Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, December 9, 1961, 4:06 p.m.

601. Re: West New Guinea. Dept has provided you with Presidential letter (next fol tel)¹ which we wish you give Sukarno soonest. In addition, we wish you make following points as appropriate to Sukarno as US position at time presentation letter. We have kept letter general, but believe important that reasoned oral presentation be made to Sukarno on three principal points; (a) use of force; (b) US role in UN; (c) future efforts US to facilitate solution.

A. Use of Force—You should make clear to Sukarno calmly and resolutely our unalterable and firm opposition to use of force by Indonesians.

In face strong feeling in GA in favor peaceful approach, and 53 votes in favor self-determination and UN administration, Sukarno would have little or no support in world if at this critical juncture he were to seek achieve his objectives by means of force. (FYI. Even if he had the means, which he presently does not. End FYI.) You should leave Sukarno with no doubt that use of force would undoubtedly bring UN consideration of this matter where US and preponderant majority would have no alternative but stand against Indonesia. Moreover, such action would alienate world opinion to point where present opportunities which exist for Indonesia achieve its objectives by peaceful means would be irreparably prejudiced. FYI. We do not like pressure tactics being used on us by Sukarno, and we believe you should make every effort dispel any notions he may still have that US would countenance use of force in these circumstances. End FYI.

B. US role in UN—We believe Sukarno does not fully understand or appreciate role we tried play in UN. Following for use in your discretion:

1) It not question being in favor of Dutch as against Indonesians. We were objective, not neutral. Our policy was based on assumption one critical change had occurred: a Dutch decision to get out of WNG provided this could be done in honorable way by means internationalizing problem and with some provision for exercise self-determination by Papuans. We sought facilitate withdrawal Dutch as first step, a step which we know Indonesians favor. We sought do this by side-stepping sovereignty issue, and by pinning Dutch to commitment to get out once UN administration established. This was to be done without prejudice to ultimate status of territory. We therefore actively sought way to help Indonesians, as Ambassador Stevenson indicated in NY, achieve 90 percent of what they wanted in first instance on assumption there was great likelihood that other 10 percent could be achieved by peaceful means. We believe Indonesians have seriously underestimated advantages Brazzaville res² in getting Dutch out and substituting UN administration which would provide Indonesians with all opportunity it wants to achieve its objective by peaceful means.

2) We think your conversation indicates you have made headway with Sukarno and that gap has been narrowed between parties as result UN consideration. We hope Sukarno is convinced by now that Dutch are completely serious about getting out of WNG and that UN administration, which would provide Indonesia with access to WNG, would offer opportunity achieve their objectives by peaceful means. This was purpose Brazzaville res. You should continue drive home our belief Indonesia has best chance achieve its objectives by peaceful means if it does not insist that transfer WNG from Dutch to Indonesia must be achieved in one bite. Our impression is that it primarily question finding face-saving device so Dutch can get out. Dutch can and would get out so long as a UN administration (not including Indonesia) is set up. As long as Sukarno insists Indonesia must be sole administrator there can be no acceptance by Dutch or Australians.

3) You should explore further why it is Indonesians not willing proceed on basis of UN administration which would permit Indonesians full access to territory. We fully aware that present Dutch influence in WNG is such that if self-determination were exercised in immediate future result not likely be favorable to Indonesians. However, with time and full access to territory, Indonesians should be in position exercise their influence. It seems to us that timing of exercise self-determination by Papuans could be adjusted in such way so that Indonesians would have sufficient time exercise its influence in WNG. We believe Dutch would not object WNG going to Indonesia in such circumstances.

FYI. US relations with Australia are at least as important as our relations with Indonesians or Dutch. Australians feel at least as strongly as Dutch that transfer from Dutch to Indonesia (even though cloaked with facade of sole Indonesian UN administration) would be unacceptable. End FYI.

4) We note Indonesians keep coming back to point that US should not have requested publicly in GA that Indian and Dutch reses³ not be pressed to vote. One reason why we did this was we had been told frequently by Indonesians that best result from their point view would be if no res adopted. If Indonesians had accepted our counsel, this would have been achieved without embarrassing defeat Indian res, which we and Indonesians knew well before vote would be result if Indian res pressed to vote.

C. US Role in Future—You should also point out to Sukarno we would be prepared to play behind scenes role in order help bring about amicable solution. In first instance, we prepared explore with Dutch what first steps might be feasible to this end. In this connection, we encouraged by urtel 1024 which indicated Indonesians hope that we will take initiative in bringing about bilateral talks.⁴ You can assure Sukarno that US stands fully by Bingham speech in GA.⁵

In summary you should seek to persuade Sukarno that if he does not give a signal for force on Monday, we can and will intensify our efforts with Dutch and with Australians and will hope to be able to indicate significant progress to him as these efforts proceed.

We intend inform Dutch here of dispatch Presidential letter to Sukarno, indicating reasons for its dispatch and general contents.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–961. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Harriman, Tyler, Cleveland, Emmons, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, Ball, and Battle; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, and USUN.
1. Document 210.
2. The 13-nation resolution; see footnote 2, Document 204.
3. The Indian draft resolution, U.N. doc. A/1367 (the 9-power resolution) was submitted to the General Assembly on November 20. As revised, it called for bilateral negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia under the aegis of the President of the General Assembly. The Indian resolution was voted upon on November 27, but failed to receive the required two-thirds majority. The Dutch draft resolution, U.N. doc. A/L.354, submitted on October 9, called for creation of a U.N. Commission for Netherlands New Guinea to examine the conditions in the territory, assess the opinion of the population about its future, look into the possibility of organizing a plebiscite, and inquire about the desirability and possibility of bringing the territory under U.N. authority during an interim period. It was never voted upon.
4. In telegram 1024, December 8, Jones reported that Subandrio expressed the hope that the United States take the initiative in bringing about Dutch-Indonesian bilateral talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–861)
5. The speech is printed in full in Department of State Bulletin, January 8, 1962, pp. 69–76; the portion on West New Guinea is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 961–963.