Because of my concern, I am taking the liberty of sending you the
attached paper as indicative of current Navy thinking in this matter,
—namely that positive action to reverse the present trend should be
initiated to the end that the communist threat is eliminated and a
stable, friendly government established in Cuba. Action taken now in the
case of Cuba will also facilitate and provide a foundation for any
similar actions which may be necessary to prevent the spread of
communism in Latin America and to stabilize other areas where unrest is
appearing.
I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to
Jack Irwin.
Enclosure
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. ACTION IN CUBA2
Introduction
1. The Castro Movement in Cuba
is a vehicle by which international communism appears to be gaining
a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. If the present trend
continues, it will soon be too late for the United States to stem
the Soviet incursion into this hemisphere. This situation, in its
many ramifications, presents an immediate threat to the security of
the United States and to that of our important neighbors in North
and South America.
Problem
2. What action can be taken to prevent the establishment of a
communist state in Cuba and to restore a stable, friendly
government?
Background
3. The U.S. has never renounced the Monroe Doctrine. This was
reaffirmed by Secretary of State Dulles in his address to the Nation on July 12,
1954,3 on International Communism in Guatemala. In
that address, Mr. Dulles
stated:
[Page 815]
“For several years international communism has been probing
here and there for resting places in the Americas. It
finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into
an official base from which to breed subversion which would
extend to other American Republics.”
“This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct
challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most
fundamental of our foreign policies.”
The United States is bound by treaties which commit it to seek
settlement of hemispheric disputes by peaceful means, but which also
provide for action in the event of aggression either from outside
the hemisphere or within. Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, 1947,4 requires each
contracting party to send to the Security Council of the UN complete information “concerning the
activities undertaken...5 for the purpose of maintaining
Inter-American peace and security.”
Article 6 of this treaty states:
“If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or
the sovereignty or political independence of any American
State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack... or by any other
fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America,
the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to
agree on ... the measures which should be taken for the
common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and
security of the Continent.”
The Declaration adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at
Caracas, Venezuela, March 1954,6 states:
“That the domination or control of the political institutions
of any American State by the international communist
movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system
of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to
the sovereignty and political independence of the American
States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for
the meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of
appropriate action in accordance with existing
treaties.”
The 26th of July Movement succeeded in displacing Batista on 1 Jan 1959. Since that
time the Castro regime has
followed increasingly the classic strategy for establishing a
communist state. The communist time table is delineated in American
Embassy Havana Dispatch No. 903 dated 29 December 1959.7 The ruthless elimination of the opposition,
[Page 816]
assumption of
dictatorial powers, suspension of elections, the “Hate America”
campaign, the studied breakdown of the economy and confiscation of
property, the initiation of relations and trade with the Soviet
Union, the forbidding of anti-communist activity and the breakdown
and reconstitution of the Armed Services and police are all typical
communist maneuvers.
The majority of the Cubans are not yet committed to the acceptance of
communism nor are they aware of the trend of the Revolution in this
direction. The lower classes, however, continue to give full support
to Castro and the
Revolution.
It has not yet been proved that Castro himself is a communist.
However, some of his principal deputies as well as other leaders are
believed to be communists. In any case, individuals susceptible to
communist influence are occupying key positions in the government as
well as in all important organizations and trade unions. Two
developments are noticeable. Communists are being appointed openly
and are being elected (in trade unions) to key positions. Hidden
communists in the 26th of July Movement are taking positions in
seeming opposition to the open communists.
At present the Cuban Armed Forces are disorganized and apparently
capable only of guerrilla warfare. Intelligence reports indicate
that the Soviet Bloc may be supplying technicians to assist in
training the new forces and supplying arms to the new government.
There is no present indication that the fall of the Castro Government is imminent. If
it should fall, however, the government would most probably emerge
as a communist government because opposition leaders have been
eliminated and there appear to be no leaders of stature remaining
around whom anti-Castro/anti-Communist peoples could rally. Should
Castro fall or be
assassinated, mob action which would probably result would
jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba. Finally, in the worst
extreme, the possibility of direct support for Cuba by the Soviet
Bloc, even to the extent of an open mutual security agreement,
cannot be disregarded.
Discussion
4. Three basic courses of action are open to the U.S.
- A.
- Multilateral Action through the OAS.
- B.
- Unilateral Overt Action by the U.S.
- C.
- Covert Unilateral Action by the U.S.
[Page 817]
All subsidiary actions, such as economic pressure and moral suasion,
which will assist in achieving the objective should also be taken in
addition to the above.
- A.
-
Multilateral Action Through The OAS.
The machinery exists in the declaration and agreements of the
OAS for the U.S. to
request convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the
OAS with subsequent
investigation of the government in Cuba, and, if approval of
the member states is obtained, intervention to prevent a
communist take-over.
- (1)
- Advantages:
- (a)
- It would be in consonance with our national
policy and our treaty commitments under the OAS.
- (b)
- It would strengthen the OAS and would reassure
the Free World and the Latin American States of
U.S. willingness to live up to commitments.
- (2)
- Disadvantages:
- (a)
- Uncertainty of support for OAS action by other Latin
American States.
- (b)
- Delay in OAS
action could result in a communist controlled
front government being a “fait accompli” in
Cuba.
- (c)
- Could result in the entire problem ending in
the Security Council of the UN where the Soviet Union has a
veto.
- B.
-
Unilateral Overt Action By
the U. S.
The U.S. has the capability to seize Cuba by
direct military action, and after a consolidation
period, cause the establishment of a friendly,
non-communist government.
- (1)
- Advantages:
- (a)
- It would be in consonance with the Monroe
Doctrine, which is still basic U.S. policy with
respect to the Western Hemisphere, and would solve
the problem.
- (b)
- It would serve notice to the world that the
U.S. will not tolerate the establishment of a
communist or communist “front” regime in the
Western Hemisphere.
- (c)
- It would re-emphasize to the world that the
U.S. will not hesitate to act when its security is
at stake.
- (d)
- It would dispel any illusions by the world
at large that the U.S. is unwilling and unable to
act no matter what the provocation. It would also
probably stop the “baiting of the U.S.” in which
some minor powers throughout the world
indulge.
- (2)
- Disadvantages:
- (a)
- It would violate our OAS commitments to seek settlement by
peaceful means.
- (b)
- It would lead to charges of aggression
against the U.S., both in the OAS and in the United
Nations, with the resulting possibility of UN and OAS action against the
U.S.
- (c)
- It would prove that the U.S. is not willing
to abide by its treaties if U.S. interests dictate
otherwise.
- (d)
- It could isolate the U.S. from the other
American States.
- (e)
- It would violate the principle of
non-intervention.
- C.
-
Covert Unilateral Action by
the U.S.
The U.S. could assist rebel groups covertly to
overthrow the present government and re-establish
a friendly government. Concurrently, it could take
all possible measures to alert all friendly
nations and the U.S. people and branches of the
U.S. Government to the danger of the threat in
order to discredit Cuba and bring world opinion to
the side of the U.S.
- (1)
- Advantages:
- (a)
- U.S. would not be charged with
aggression.
- (b)
- If carried out successfully, Free World and
Latin American opinion would be favorable to the
U.S.
- (2)
- Disadvantages:
- (a)
- There is no certainty of success.
- (b)
- The effort might well come too late.
In considering and comparing the above courses of action, the basic
assumption that the United States cannot and must not permit within
the Western Hemisphere the establishment of any government dominated
by the International Communists is paramount. Therefore, if other
courses of action fail, the U.S. must, even in the face of adverse
world opinion, take unilateral action to prevent such an
occurrence.
Until the situation reaches the stage where direct unilateral action
by the U.S. is the only means left, it appears that a combination of
those parts of courses of action A and C which have a fair chance of
success should be followed in order to utilize the prime advantage
given under A, i.e., the cooperation and good will of the other
American States.
Conclusions
5. The following conclusions are reached:
- a.
- The establishment of a Communist government, or a “front”
government following communist precepts, in Cuba would be a
direct threat to the security of the U.S. and would endanger
hemispheric security.
- b.
- The U.S. should initiate positive action to eliminate the
threat before a communist or “front” government in Cuba is a
“fait accompli.”
- c.
- Although the revolution still has the support of the
masses, the resulting government in Cuba is following the
path of international communism. Although they are not yet
aware of the trend toward communism, Castro has the personal
loyalty of the masses.
- d.
- American holdings are being confiscated. American lives
may be endangered if stable, responsible government is not
ensured.
- e.
- The Monroe Doctrine is still basic U.S. policy with
respect to the Western Hemisphere.
- f.
- Procedure exists under the Declaration of Caracas to
request action by the OAS
against a Communist threat to hemispheric security.
- g.
- The U.S. should proceed to document the extent of
infiltration of communists into key positions in Cuba and
the extent of extra-Western Hemispheric Communist support of
the present Cuban regime.
- h.
- The U.S. should initiate a campaign to apprise all U.S.
agencies, the U.S. public, and the other American States of
the threat in order to gain support for any future action
that may be taken.
- i.
- The U.S. should covertly support the Cuban
opposition.
- j.
- The U.S. after having gained the required support, should
present its case before the OAS in order that joint action by the members
of the OAS may be taken to
eliminate the communist threat and establish a friendly,
stable government in Cuba.
- k.
- The U.S., as a last resort, should take unilateral
military action to eliminate the threat.
Recommendations
6. To accomplish the above, the following plan of action is
recommended:
- a.
- Immediately document the communist time table and the
communist take-over in Cuba.
- b.
- Use all resources and media to make the U.S. and the other
American States aware of the threat. The following should be
utilized to accomplish this:
- (1)
- Intelligence briefings of:
- (a)
- U.S. Government officials.
- (b)
- Newspaper representatives and
editors.
- (c)
- U.S. businessmen operating abroad and going
abroad.
- (d)
- The IADB
members and Latin American diplomatic personnel
and military attachés.
- (e)
- The Catholic Church (possibly through the
Apostolic Delegate).
- (f)
- Church groups operating in Latin
America.
- (g)
- Latin American officials visiting the U.S.
and U.S. installations.
- (2)
- Orientation of radio broadcasts and news reports,
both government and private.
- (3)
- The U.S. Information Service.
- (4)
- All country teams.
- c.
- Covertly support the Cuban opposition. Select and groom
trusted Cubans as appropriate to assume responsible posts in
a friendly government.
- d.
- Be prepared to use force to safeguard and evacuate U.S.
Nationals should the situation deteriorate to the point
where they are endangered.
- e.
- When support has been gained, request, in conjunction with
other members of the OAS,
convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS under the terms of the
Declaration of Caracas to:
- (1)
- Seek OAS action to
call on Cuba to place herself under OAS auspices “in order to
preserve the revolution for the people and prevent
communist take-over,” and;
- (2)
- Seek OAS action to
intervene by force in the event the above fails,
and;
- (3)
- In whatever joint group is formed to accomplish
the above, keep U.S. participation to a minimum in
order to force the Latin American States to assume
their responsibilities to the Hemisphere and to
counter accusations of U.S. imperialism.
- f.
- In the event time does not permit completion of the above,
or as a last resort, be prepared to take unilateral military
action to establish a non-communist government in
Cuba.
