. One of his messages from Geneva showed a considerable eagerness to be tough with Sukarno.2 The time for that may be coming but it might be dangerous if he were to show this move to van Roijen at this stage. Our interest is still to have a peaceful settlement with as much face-saving for both sides as possible. The Dutch have made it clear that they will not fight if it comes to war, and we really do not want Sukarno to have a military victory with massive Soviet backing.

McG.B.3
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. II, 7/62–8/62. No classification marking.↩
  2. See Document 279.↩
  3. In Secto 52 from Geneva, July 25, Rusk commented: “It seems absurd to me that Sukarno insists on transfer during 1962 simply because he has made a speech or two promising that this will happen. We don’t let Khrushchev get away with such tactics. I feel strongly that US cannot press Dutch to yield on this point without surrender our own integrity and self respect. Sukarno can announce in 1962 that his object has been achieved. Most politicians have to settle for less. Unless matter cannot be held for my return tonight suggest you discuss with President possibility of direct message to Sukarno pointing out that world would be indignant if fighting should break out over this point of no substance and that such fighting would not be just a simple matter between Indonesians and Dutch.” (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/7–2562)↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials:↩