Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

257. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 4, 1960—2 p.m.

1151. Some three weeks after coup, following are my evaluation and recommendations:

On surface life has returned to normal, Viet Cong activities appear to have diminished somewhat, although this could be lull before storm; Diem has not adopted vengeful attitude against rebels, although certain others have sought take advantage of situation for “settlement of accounts” and some of “people’s” actions against rebels’ families, newspapers, et cetera, were unfortunate; Diem has taken some steps recommended by us in military field, i.e., partially placed Civil Guard under defense (this being clarified); is reportedly working on plan to set up what we hope will be effective operations commands, including reorganization and streamlining of field headquarters which we hope will be allowed to operate through firm chain-of-command; Diem, Nhu and Thuan have told us they working on other reforms, i.e., election youth representatives to village councils, eventual implementation elective representatives to National Economic Council, plan for periodic “fireside chats,” promised reorganization of the cabinet structure, and other unspecified moves which Thuan promised would be worked out by Christmas. It is hoped that these reforms are not just reforms on surface with little or no substance. Despite these signs, there is basically quite serious undercurrent malaise and skepticism whether effective reforms will be taken soon enough. This uneasy feeling not confined to intellectuals or opposition groups; but to sizeable number of others, i.e., cabinet Ministers, other loyal officials, deputies and some military. Nhu and Thuan have indicated that Diem, who not particularly interested fundamental political matters, is resisting some suggested basic reforms.

Nhu and Diem still deeply rankled particularly by critical American press stories about autocratic regime and entourage, and Diem made the ridiculous statement to Ladejinsky November 30th that he believes some Americans may have backed coup because one of coup leaders. Colonel Dong, “told him so during negotiations.” This may represent rationalization blame others not selves. Diem probably drawing on his “miracle theory” refuses admit rebels could have captured or killed him if they had followed through initial advantage (General Khanh told me 3rd after first rebel attack morning 11th there were only 30 defenders in Palace which could have been easily taken) and both Nhu and Diem now expressing deep displeasure because “Americans equated Diem regime with rebels because both anti-Communists and therefore we urged both sides negotiate. While under circumstances their attitude understandable, we have made point clear to them that we did all in our: power to prevent bloodshed and urge rebels when they had power to oust Diem that he should be given active role in any government established. While hothead Can Lao party members who organized committee against Communist colonialists have been calmed down somewhat, this element could regain momentum and cause further trouble if unleashed again by GVN.

Just below surface there is much talk about another coup unless Diem relaxes some controls, puts in effective reforms, takes more effective action to fight VC and give protection to population. There is still strong under current of resentment against entourage but because any action he took this score would be under pressure and indicate weakness, and particularly his resentment of press stories about entourage, coupled with fact Diem feels he needs Nhu as loyal adviser, prospects Diem will transfer Nhu to other work or abroad not in sight, at least for some time. Despite this malaise and feeling about entourage, most critics still respect Diem as only leader at moment but this feeling could easily change² unless he takes fairly drastic action to meet criticism and basic desires most strata population.

We believe also that unless Diem takes early effective action on political front, coup has increased chances for development neutralism and for anti-Americanism among those critical of GVN. Despite our close identification with Diem and his regime critics have not to date bracketed us with government in expressing their dissatisfaction. Many have told us however those only we can induce Diem adopt changes which will save his regime, thus indicating they look to us to help them. If, after failure of clearly anti-Communist coup attempt to bring about changes we are not successful in inducing Diem to make peaceful changes, critics may well become frustrated, turn against U.S., seek other means bring about change and might even move toward neutralist position in middle. If Viet Cong guerrilla successes in countryside continue at rate registered during past year, this will also increase frustration of armed forces and population and could provide soil in which neutralism may grow.

Recommendations:³

1. We must continue urge effective integrated programs soonest in political, social, economic including needed fiscal reforms, and military fields. Since Diem and others assure us they working on reforms we should not at moment press too hard.

2. We should continue urge other foreigners, particularly Asians, to urge Diem take above steps.

3. We should continue urge Diem, Nhu and others to change their attitude regarding foreign as well as local press and take effective steps to have better public relations internally as well as abroad and implement an effective country-wide psywar program.

4. If necessary, do all we possibly can to prevent hotheads from trying gain upper hand and going in for vengeance against rebels and adopting ultra-nationalistic attitude.

5. Take appropriate opportunities urge Diem and others adopt at least most important suggestions contained in my démarche to him Oct 14th.

6. Do all we can get Diem to accept basic principles suggested in MAAG counter-insurgency plan, which will be forwarded soonest (some parts of plan which within U.S. agreed policy directives have been urged on GVN with some success).

7. Clarify inconsistencies in transfer Civil Guard to DOD in order that MAAG may start training on large scale soonest and make MAP equipment available.

8. Since Diem believes we do not understand seriousness of VC threat and he suspects we may have encouraged rebels, we should make arrangements immediately to ship six H–34 helicopters which are not only most urgently needed fight VC effectively but would reassure Diem we trying give effective help.

9. ⁴ Since it far from certain Diem will introduce sufficiently appealing and effective new programs and use his present security forces in most efficacious manner, we must find suitable means to bring pressure on him. As I outlined in Embtel 1105⁵ as well as in memorandum this subject (Letter to Parsons Nov 8⁶) I am convinced, even if we eventually should agree, that we should not now accord his request for 20,000 additional force or concur in his unilateral action to raise force level (Chief MAAG 1537 Dec 1⁷—copy JCS). To do so without his having relaxed controls, instituted effective reforms and having permitted efficient use present forces, would not save the day for Diem but might even induce him follow his instinct to rely primarily on use of force both to control population and fight VC. While I am not fully convinced need for extra 20,000 men, I would be willing to concur in such addition if careful study by all concerned concurred in this recommendation. (MAAG views on urgent need for 20,000 increase forwarded Parsons my letter Nov 30th⁸) therefore, suggested this matter be carefully studied Washington and if final recommendation is favorable it be kept secret as ace in the hole to grant Diem provided he has taken other necessary steps which are to me much more fundamental, and provided he needs extra force after taking more essential steps. If, for instance, at the beginning next year he has taken effective steps along lines suggested above and it is still considered he needs increased force level we could so inform him then. But in meantime, in view his threat to raise force level unilaterally, I should be instructed soonest to take suitable opportunity to state while force level increase is under consideration Washington cannot now see its way clear to grant such increase when other more important steps are essential at present in fight against VC and to make further progress Viet-Nam.

10. In summary, situation in Viet-Nam is highly dangerous to US interests. Communists are engaged in large-scale guerrilla effort to take over countryside and oust Diem’s government. Their activities have steadily increased in intensity throughout this year. In addition Diem is faced with widespread popular dissatisfaction with his government’s inability to stem the Communist tide and its own heavy-handed methods of operation. It seems clear that if he is to remain in power he must meet these two challenges by improvements in his methods of conducting war against Communists and in vigorous action to build greater popular support. We should help and encourage him to take effective action. Should he not do so, we may well be forced, in not too distant future, to undertake difficult task of identifying and supporting alternate leadership.

This is not for discussion with foreign governments.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12–460. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to London, Paris, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Canberra, and CINCPAC PolAd. Printed also in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1334–1339.
2. At this point a marginal note in an unidentified hand reads: “What proof.”
3. In the margin next to each of the first eight in an unidentified hand is the notation “O.K.”
4. In the margin next to recommendation 9 in the same hand is the note: “Reply in draft.”
5. Document 247.
6. Document 214.
7. Not printed.
8. Document 253.