Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

168. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to Acting Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, March 28, 1959.

Dear Chris: I have been talking with our good friend, Allen Dulles, in regard to the recent reports emanating from Baghdad about Iraq.

I am concerned, and I know you are, because it looks as if Iraq is sliding behind the Iron Curtain at an increased rate.

I know that State is fully aware of the problem as is CIA. But I would like to offer the services of the Navy if there is anything that you think we could possibly do to help keep Iraq from going Communist.

I recognize that there may have been low level discussions with Nasser’s people in regard to his accommodating his future actions more closely to the United States views. Although relying upon Nasser may be taking a big chance because he is not a reliable man, yet it looks as if he has available to him the only assets which can be used quickly enough in Iraq. If this is true, then perhaps it might be possible to initiate negotiations with Nasser immediately. If the initial conversations are satisfactory to us, it might be good to offer him support in specific amounts to assist us.

Enclosed is a note which I have sent to Allen Dulles which contains the alternate suggestions of reduction in oil purchases from Iraq and the possibility of raising the prices, if bribery is more useful than reduction of Kassem’s income.¹

With warmest regards on these very busy days of yours.²

Sincerely,

Arleigh

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/3–2859. Secret; Personal.
1. In this note to Allen Dulles, also March 28, Burke emphasized the need to act quickly to “rectify the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq before it came under complete Communist domination.” Burke recommended that Western oil policy—either by threatening to not buy Iraqi oil or conversely to agree to buy more oil if Iraq limited Communist influence—could be a useful weapon.
2. Herter responded to Burke in an April 6 letter assuring him that the President had directed a thorough analysis of possible courses of action in Iraq (see Document 172), and that once the preliminary work was done in the Department of State, Herter would get together with the various agencies involved, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and consider the suggestions put forward by Burke. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Iraq)