13. Memorandum of Discussion at the 358th Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]
2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
With respect to developments in the Near East, Mr. Dulles indicated that King Saud’s position had become critical as the result of his implication in the plot to assassinate Nasser.1 Nevertheless, Saud was such a wily individual that Mr. Dulles thought he would probably pull through. He faced many problems, however. There were still some ten thousand Egyptians in Saudi Arabia in various professions and occupations. Another problem was posed by the fact that King Saud is not in full accord with his several brothers. He therefore couldn’t even trust his own household in the present difficulties.
Developments in Saudi Arabia had made the position of Jordan and Iraq even more shaky. Mr. Dulles emphasized to the President that the situation in the Near East generally was very grave indeed from the Western point of view. It was plain that Nasser had caught the imagination of the masses throughout the entire area.
The President inquired whether, if King Saud asked for Western assistance and we responded with military forces, the situation could be stabilized.
Mr. Dulles replied that this question hinged on the applicability of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Secretary Herter commented that the Eisenhower Doctrine could be invoked if there were a finding that International Communism constituted a threat to Saudi Arabia; but such a finding would have to be made.
The President stated that even so, we simply could not stand around and do nothing and see the whole area fall into the hands of Communism. Secretary Anderson commented that, whether or not the Eisenhower Doctrine was thought to be applicable to the present situation in the Near East, the loss of Near Eastern oil to the West, particularly to Europe, would be catastrophic. He thought that perhaps we should make it clear to the world that the United States or NATO would not tolerate the prospect of the loss of Middle Eastern oil to the West. [Page 47] Secretary McElroy supported Secretary Anderson’s position, especially in view of what we might have to face in Sumatra in the near future.
General Taylor asked whether the United States should undertake to replace in Saudi Arabia the Egyptian military mission which had been withdrawn. Should we also undertake to replace other Egyptian contributions? Mr. Dulles thought that to do this would be a mistake if we acted before we had determined our whole policy approach to the area.
The President asked the State Department to get busy at once and examine with the Department of Defense just what it was that these countries wanted by way of support and assistance from the United States and what our Government ought to do next. Secretary Herter commented that we would have to find a good excuse to intervene.2
Note: The following actions, numbered 2 and 3, were separated into two actions, instead of being one action on the DCI’s briefing.
The National Security Council:3
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to developments in the Soviet ballistic missiles program; the situations in Indonesia and North Africa; the recent election in the Sudan; and recent developments in the Middle East.
3. Possible U.S. Actions in Support of Pro-Western Nations in the Near East
The National Security Council:4
Noted the President’s request that the Department of State in consultation with the Department of Defense, as a matter of urgency, explore what types of U.S. support might be given to the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia it required in the immediate future, and examine possible actions which the United States might take if requested to give such support.
Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.
[Here follows agenda item 4.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on March 14.↩
- See Document 307.↩
- On March 15 Herter sent Dulles a memorandum summarizing this briefing by Allen Dulles and relating a conversation he had after the NSC meeting with Neil McElroy, Allen Dulles, and Max Taylor. McElroy thought that “we ought to “buy into Nasser’; that we ought to try to recapture whatever remaining potential of good will that there was there and turn it to our own purposes. Allen agreed this should be studied at once.” Herter discussed this with Rountree and asked him to prepare a “fresh look at the various situations and see whether there is not something we can do.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/3–1558)↩
- The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1874, approved by the President on March 15. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩
- The following paragraph and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1875, approved by the President on March 15. (Ibid.)↩