Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

475. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)¹

Washington, March 10, 1960.

Dear Arleigh: I was much interested in your personal letter of February 26, 1960² on Cuba and the Caribbean situation, in which I noted a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve this result.

As you are doubtless aware from the briefing which Dick Rubottom and I gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 8, 1960,³ most of the courses of action suggested in the memorandum headed “Recommendations for U.S. Actions in Cuba” which you transmitted with your letter were initiated some time ago and are constantly being intensified. To recapitulate, our own thinking on the Cuban situation as it relates to Communism and our own security interest has been as follows:

a. The maximum objective of International Communism—in the immediate future—is the consolidation of a radical, anti-American Revolution friendly to the USSR in Cuba and the utilization of Cuba as a base to promote similar revolutionary movements in the Caribbean. The minimum objective of the Communists, if they are unable to achieve the foregoing, is to make the United States pay as high price as possible for the elimination of the undesirable features of the Cuban Revolution. In particular, the Communists stand to gain by provoking us into armed intervention, or otherwise taking interventionist actions in violation of our commitments in a manner which could be made to appear as if the United States reacted the same way as the Soviets did in Hungary and other satellites.

b. Unless we were indefinitely to occupy Cuba militarily, the only solution to the Cuban problem is necessarily the emergence of a Cuban leadership willing to and capable of governing the country along lines acceptable to the Cuban people and along lines consistent with basic U.S. policy with respect to Latin America. This will take time. On the one hand, it is doubtful that any Cuban Government which resulted from U.S. armed or other overt intervention could long survive our withdrawal. On the other, despite our own long-standing misgivings concerning Castro, it is an inescapable fact that he came into power with overwhelming support not only in Cuba but elsewhere in the hemisphere, including in this country. Although that support has largely evaporated in the United States—and, to a lesser extent, in responsible circles in the other Latin American Republics—Castro and, particularly, his reform program still enjoy very considerable support in his country. Cubans, even those disillusioned with Castro, have yet to find an alternative leadership which they believe would actually carry out the reform measures which public opinion still demands. Opposition elements tainted with collaboration with the Batista regime are still politically unacceptable and could not establish a stable government. Opposition groups that might be acceptable to Cubans are beginning to organize more effectively but, at best, it will be months before they are ready for vigorous action.

c. The primary objective of U.S. policy should be the acceleration of the creation of an effective, patriotic movement friendly to the United States within Cuba and among Cuban exiles to counter Cuba’s current trend. The first task is to assure, insofar as we are able to do so, a climate in which responsible and friendly Cubans would find it worthwhile to oppose Castro policies which help the Communists and undermine good U.S.-Cuban relations. On the positive side, we should and are taking actions and making statements which would encourage such elements to organize more effectively and to expect our support and collaboration in their efforts to achieve political and economic progress for Cuba by taking a different road than the present Cuban regime’s. At the JCS briefing, we gave an indication of the covert activities underway towards this end, as well as an indication of the extensive unattributed effort which has been underway for over a year to identify and expose to public opinion throughout the hemisphere the Communist aspects of the Cuban problem. On the negative side, our policies are guided by the principle that opposition to Castro’s policies in Cuba will increase fairly rapidly if it is clear to Cubans that Castro himself is responsible for political and economic deterioration of the country. However, the consolidation of the opposition will be slowed down it Castro can succeed by wrapping the flag of patriotism and nationalism about himself in further convincing the Cuban people that the United States has aggressive designs on the Cuban nation as a whole and that the United States rather than Castro’s policies is responsible for Cuba’s difficulties. We must, therefore, exercise the greatest care that we do not unnecessarily transform the developing dissatisfaction of the Cuban people with Castro into a fight between the United States and Cuba, for no self-respecting Cuban could then afford to support us against his own country.

d. While we believe that inter-American action through the OAS and/or some economic action by the United States in defense of its rights may play an important role at the proper time, we must not let these possibilities cause us to lose sight of the critical fact that no solution will be possible until an alternative leadership is ready to move in. If the application of collective or unilateral pressures should bring the Castro Government down before an acceptable leadership is ready to take over, the probabilities are civil war or a take-over by even more Communistic elements. Either would bring us closer to armed intervention. Thus, while we are going ahead in the process of influencing the other American Republics to see the Communist and other aspects of the Cuban situation as we do and preparing the ground for possible Inter-American consideration of the Cuban problem, we intend to control the timing of any such meeting insofar as possible to coincide with the development 01 an alternative leadership, It is also the intention of the Administration to propose to the Congress that the President be given discretionary authority to alter sugar quotas in the national interest and we have developed and are putting into effect an action plan to obtain the release of the United States from certain other economic commitments which impair our ability to take action in the economic field when this could contribute to safeguarding our interest or to the creation of conditions favorable to a leadership opposed to Castro’s policies.

With respect to all these matters, a most important element is time. Time is needed for Cubans to realize that the deterioration of their political and economic life is due to Castro’s excesses, including his connections with International Communism. Time is needed for an alternative leadership to emerge and to organize effectively for action. Time is also needed further to awaken Latin American opinion to the dangers of the situation and for Latin American Governments to come around more to the point of view that the Cuban situation is a matter of common concern, not just a U.S-Castro quarrel. We are using all available facilities to make this time as short as possible, but our experience in other difficult situations in the Near East and Central America indicate that immediate results are not to be expected. Meantime, we are going to have, we believe, to exercise restraint from taking actions which, while reflecting our own great sense of concern and urgency, would actually retard the process of change which we all desire.

I should point out also that, while action in the OAS at the right time may be desirable as a means of encouraging an alternative Cuban leadership, we would probably have to contend with Soviets in the United Nations. It is almost certain that the Cubans will try to anticipate or counter any U.S. approach to the OAS by going directly to the United Nations. Furthermore, actual “enforcement action” by the OAS would probably be brought up before the United Nations under Article 53 of the UN Charter even if we argued that any action taken by the OAS constituted only “recommendations” to governments. This reinforces our view that action in the OAS—which can be taken under the Charter by convoking a meeting of Foreign Ministers, as well as under the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Resolution—should primarily be viewed as a means of strengthening Cuban opposition to Castro’s policies at the right moment rather than as a means of quarantining Cuba and waiting to see what happens. It would at present be somewhat difficult to bring a case against Cuba under the Caracas Resolution since the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate⁴—which we have asked to be reviewed—does not find the Cuban Government to be Communist-dominated at present. If our own Estimate does not yet substantiate the case, it would be difficult in a short time to persuade less well informed governments that “the political institutions” of Cuba are under International Communist control or domination.

As you are aware, our basic national policy (NSC 5902/1)⁵ views armed intervention as a last resort to be approved by the President when all else fails. We would be most reluctant to make or concur in such recommendation to the President until there had been a reasonable chance for all other solutions to be tested.

Thank you again for sending me a copy of your memorandum. As you know, the NSC is keeping the Cuban problem under constant scrutiny, having discussed it in some detail at its January 14 meeting and again this morning.⁶ At the first of the meetings, the Secretary of State reviewed the policy toward Cuba which has been approved by the President, and the consensus of this morning’s meeting was that this policy is essentially correct. We anticipate that, at future meetings of the NSC, there will be further discussions concerning Cuba to determine whether there should be a modification of policy toward that country. In view of the fact that today’s NSC meeting indicated continued agreement on the validity of the policy discussed in January, it would appear unnecessary to develop new policy documentation at this time, especially as the proposals in your Navy memorandum closely parallel policies which are already underway. Should you, or your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, desire a further briefing on our actions and operational plans to carry out the policy, I should be more than glad to arrange it.⁷

Sincerely,

Livingston T. Merchant⁸

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by Hill and cleared with Mallory and Gerard Smith.
2. Document 466.
3. See Document 419.
4. SNIE 80/1–59, “The Situation in the Caribbean Through 1960,” December 29, 1959; text is scheduled for publication in volume V.
5. NSC 5902/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” February 16, 1959, is scheduled for publication ibid.
6. See Document 423 and supra.

7. This final paragraph had been substantially revised by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at Merchant’s request. It had been initially drafted by Gerard Smith in a memorandum of March 8 to Rubottom as follows:

   “If the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not satisfied with present policy, I suggest that the Secretary of State advise the Chairman of the JCS that he would be glad to review this policy and its present implementation with the Chairman of the JCS at a meeting with the President—in view of the fact that the policy has received Presidential approval and in view of the fact that the policy very recently was reviewed by the Secretary of State at the National Security Council (January 14, 1960).” (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961)

   According to a memorandum of March 10 from Frank Mau (S/S–RO) to Gerald Lamberty (ARA), Merchant preferred that ARA draft a new concluding paragraph along the following lines:

   “Thank you again for sending me a copy of your memorandum. I think that the NSC should keep the situation in Cuba continuously under scrutiny to ensure that our policies are appropriate. Your memorandum, which I understand has now been approved by the JCS, together with my comments on it should, I think, be useful in preparing for such discussions.” (ibid., Central Files, 737. 00/3–1060)

8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.