210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0
602. Please deliver following letter from President Kennedy to President Sukarno soonest. Separate cable gives instructions on points you should make orally to Sukarno at earliest appropriate time.
“December 9.
Dear Mr. President:
Ambassador Jones has promptly reported to me your discussion on December 8 on West Irian.1 I am naturally deeply concerned over the views you expressed to him.
[Page 478]I am taking the liberty of giving you my frank comments in the spirit of the very profitable discussions we have had together in Washington.
I have asked Ambassador Jones to have a further, frank and full discussion with you on this subject for I am convinced there is far from a full understanding of what we have been trying to do, in the United Nations and in private talks with your people and the Dutch, to help get West Irian off the list of dangerously unsettled international issues.
The airing of this matter in the United Nations served, as open debate so often does, to stir up some contentious issues. But the whole experience of the past few months has, in our judgment, narrowed the gap between the Dutch position and your own. Some definitive action which will result in the Dutch relinquishing their position in the territory, and give Indonesia a greatly enlarged opportunity to influence the territory’s future, now seems a wholly realistic prospect.
In these circumstances, we are quite ready to play whatever role you and the Dutch think would be useful in helping to work through this situation in a manner that accords with the principles of peaceful settlement of international disputes, a principle to which both our nations have contributed much.
Meanwhile, as a friend and one deeply interested in Indonesia maintaining her respected place in the family of nations, I most earnestly hope that you will avoid the use of force to settle the future of West Irian. All your friends will honor you for refraining from any attempt to bypass the sometimes difficult but always necessary processes of peaceful settlement, and more sympathy can then be mustered around the world for Indonesia’s position. But more than this, the use of force would make it very difficult for me to be as helpful as I would like to be in working out a satisfactory resolution of this matter.
After Ambassador Jones has had the opportunity further to explore this whole question with you, I will look forward keenly to an indication from you how we might most usefully contribute to a peaceful outcome.
Signed John F. Kennedy”.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–961. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Steeves and Cleveland; cleared by Harriman, Tyler, Ball, Emmons, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, and Battle; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, and USUN.↩
- In telegram 1018 from Djakarta, Jones reported that Sukarno had told him he was “shattered” by the U.S. abandonment of its historic position of neutrality during the U.N. General Assembly debate on West New Guinea. No denials by Jones could convince Sukarno that the United States had not abandoned its policy of neutrality. Sukarno remained adamant that the U.S. officials at the United Nations had supported the Dutch and stated that he must now consider the use of force. Since he was meeting with his military service chiefs on December 11, Sukarno stated he needed to know if the United States had any proposals before that meeting. (Ibid., 656.9813/12–861)↩