Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

476. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, March 11, 1960, 11: 30 a.m.¹

Washington, March 11, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

I Cuban Situation—(JCS Initiative)—Briefing by Captain Cresap—J–3

Captain Cresap started his briefing by referring to the deteriorating situation in Cuba which may require the use of US armed forces and the steps which might have to be taken. He said there were about 10,000 US citizens (report from American Embassy Habana of February 29) who might have to be evacuated from that country. He said there were about 4,000 US Government employees and dependents in Cuba, 3,000 of whom were at Guantanamo and most of the remainder in Habana. There were 4,800 non-official resident Americans in Cuba, 3,500 of whom are in Habana, 700 in Oriente Province and 200 in Camaguey. In addition at any one time there are about 1,100 American tourists in the country. He pointed out that the overall responsibility for the evacuation of Americans rests with the Department of State and that normal practice is to use commercial aircraft and ships for the evacuation. In the event these facilities are not adequate or in the event armed assistance is necessary, the Department of State calls on the Department of Defense for assistance.

Insofar as Cuba is concerned, the Commander of the Caribbean Sea frontier has the responsibility for seaborne evacuation. This command is divided into two groups, the Eastern and Western. Their mission is to conduct evacuation of non-combatants, and, if necessary, to provide landing forces to protect those being evacuated. Although there are many ports in Cuba which might be used, this command anticipated large-scale evacuation only from the ports of Habana and Guantanamo. Air evacuation would be concentrated at two air fields having 7,000 plus foot runways, i.e., the airport at Guantanamo and the Jose Marti Airport in Habana.

The US base at Guantanamo was obtained by the United States under two agreements with Cuba in 1903 and 1934. Under these agreements the US leases the land for the base at $3,400 a year and the agreements can be modified only by mutual action, unless the United States unilaterally lets its base rights lapse. Guantanamo is the key link in our network of Caribbean bases, which include Panama, Roosevelt Roads and Trinidad. The basic mission of the base is to protect maritime routes in the Caribbean and the approaches to the Panama Canal. Our investment in the Guantanamo base is approximately $76 million. The most vulnerable aspect of the base is its water supply which comes from a pumping station on the Yatros River approximately four miles from the boundary of the base. Within the base there is storage for about five million gallons of water, an 8 to 10 days supply at reduced consumption. The Navy has two clean gasoline tankers which it can use for water. Each tanker has a capacity for 750,000 gallons of water. In an emergency additional tanker-type vessels could be furnished expeditiously with water being hauled from the United States itself in the first instance. Closer sources, such as Jamaica, could be developed very quickly.

The JCS has approved plans for action necessary for the support or re-establishment of a Cuban Government friendly to the United States and to protect US citizens where necessary. Under these plans it is anticipated that under one alternative forces would be used from the United States and other nations, and under another alternative US forces would be used unilaterally. The plans envisage, in one instance, that only Naval and Marine forces would be used with the Navy providing amphibious support and the Marines landing forces. Only a few hours would be necessary to implement this Navy–Marine plan. In another instance it is anticipated that all US services would provide forces with the Navy providing a task force, the Marines amphibious landing forces, and the Air Force and Army airborne forces. This plan also can go into effect within a few hours.

The plan provides for blockade if necessary. It was pointed out that this would be a very serious step because under international law a blockade is an act of belligerency. Under the blockade territorial limits would be drawn and publicity would be given these limits.

There is no point to blockading only Cuban ships in view of the limited number of these. CINCLANT would require 24 hours to implement any blockade.

The JCS are extremely concerned over the situation in Cuba. On March 1st the Chiefs submitted a plan to the Chief of Staff outlining the steps necessary to provide for a stable Government in Cuba along the following lines:

1. Document the communist timetable for the complete communization of Cuba;

2. Publicize the threat;

3. Give covert support to forces friendly to the US;

4. Provide forces to protect US nationals;

5. Consult with the OAS under the terms of the Declaration of Caracas under which Cuba would be governed under OAS auspices and if this were not possible support OAS action, such as intervention with an international police force.

At this point the briefing by Captain Cresap was concluded.

Admiral Burke said he disagreed with the briefing on one point, that in view of history over the last 30 years a blockade was not necessarily an act of belligerency. He said this theory was a pre-World War I rule which actions by the Communists and others in the intervening period had rendered invalid. He felt that blockade was a belligerent act only when the President declared it so to be. He said we could call a blockade something else, such as a “search for arms”.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that, while Admiral Burke’s observations were no doubt practical, he thought that if, for example, claims under our blockade were to be adjudicated in the ICJ, the judges in that international court would undoubtedly be guided by the international rule of a blockade being a belligerent act.

With regard to Guantanamo Mr. Merchant asked whether US forces there were sufficient to ensure the protection of the base. Admiral Burke replied that they were. Mr. Merchant asked if it were true that Guantanamo was situated in desolate country. Admiral Burke replied that it was and that the land was not arable. Mr. Merchant wondered whether this then would allow our intelligence sources to detect a Cuban military build up to attack the base before such an attack was made. Admiral Burke said that this was the case. Mr. Merchant wondered whether the vulnerability of the water source would affect the security of the base. Admiral Burke said we could haul enough water for the base’s needs.

Mr. Merchant then referred to a recent letter he had received from Admiral Burke² concerning Cuba and said he thought it was an accurate portrayal of our existing policy toward Cuba. Admiral Burke said he had just received Mr. Merchant’s reply³ to that letter, but had not had time to study it.

Admiral Burke thought that our efforts in the propaganda field toward Cuba should be increased significantly and he hoped more could be done in this field. He thought that overall our operation to combat the Cuban situation was going slowly.

Mr. Mallory agreed that operations in Cuba were going slowly. He then pointed out part of our problem was that the current valid National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)⁴ stated Cuba was not communist dominated. He said we had asked for an urgent reassessment of this Estimate which was promised for next week. He thought that if the Estimate concludes that Cuba is communist dominated we can then more realistically and effectively approach other countries on this basis and enlist more readily their support. He did not think, however, that this would prove to be the case as yet but pointed out that we should have almost weekly estimates of the situation.

Admiral Burke said that if the Cuban Government was not communist nevertheless it was still acting like a communist government. Mr. Merchant alluded to the Alsop column of today for evidence of how responsible American reporters were still not facing up to the realities of the situation.

Mr. Smith⁵ wondered at the low figures on our investment in Guantanamo ($76 million). Admiral Burke said that these figures were based on pre-inflation construction costs, that it would cost approximately $200 million to replace the existing facilities.

Admiral Burke referred to his meeting early this week with the Defense Minister of Ecuador who had pointed out that one of the basic problems in South America is that of orienting the common people to the difference between democracy and communism. The Ecuadorean official had also said something had to be done in Cuba and done quickly. Admiral Burke thought that we had not done as much as we could in describing the danger of Castro to the other South American countries.

Mr. Merchant referred to President Eisenhower’s recent trip to four South American countries and said that considerable progress had been made in exposing our views on Cuba in those countries. Mr. Merchant then said that we supply our embassies in South America with policy guidance on key issues and he wondered how our diplomatic instructions were tied in with policy guidance sent independently by Defense to the Service Attachés. Admiral Burke said that most Ambassadors kept in very close touch with the Service Attachés in this sense and that, of course, the country team concept was also applicable.

Mr. Achilles expressed the view that it would be more effective for us to concentrate with the peoples of South America on the concept of Castro as a dictator rather than Castro as a communist. Admiral Burke said it would not be easy to do this quickly. Mr. Achilles agreed but thought we ought to keep at it.

Mr. Merchant noted that the NSC was keeping the Cuban situation under constant review.

Admiral Burke repeated how disturbed he and the Chiefs were over the Cuban situation and asked that Mr. Merchant let them know what they could do about it.

General Decker, reverting to Mr. Achilles’ statement, agreed that it would take time to convince the ordinary people of South America that Castro is a dictator, that it was not easy to get universal acceptance of this fact although it should be obvious to the more educated elements.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

1. Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, March 1960. Top Secret. Drafted by Edward T. Long, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Merchant. The cover sheet, which contains a list of 29 participants from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council, indicates that the memorandum was not cleared with the Department of Defense.
2. Document 466.
3. Supra.
4. See footnote 4, Document 475.
5. Gerard Smith.