Office of the Historian

167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq0

Washington, March 28, 1959, 2:21 p.m.

2416. Embtel 2758.1 In light Embassy’s evaluation current situation in Iraq, comments desired on following questions which we emphasize purely exploratory:

1.
Would it now be helpful to approach Qasim again re GOI attitude toward US military aid agreement, with view to possible release of remainder of military items in pipeline? We doubt such release would have noticeably constructive effect in Iraq and it would certainly have negative results on current valuable UAR anti-Communist campaign. Would also be difficult justify publicly view Iraqi withdrawal from BP.
2.
Should US now express publicly its concern re Communist threat to independence of Iraq? We think this would have negative results in Iraq, and might also inhibit UAR anti-Communist campaign. Such step however would help focus world attention on Iraq and remove any impression US complacent re present situation.
3.
Should we encourage some nation, such as Turkey or Pakistan, to send emissary to Qasim to warn against danger of letting local Communists become too powerful?
4.
Would it be helpful from our point of view in Iraq if current UAR attacks on Iraq should cease?
5.
Would Nasser’s capacity to reverse tide of events in Iraq be enhanced by any direct encouragement or assistance which we might discreetly give?
6.
Assuming we could get the UK and France to agree, would a US-UK-French threat to boycott Iraqi oil if Communist control of Iraq established be a helpful move?
7.
Would it facilitate reversal of present trend if IPC lines should be cut by UAR and remain so for considerable time? It seems to us UAR might conceivably decide to do this.
8.
Are there any measures in psychological field we could take which might be helpful?
9.
Would it be good idea for President to write Qasim in friendly terms to express desire for good relations and to warn re danger of entanglement with Communists?

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There are of course grounds for serious reservations about most if not all of above but we would like your reaction, as well as any suggestions re other measures we might take in effort to prevent further deterioration of situation.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/3–2659. Top Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Rockwell and approved by Herter.↩
  2. Document 166.↩