On March 13, the National Security Council discussed the Near Eastern
situation.1 Following this meeting and a
discussion with Governor Herter,
it was considered desirable for NEA, in
consultation with CIA and Defense, to
prepare an assessment of the current situation in that area (Tab
E).2 We now
forward this assessment for your consideration and for possible
discussion with the President. Defense and CIA have concurred.
[Tab A]4
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST
1. Impact of Recent
Events
The relative calm which existed in the area just prior to the
emergence of the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation has
been rudely broken. Intra-Arab tensions and rivalries have reached a
new peak. Iraqi officials have publicly attacked the UAR, and King Saud’s name has become associated
with a plot to detach Syria from Egyptian control. Nasser has strongly attacked the
pro-Western regimes, concentrating on the Arab Federation and Saudi
Arabia, and has attempted to assert Egyptian sovereignty over a
border area long administered by the Sudan. From the latter effort
he has temporarily backed away in the face of Sudanese determination
to resist. Nasser’s constant
references to the eventual overthrow of pro-Western Arab leaders in
the area can only be interpreted as an invitation for assassination
and civil commotion. He has made some of the usual speeches about
the ultimate redemption of the Palestine homeland, but it seems
clear at this stage that his primary targets are Arabs rather than
Israel.
This conduct of Nasser’s is
the more disturbing because he is at a pinnacle of popularity. The
appeal of Arab unity has thus far served to minimize and play down
the difficulties and strains involved in the absorption of Syrian
sovereignty by Egypt. Nasser
continues to represent the answer to the prayers of many Arabs,
particularly urban elements, who have for so long suffered economic,
social, political, and psychological frustrations. There is no
pro-Western Arab leader who can begin to match his popular appeal.
It seems possible, however, that Nasser’s drive for domination will engender problems
and obstacles which will slow down this drive.
The impact of these events in the Arab countries of the area has been
strong. Israel seems to be taking them most calmly, confident in her
defense capability, and aware that so long as there is serious
internecine strife among the Arabs their ability to threaten Israel
is reduced. King Saud, one of
Nasser’s major targets,
has thus far reacted in a confused and ineffective manner, [3 lines of source text not declassified].
There is no doubt that King Saud has suffered a serious loss of prestige and
that respect for him both in the area and in his own country has
declined. The withdrawal from Saudi Arabia by Nasser of about 250 Egyptian
military advisers and technicians indicates that a patching up of
the
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Saud–Nasser quarrel will not be easily
achieved. While the loss of this technical personnel is a serious
matter for Saudi Arabia, through it Nasser is deprived of an avenue of subversion.
[2 lines of source text not declassified]
However, there is in some quarters a wait-and-see attitude toward
the Arab Federation based on hopes of economic opportunity in Iraq.
While Nasser can and is
contributing to a major internal security problem in Jordan, the
situation is at present under control and it seems clear that an
effort to overthrow the regime will, as has for some time been the
case, require something more, either: 1) the assassination of King
Hussein, or 2) a shift in
allegiance of major elements in the Jordan Army. There is, of
course, another aspect in the picture, that a breakdown of authority
in Jordan would almost inevitably cause Israel to react. Whether
this is an inhibiting factor on Nasser is not known.
Iraq has managed to maintain internal security and appears to
maintain its capabilities in this regard. At the same time,
Nuri’s return to power
served to point up to the Iraqis their isolation from the main
currents of Arab nationalism and the identification of their regime
with policies and pro-Western connections which have little popular
appeal. The possibility of Jordan’s becoming a financial burden on
Iraq has served to dim the luster of the Arab Federation. Ruling
circles in Iraq are displaying nervousness as to the future.
Lebanon is also highly nervous. Nasser’s popularity has served to accentuate
Moslem-Christian differences. Nasser’s policies have also been seized upon as a
rallying point by Lebanese politicians eager to prevent President
Chamoun’s re-election.
In the Sudan alone have pro-Western, ant-Egyptian elements made a
good popular showing. The success of Prime Minister Khalil and his Umma party at the
polls portends that the Sudan will continue to pursue a policy of
jealous safeguarding of its sovereignty from Egyptian influence.
However, Nasser’s set-back in
the Sudan seems certain to sting him to new attempts at subversion
and penetration.
2. Possibilities for the
Future
The above paints a gloomy picture so far as the outlook for
pro-Western interests is concerned. There is rampant in the area a
force of radical Arab nationalism inimical to our interests and
which the United States has limited capacity to control. The present
prospects of successful indigenous resistance to it are poor. An
analysis of present United States and Western assets in the area
does not in itself give confidence that we can hope, in the
framework of present commitments and policies, to stem the tide. The
question we face is whether the present force of Nasser can be contained until it
has been blunted by obstacles created by itself or placed in its
path, and the long-term interest of the area and
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its peoples in close relations with the
West can be reasserted. Increased efforts, both on our part, and by
our friends in the area are required, but the United States capacity
to be effective, already limited by circumstances in the area, is
further weakened by United States association with Israel and the
Western position on problems of intense interest to the Arab world,
such as Algeria.
3. Conclusions and
Recommendations
- A.
- Short Term
- 1.
- Nasser is
currently riding the crest of his popularity and is
widely identified in the area as the leader of Arab
unity and nationalism against Western
imperialism.
- 2.
- Nasser can be
expected to adopt a flexible policy when confronted by
determined local resistance.
- 3.
- It would seem unrealistic to believe we could reach a
full understanding with Nasser. However, certain of our
remaining restrictions toward the UAR, in such fields as
exports, cultural exchanges, CARE, et cetera may have outlived their
usefulness. Their gradual relaxation might have
beneficial results.
- 4.
- We must stiffen the spines of friendly countries in
the area through military and economic assistance. We
should encourage them to collaborate in resisting
Nasser’s
expansionism.
- 5.
- We should avoid at present any move which would
publicly indicate our opposition to Nasser as this would
alienate his widespread following.
- 6.
- We should avoid any use of military force unless we
were committed to such action by the Tripartite
Declaration, the Eisenhower
Doctrine, or current commitments to friendly countries
in the area.
- 7.
- While continuing to provide staunch and continuing
support to our friends in the area, we should at the
moment seek to avoid, insofar as possible, further
dramatic and overt United States intervention in defense
of a particular pro-West regime, as this has political
repercussions unfavorable to the regime in
question.
- 8.
- We should work closely with the United Kingdom where
appropriate.
- B.
- Long Term
- 1.
- Control of the Near East by radical nationalism of the
Nasser brand
would be inimical to United States interests.
- 2.
- The current success of Nasser has reduced or neutralized many
of the assets which the United States could formerly
count on in the Middle East, and the United States is
not now in a position to influence decisively, in a
manner consistent with United States interests, the
trend of
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events
in the area. At the same time Nasser is not totally
invulnerable and in his ambitions he may create future
problems for himself. We must be alert to the
possibilities of developing new assets which may reside
in such an eventuality.
- 3.
- The United States should seek to assist its friends in
the area to make the necessary adjustments from their
present conservative regimes to meet the needs of
constructive nationalism.
- 4.
- Given the situation in the area, United States policy
should seek as far as possible to avoid becoming
inextricably identified with and attached to specific
individuals.
- 5.
- United States and Western capabilities in the area are
and will continue to be greatly handicapped in their
efforts to contain radical nationalism by our
relationship with Israel and the policy differences we
have with the Arabs with respect to Algeria, Tunisia,
Buraimi, and the Gulf of Aqaba. Modification of United
States policy in the above problems, to be most
effective, should be made against a background of
internal economic and political reforms in the friendly
Near East states of a character which would generate
popular support for moderate alternatives to Nasser.
