477. Editorial Note
On March 11, British Ambassador Harold Caccia met with Under Secretary Merchant at 6:30 p.m. According to Merchant’s memorandum of their conversation, Caccia gave him a letter from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary Herter “on Cuba and the Middle East.” Merchant wrote that he made the following response to Caccia’s inquiry as to what was the U.S. Government’s basic policy toward Cuba:
“Having glanced at the letter, I replied that the Secretary would wish to give a considered answer but that in a word our policy with respect to Cuba remained one of exercising restraint. I added that this was increasingly difficult under mounting Congressional and public pressure for reprisal. One of the keys to the situation, I said, was the absence of emergence so far either within or outside Cuba of an alternative leadership which could serve as a rallying point for moderate Cuban opinion. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1160)
The letter from Lloyd to Herter has not been found. A letter of March 11 from Caccia, however, bears the following handwritten marginal note by Merchant: “Handed me by the British Ambassador, 6 [Page 846] p.m. 3/11/60. LTM”. The opening paragraph briefly mentions Cuba, but Caccia’s letter deals primarily with the Middle East. The opening paragraph reads as follows:
“The Foreign Secretary asked me to have a word with the Secretary of State on his return from Latin America about two separate topics. One is Cuba, and we have already given a copy of our Joint Intelligence Committee paper to the Caribbean officer. We are waiting for your views on this paper, and I will make our further points orally.” (ibid.)
The Joint Intelligence Committee paper has not been further identified. No reply by Herter to any letter of March 11 from Lloyd has been found, but Merchant’s reply of March 18 to Caccia’s letter is ibid. No other reference, except for Merchant’s memorandum of conversation, has been found to any letter from Lloyd to Herter.
The possibility that Merchant had erred in identifying the letter is further suggested by the absence of any reference to a March 11 letter in a letter regarding Cuba that Lloyd sent to Herter on March 17.
In this letter, which was transmitted to Herter under cover of a brief note of the same day from Hood, Lloyd thanked Herter for his February 21 letter (Document 461) and observed that he did not see “much likelihood of spontaneous action” by other Latin American governments to reverse Cuba’s drift toward the Communist bloc nor did he foresee any “serious counter revolutionary effort” in the near future. Under the circumstances, the British Government’s refusal to permit the sale of the six helicopters would reduce its “moderating influence” on the Cuban Government. Not only would such a decision have a bad effect in Great Britain, but it would stimulate criticism elsewhere that the British action was dictated by the United States. Lloyd assured Herter that if it became obvious, before the helicopters were ready for delivery, that their arrival in Cuba would “seriously complicate the situation,” the British Government would not hesitate to revoke the license. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, March 1960) In a brief reply of March 22, Herter pointed out that the United States had just revoked an export permit previously issued for two helicopters ordered many months ago. The Secretary concluded: “As you say, presumably by the time your own are ready for delivery, the situation may have changed and we will have a chance to discuss the matter again.” (ibid.)