206. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0
WWR
Need for Movement on West Irian
I heartily second Bob Johnson’s plaintive memos on West Irian.1 Fortunately, we’ve just been saved from the worst consequences of our recent attempt to walk down the middle by the failure of our resolution in the UN. But time is running out; Indo preparations to force the issue by a military move will create a crisis next year.
The important thing is not to lose sight of the purpose of the exercise. Inevitably West Irian will go sooner or later to Indonesia. The only question is will it go with our help, and in such a way that we get some credit for it, or will this issue be left on a silver platter for the Bloc? All the economic and military aid we could give Sukarno would buy us far less than supporting him on this irredentist obsession. Moreover, he’s gotten Indos solidly behind him on it; even Nasution and the army back him.
[Page 470]So with the failure of our UN gambit, the time has come to take the gloves off, and adopt a frankly pro-Indonesian stance while there’s still time to get some political capital out of it. We, the Dutch, and Australians must face up to the fact that in time we’ll have to accept Indo hegemony over West Irian anyway and might as well roll with the punch. Continuation of our present policies won’t stop the inevitable; indeed it will only result in greater likelihood of losing Indonesia itself to the Bloc. With $833,000,000 in military and $600,000,000 in economic aid commitments, does anybody doubt that Bloc regards this key piece of real estate as a very choice target? Add that Aidit runs the largest and best organized free Asian CP and may well win the power struggle which will ensue upon Sukarno’s demise, and we have real cause for concern. CPI is making real hay on Irian issue. Yet we are not paying a tenth the attention to this incipient crisis in “offshore” SEA that we are to Laos, much less Vietnam.
Nor would we risk overriding complications with our allies. There are growing indications that Dutch are tiring of this hopeless issue. Their stand on self-determination is largely a product of Luns’ fanaticism. I can’t believe that Netherlands would quit NATO or otherwise cut off its nose to spite its face if we switched our policy (any more than Belgians have on Congo or even Portugal on Angola).
Australia is the real problem. Rusk was apparently swayed most recently by Spender’s passionate plea. Aussies are petrified over thought that if Indos get West Irian they’ll start on Papua next. But can’t we get across to Menzies how short-sighted Aussie policy is? West Irian or even all of this neanderthal island under Indonesian sovereignty would be an infinitely smaller threat to Australia than if Indonesia as a whole went behind the Curtain. Indeed, why shouldn’t Aussies insist on iron-clad guarantees for Papua as their price for acquiescing in West Irian switch.
US still has time before Sukarno in frustration mounts a military attack on West Irian and precipitates the crisis, or his death brings a CP bid for power. If we are to use this time wisely, however, we have to get the President personally to weigh in on State. Now that UN gambit has failed, time has come for him to press Rusk on why we shouldn’t now lean on Aussies and Dutch.
Indonesia would be worth Task Force treatment as device to overcome Foggy Bottom lethargy. What say?
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 11/21/61–11/30/61. Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Schlesinger, and Robert Johnson.↩
- The most recent was Tab B to Document 205.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩