478. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State 1

2370. Argentine Ambassador Julio Amoedo informed me March 11 he was suggesting to some Latin American colleagues that they make point of mentioning to Foreign Minister Roa their concern at Cuba-US tension. I expressed interest and requested he keep me informed.

Last night Amoedo came to my house following long conversation he said he had just had with Roa and with presidential secretary Luis Buch. [2 sentences (7 lines) not declassified] (Amoedo said he pointed out to Roa recent conciliatory press statements by Herter.) Roa had accurately described to Argentine Ambassador meeting to which he summoned me on March 8 and had said that Castro had specifically directed that I be treated with courtesy and restraint since “American Chargé has done nothing personally to add fuel to flames”. Amoedo said he had urged Roa to send us GOC’s suggested agenda for discussions and believes we should show conciliatory spirit by accepting GOC assurances that no accusation intended against Ambassador Bonsal. Amoedo willing as before to help promote a friendly settlement and still sees himself in possible role of mediator. I told Argentine Ambassador that in my judgment Cuban agreement with Soviet Union and recent charge of US complicity in ship explosion had introduced new elements in situation and that I would have to consult Department as to whether we wished actively to seek a reconciliation. I said it my impression we were now considering our Cuban policy more in light of its effect rest of Latin America than Cuba itself. [2 sentences (5 lines) not declassified] Amoedo believes temporary rapprochement feasible, however, and that Latin America would want us not to leave any possibility for friendly settlement unexplored. For US to be “victim” of Cuba’s excesses and abuse was best way he thought to overcome Latin American predisposition to side with weak American republic against powerful US. Amoedo very definite that to modify our policy of patience and restraint now in favor of tough policy would be tactical error.

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Department’s thinking on subjects herein discussed would be appreciated.2 One advantage of conciliatory course even if very transitory would be that it would facilitate Bonsal’s return.

Braddock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–1460. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Buenos Aires.
  2. No direct reply by the Department has been found, but telegram 1359, infra , constitutes a partial answer.