Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

207. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, December 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

I picked up at the State Department this morning both an FE draft of the letter from the President to Sukarno¹ and a draft of the recommendations section of the broader paper on West New Guinea which has been in preparation this week.² There was a meeting at 11:00 this morning, attended by Mr. Harriman and Harlan Cleveland, at which the FE draft was tabled along with a separate draft from IO. The discussion continued during the lunch hour and the formal meeting reconvened at 2:15. I have no information on the outcome of the meeting yet.³

The FE draft recommendations contain an interesting tactical proposal for creation of a bilateral Dutch-Indonesian “technical commission” to deal with the issues outstanding between the two countries. (This would bypass preconditions both sides have laid down for discussions of WNG alone.) However, like every State Department paper that has been produced on West New Guinea, this one is terribly fuzzy on the subject of exactly what kind of solution we would like to see. Even more important, it contains no recognition whatsoever of the fact that negotiations can succeed, and can hold but some promise to the Indonesians of succeeding, only if we are prepared to use our influence with the Dutch to attempt to get them to negotiate seriously and to recognize that self-determination is not the final answer. I believe that the fundamental reason for this continuous fuzziness if our failure to recognize clearly that West New Guinea is ultimately going to go to Indonesia and that the real problem is to find a way to effect the transfer. The reasons for the fuzziness are complex, but they include the divisions within the Department, and the Secretary’s dislike for Sukarno and concern over Australian views.

The FE draft of the letter from the President to Sukarno was defective in three respects:

a. It failed to exploit the point that Ambassador Jones has made—that whatever else the Indonesians may feel about our actions in the UN, they do recognize (and could be reminded) that our talks with the Dutch resulted in a Dutch decision to give up West New Guinea.

b. The heart of the message was a simple offer to help the disputants find a solution by direct negotiations. It did not state that we would use our influence with the Dutch in an effort to find a solution that can be accepted by Indonesia. The key to a solution is a change in the Dutch attitude (and to a slightly lesser extent, in the Australian attitude). The Indonesians have long wanted us to use our influence with the Dutch and Sukarno indicated in his recent conversation with Jones that this was the kind of specific help he is now seeking. Without such an indication our offer will not have the specific content that Jones has requested. It will have much the same flavor as previous efforts at reassurance. Such general reassurances have been employed so often that their value has been depreciated, particularly since Sukarno takes the view, with some justification, that our actions in the UN indicated not that we wanted a solution acceptable to both sides but rather that we were abandoning our policy of neutrality and siding with the Dutch.

c. The FE draft contained a reference to the possibility that, if the Indonesians took military action, friend might be pitted against friend. It seemed to me that this has the flavor of a threat that we would intervene on the side of the Dutch—something that we have not decided (and I hope never will decide) to do.

I have made all of the above points to the FE drafter of the message but have been unable to make them to those actually involved in the State meetings because of my inability to reach them. The FE drafter indicated that the point referred to in c above was put in, not in the expectation that it would be left in the final version, but rather as a stimulus to consideration of the alternatives by which we may be faced.

I have discussed the FE draft in some detail because, for all of its caution, it probably represents the “extreme” end of the spectrum. What we can expect to receive will be even less clear-cut and even further from what is required. This discussion may be useful background to our reaction to the State draft.

State is attempting to get a draft letter prepared today. It fears that if we wait until the President returns tomorrow the message may not get to Jones in time.

A recent message from London indicates that the British, who have previously thought that the U.S. was too exercised about the West New Guinea problem, now consider the situation most dangerous.⁴ This development can be used by us if we ever decide clearly on our own position. We should be able to build on the British concern as a means of getting them to influence the Australians away from their very short-sighted policy.

I learned that there is no contingency planning covering U.S. action in the event that the Dutch do attack West New Guinea.⁵ I suspect that one reason why there is no such plan is the impossibility of the choices. Nonetheless, I think that one thing that would be useful at this stage would be a request that such contingency planning be initiated. It would be one way of forcing us to face up to the ultimate choices and to weigh the importance of the ultimate loss of Indonesia against the danger of our relationships to the Dutch and the Australians.⁶

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 12/6/61–12/10/61. Secret.
1. For the letter as approved and sent and a related cable, see Documents 210 and 209, respectively.
2. The recommendations section apparently became the basis of Document 209.
3. No other records of these meetings have been found.
4. Not further identified.
5. An INR estimate assessed the military balance between the Dutch and Indonesian forces in the context of West New Guinea: Military intelligence officers were unsure of Indonesian amphibious and airlift capabilities and were skeptical of Indonesian ability to airlift many troops. The Dutch had three destroyers, miscellaneous smaller naval craft, and some naval patrol aviation, but there was little information on Dutch air strength in West New Guinea. INR concluded that, in general, “the Dutch could take care of themselves if attacked.” Rusk initialed the estimate. (Memorandum from Howells to Swank, December 8; Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–861)
6. Johnson added the following handwritten postscript: “I have just learned that WNG is presently being discussed with the Secretary in a meeting attended by Harriman and Rostow. I have also heard from the FE desk-officer that subsequent drafts of the message which he has seen are weaker than the FE draft as I expected.”