Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

461. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd¹

Washington, February 21, 1960.

Dear Selwyn: I deeply appreciate the message² you forwarded to me through Ambassador Caccia regarding the prospective sale of six unarmed British helicopters to the Cuban Navy. I know you have given this matter serious consideration and I do not want to let this opportunity pass without first expressing my gratitude for the splendid cooperation we have received from your government in controlling arms shipments to the Caribbean area, a policy which seems more important now than ever. I have in mind not only the position you have taken with respect to British export of arms and military equipment but also the numerous occasions in which you have joined with us in trying to forestall arms shipments to this area from other European supplier nations.

As you know, we are most concerned with the continuing deterioration of our relations with the Cuban Government. We feel that Mikoyan’s recent visit was a long step toward the breaking of the remaining links between the Government of Cuba and the American family of nations and presages the establishment of close working relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union. I refer not so much to the commercial agreement but rather to such things as the statement in the joint Cuban-USSR communiqué which asserted that it is “the clearly recorded interest of both governments to collaborate actively in the United Nations in favor of co-existence,... “,³ the provision for Soviet technical assistance in factory construction and the possibility of the renewal of diplomatic relations.

The Soviet Union has up to now moved with a certain caution in regard to relations with Cuba. However, I believe this to be the first of a series of steps which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is undertaking to bring Cuba into the closest kind of collaboration.

Under the circumstances, I am sure you will appreciate our concern with the shipment of any matériel which, even in minimal proportions, increases the potential of the Cuban armed forces. While I do not wish to exaggerate the security aspects of the problem, the time may come when we can no longer ignore the implications which a Soviet influenced Cuba may have for the peace and progress of the hemisphere.

In making your decision, I feel you would also wish to consider the following factors.

While it is true that the helicopters do not seem to be adapted for direct over-water flight to the Dominican Republic or Haiti, our best information is that the June expedition to overthrow the Dominican Government was escorted across the Windward Passage by a Cuban Navy vessel which vividly raises the possibility that such helicopters could and may be intended to be used by the Cuban Navy to support landings or to exploit a beachhead, especially if the current situation in the Dominican Republic deteriorates to a point where Castro is tempted to intervene. The same, of course, applies to some extent to Haiti.

More important, however, is the possibility that if the lines continue to be drawn sharply in Cuba on communism and other issues deriving from Castro’s drastic actions, there may, before too long, be a renewal of guerilla warfare in that country including, as is habitual in the Caribbean, the smuggling of arms and equipment to anti-Castro guerilla forces. In this event, it might be of some embarrassment to have helicopters supplied by any of us utilized by Castro to spot and put down these revolutionary efforts.

You may also have noted the statements made by Mr. Mikoyan in Cuba with respect to the sale of military aircraft on request to the Castro government.⁴ Should such sales materialize, we ourselves think that there would be a very adverse reaction by the United States public and Congress which, as you know, is very much concerned about the Cuban situation. If we were to appear to relax our embargo in order to compete with the Russians or if our trusted allies appeared to be turning away from us on this matter, I am afraid, in such circumstances, the subtleties with respect to range and capacities of helicopters supplied directly to the Cuban Navy would be lost so far as public reaction is concerned.

Finally, we take into account that, as a result of a resolution⁵ passed by a meeting of American Foreign Ministers which I attended in Santiago, Chile last year, the Inter-American Peace Committee is now actively engaged in a study of the tensions existing in the Caribbean area. Should the Soviet Union carry through with a sale of aircraft or other arms, it might well be that this group would have to take some cognizance of this action as contributing to these tensions and that an even stronger action by the inter-American community could conceivably result. If there were a disposition by other American Republics to condemn such Soviet action, we would, of course, consider it to our advantage to encourage this action. In this event, it would, of course, be regrettable if we or our allies could also be charged with furnishing equipment of military utility to the Cuban armed forces precisely at a time when we were working with the Inter-American Peace Committee on these matters.

I am sorry to have burdened you with such detail on a matter which, in itself, is of such relatively minor weight. It does, however, reflect our grave and deepening concern with developments in Cuba.

Once more, let me express my graditude for the close cooperation and sympathetic understanding you have extended to us in the matter of our Caribbean arms policy.

With warmest personal regards.

Most sincerely,

Chris⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5622/2–2160. Confidential. Transmitted to London in telegram 6314 to London, which is the source text.
2. In Lloyd’s message of February 15, he mentioned the British Government’s interest in selling six helicopters to the Cuban Navy and its belief that the helicopters did not come within the scope of the embargo on exporting arms to the Caribbean. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Cuba)
3. Ellipsis in the source text.
4. Apparently the same statements referred to in Document 456.
5. For text of this resolution, Resolution IV, adopted at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the American States, Santiago, August 18, 1959, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 364–365.
6. Telegram 6314 bears this typed signature.